

Is Deliberation an Antidote to Extreme Partisan Polarization? Reflections on “America in One Room”¹

James Fishkin, Stanford University

Alice Siu, Stanford University

Larry Diamond, Stanford University

Norman Bradburn, NORC at the University of Chicago

¹ Paper presented at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 2020 (online).

Abstract

This paper is positioned at the intersection of two literatures: partisan polarization and deliberative democracy. It analyzes results from a national field experiment in which more than 500 registered voters were brought together from around the country to deliberate in depth over a long weekend on five major issues facing the country. A pre-post control group was also asked the same questions. The deliberators showed large, de-polarizing changes in their policy attitudes and large decreases in affective polarization. The paper develops the rationale for hypotheses explaining these decreases and contrasts them with a literature which would have expected the opposite. The paper briefly concludes with a discussion of how elements of this “antidote” can be scaled.

Is Deliberation an Antidote to Extreme Partisan Polarization? Reflections on “America in One Room”²

This paper stands at the intersection of two empirical literatures—on partisan polarization and on democratic deliberation—that have not had much connection with one another. If readers find some of the results surprising, the authors have had the same reaction. Our task in this paper is to offer an account of these results and an approach to explaining them.

Extreme Partisan Polarization

The U.S. is deeply divided along partisan lines. If representatives stray from the party line on any salient issues, they are pressured at the elite level by the party “whips” and threatened at the mass level by activists with being “primaried” (Boatright 2014). At the mass level, scholars debate whether polarization on issues has been increasing (Fiorina 2009, Fiorina 2017; Abramowitz 2013, 2018;

² We would especially like to thank Henry Elkus and Sam Feinburg of Helena for their vision in supporting this project. Michael Dennis and his superb team at NORC were essential. We would also like to thank all the members of the Advisory Committee for their comments and advice. See <https://helena.org/projects/america-in-one-room>. Bruce Ackerman was especially noteworthy in helping to conceptualize the initial work. Dan Werner of “By the People Productions” played an essential role in executing the project.

Hopkins and Sides 2015; Campbell 2016), but on some salient issues, divisions along party lines seem intractable. Further, there is clear evidence that affective polarization has increased at the mass level and this gap in affect reinforces the divisions on substance (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes 2012; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018; Iyengar et al 2019).

On at least some issues that deeply divide Americans, the lock-step choreography of party elites and mobilizable voters (undoubtedly with causal arrows in both directions—see Jacobs and Shapiro 2000 and Lenz 2012) leads to policy deadlock. The continuing stasis on many issues potentially endangers both process and outcome legitimacy (Arnesen 2017).

The divisions are both substantive and affective. Social sorting has accompanied the political sorting of the two major parties, probably increasing the affective gap between them (Mason 2014). Our division into competing political tribes has led to a tribalism of social separation. This, in turn, reinforces political polarization at the mass level and stalemate among policy elites. Affective polarization intensifies political distrust which further fuels the deadlock (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Thus, we investigate both the substantive differences on specific policies and affective polarization as measured by feeling thermometer ratings (see Iyengar et al 2019 for an overview).

Empirical Study of Public Deliberation

Over the last three decades a large literature on “deliberative democracy” has developed, both in normative theory and in empirical social science (for a comprehensive compendium see Bachtiger et al 2018). The root of the word “deliberation” is “weighing.” The basic idea is that people should make reasoned choices after weighing the arguments on each side of an issue. The choice could be a proposal before a legislature, or before the mass public in an election or a referendum, or just an issue that is worth consulting the public about, even if there is not any immediate likelihood of a decision.

Broadly sketched, the focus of deliberative democracy work has moved increasingly from policy elites (including elected representatives) to the mass public and from normative theory to the empirical study of deliberation (or the lack of it) by the mass public. While most of the applications were initially in the US and other western democracies, the dialogue and debate has engaged many countries, including developing countries (Chirawurah et al 2019 and some authoritarian ones. (He and Warren 2011; He 2019)

According to some theories of democracy, elected representatives are supposed to deliberate on the merits, regardless of party. (Burke 1774; Bessette 1994). But party discipline gives representatives little opportunity to do so. Further, the prime incentive for elected representatives is to win re-election. They tend to be more interested in winning the election than in winning the argument on the merits.

How about members of the mass public? There is a great deal of evidence that most citizens, most of the time, are not well informed about complex policy or even constitutional issues. Such generalizations appear to hold, not only for the US but for most modern, large-scale democracies (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, pp. 89-92). There is likely some explanatory power in Anthony Downs's insight that most citizens in mass society have incentives for "rational ignorance" (Downs, 1957). If I have one vote, or one voice, in millions, it is unlikely to make a difference, so why pay attention to the complexities of most public issues? Perhaps as a by-product of other activities, individuals can pick up impressions of important information and draw inferences from them (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994), but most people will not have the time to consider the issues in depth. Much the same argument applies to deliberation: If I do not have an effective incentive to acquire information about an issue, I will not want to spend time weighing the competing arguments that apply to that issue. Rational ignorance and rational non-deliberation are both, at root, part of the same collective action problem given the condition of the citizen in the large-scale nation-state.

However, such generalizations do not apply to every issue. On occasion, grand debates focus the attention of the public on some salient issue on which the public deliberates to some considerable degree. Perhaps these are the "constitutional moments" Bruce Ackerman has identified in the history of the American Republic, over such matters as the Founding, Reconstruction, the New Deal and most recently the Civil Rights movement (Ackerman 1993). While these national discussions mostly preceded the development of modern public opinion research, in the case of civil rights there has been a dramatic shift in public opinion over several decades (Page

and Shapiro 1992). On some issues the change can be more rapid. Same-sex marriage seems to be a surprising case of far swifter transformation (Rosenfeld 2017).

Generally, “everyday talk” as Jane Mansbridge calls public discussion outside organized settings, can have deliberative qualities but it is likely, she hypothesizes, to be less deliberative, less focused on the weighing of competing arguments, than what could be achieved in an organized setting devoted to the purpose (Mansbridge 1999). Empirical studies of public discussion, as distinct from just public opinion, seem to confirm this picture (Johnston, Searing and Crewe 2002).

In everyday talk, citizens are more likely to talk with those from similar social locations and with those who share their political views (Mutz 2002; Huckfeldt, Mendez and Osborne 2004). They are also likely to consult congenial news sources and web pages and to get information on social media from their political soulmates. They will, to some degree, be within their own “filter bubbles” with social media firms manipulating their algorithms to keep their attention by giving them mostly what they seem to want (Pariser 2011; Sunstein 2017). The explosion of choice has undermined one of the key empirical premises of classical liberal-democratic theory: that liberty will lead to diversity in the airing of different points of view, which will help people think for themselves (or as J.S. Mill put it, lead people to achieve “individuality” (Mill 1859)). Apparently, when people have too much choice, when left to their own devices, they may well choose the most congenial options and end up exposed to like-mindedness rather than the views they disagree with. Too much choice can be constraining (Schwartz 2004) and produce a collective sorting with political consequences (Sunstein 2009). After

exercising choice, partisans may have little idea what people on the other side are thinking, just as viewers of MSNBC may have little idea of what viewers of Fox News are really thinking (and vice versa).

Given the state of everyday talk, the revival of interest in deliberative democracy applied to the mass public has been driven by a new (and very old) idea: engage a random sample of the relevant population in a design for deliberation where people are effectively motivated to weigh competing arguments on the merits and get good information so as to come to considered judgments. These deliberating microcosms or “mini-publics” come in various designs. Some versions of the idea go all the way back to ancient Athens (Hanson 1991; Manin 1997; Ober 2008, Fishkin 2018). Modern designs vary in the kinds of data that are collected before and after deliberation, in the design of the deliberative process itself and in the methods of identifying and recruiting random samples (for some of the challenges of recruitment see Neblo 2010; Dennis et al 2020). Citizens Juries engage small samples, up to two dozen or so, who deliberate together and try to reach a consensus on recommendations (see Már and Gastil 2019 for how they are applied to ballot propositions in the “Citizens Initiative Review”). Consensus conferences screen volunteers to get 14 or so who self-select from large initial samples (Andersen and Jaeger 1999, p. 335). Citizens Assemblies gather somewhat larger groups (in the first case in British Columbia about 160) and can meet for many successive weekends, arriving at a recommendation (for British Columbia see Warren and Pearse 2008; Fournier et al 2011 and for more recent citizens assemblies in Ireland see Farrell, Suiter and Harris 2018; Farrell et al 2019).

Deliberative Polling involves stratified random sampling, often with control groups and with numbers of participants large enough so that both the representativeness and the opinion changes can be evaluated in a statistically meaningful way. Despite these differences, the basic idea that they share can be viewed as a response to some of the limitations of deliberation by the mass public in natural settings. If instead of one opinion in millions, I think of myself as having one opinion in a few hundred, or one opinion in a small group of a dozen or so (if the design involves many small groups meeting concurrently), then I can think of myself as having a more significant role in the proceedings. Participating in a mini-public rather than just as a member of the public at large recalibrates the scale of interaction, so that each individual can plausibly feel more consequential. Each person can think that one's voice matters. In addition, the process can be designed to provide easy access to vetted briefing materials with good information expressing the competing sides of the argument. If the several hundred participants are randomly assigned to small groups, these are likely to offer the diversity of viewpoints that most people do not get in ordinary discussion, or on their social media newsfeeds. Two of the key aspects of any mini-public—the recalibration of the scale of discussions so that each individual can have a meaningful role and the effective engagement of the participants with balanced argumentation--respond to two of the key debilitations of everyday talk.

The “America in One Room” Deliberative Poll

The data for this paper come from a deliberating microcosm or “mini-public” of a certain design—Deliberative Polling. The basic idea is simple. Engage a stratified random sample of the relevant public in good conditions for deliberation about a topic. What would the public really think about an issue if it had the time and opportunity to consider it in depth with balanced and authoritative information, to discuss the pros and cons with diverse others in moderated small group discussions, to identify questions for panels of competing experts in plenary sessions, and then to come to a considered judgment as expressed in confidential questionnaires? Deliberative Polling has some kinship with other methods to bridge civic divides. But unlike Citizens Assemblies, Citizens Juries or Consensus Conferences, it makes no effort to arrive at a shared consensus or group decision on the issue. Thus, opinions can be studied at the individual level, free of social pressure to go along with the crowd. If a consensus on the issue emerges, it will be apparent from the data—the confidential questionnaires (or if you will, secret ballots)—and it will be an expression of the group’s considered judgments.

In advance of the initial survey, an advisory committee reflecting different points of view on the selected topics vets the briefing materials for balance and accuracy. These materials serve as the initial basis for discussion when the sample is convened for its deliberations. The agenda focuses on policy options with arguments for and against each option.

The first stage of the process resembles a normal public opinion poll: participants are surveyed with a standardized instrument in advance of seeing or discussing any information from the project. In the second stage, the random sample is brought together to a single place for extensive face to face discussions, usually over a long weekend. They are randomly assigned to moderated small

group discussions, and they attend plenary sessions where they can pose questions agreed upon by their small groups to panels of experts or decision makers with diverse views on a particular issue. At the end of the deliberations, participants take the same questionnaire as on first contact, plus added questions for evaluation. Whenever possible, a pre-post control group completes the same questionnaire. In its full realization, the project is a national field experiment in deliberation.

Our data come from *America in One Room*, a national experiment in public deliberation about the major issues facing the country in the period just preceding the 2020 presidential primary season. The event gathered a stratified random sample of 523 registered voters from around the country, recruited by NORC at the University of Chicago. A control group of 844 was also recruited by NORC and took essentially the same questionnaires before and after. The registered voter samples for both the treatment and control groups were sourced from NORC's probability-based and nationally representative AmeriSpeaks panel. The recruitment and representativeness of the treatment and control groups is discussed in the online appendix and in the NORC Methodological Report.³

The deliberations revolved around five broad issue areas, largely selected from a previous NORC survey about the top issues that the public hoped to see discussed in the presidential campaign.⁴ These issues were immigration, the economy (including taxes), health care, the environment (including climate change) and foreign policy. Each policy domain discussed at the event included specific policy proposals (49 in all) under active discussion by presidential candidates or other relevant policymakers. Some of the proposals

³ The NORC methodological report is available at <https://cdd.stanford.edu/mm/2019/10/NORC-Report-for-A1R-2019-Final.pdf>

⁴ <http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/HTML%20Reports/2019publicprioritiesexpectations.aspx#domestic-issues>

were more congenial to Republicans, some more to Democrats. The project briefing materials aimed to concisely present the strongest evidence-based arguments for and against each proposal. A video version of each issue briefing was also prepared and coordinated with the printed versions. The briefing materials were vetted by subject matter experts with opposing perspectives on the issues and the non-partisan Advisory Committee.

The sample gathered in Dallas on the weekend of September 19-22, 2019, arriving Thursday late afternoon and leaving Sunday after lunch. The agenda alternated small group discussions by issue area and plenary sessions, each lasting 90 minutes and running throughout the weekend. Each of the five issue domains was discussed both in small group discussions and in plenary sessions with experts. Participants remained with the same small group (averaging about 13 persons) throughout the event, enabling them to get to know one another on a personal level over the course of the weekend. In the final questionnaire, completed just before departure, respondents were asked (as they had been in the pre-deliberation survey) to rate each specific policy proposal on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 was “strongly oppose” and 10 was “strongly favor” and 5 was the midpoint.

Of the 49 proposals, we classify 26 as instances of extreme partisan polarization between Republicans and Democrats. Our criteria are:

- a) At least 15% of each party takes the most extreme possible position (0 or 10) at time 1, with these Democrats and Republicans at opposite poles on the proposal.
- b) A majority of those party members who take a position at time 1 are on the same side of the scale as the “extremes.”

These two criteria combine to identify extreme partisan polarization because the extremes are balanced at the two poles, Republicans on one side, Democrats at the other. The majority support on either side is also balanced in that a majority of Republicans are on one side and a majority of Democrats are on the other.

There were also party-based divisions on the other 23 proposals, but they were not as balanced by each party at the poles both for the extreme responses and the majorities of party members on either side. While we take the 26 items to be the clearest expression of extreme partisan polarization, many of the other questions also exhibited some degree of partisan polarization.

Our investigation focuses on whether issues of extreme partisan polarization de-polarize when subjected to certain kinds of public deliberation. What do we mean by de-polarization? To clarify, we need to distinguish movements by members of a given party from the separable question of how those movements relate, if at all, to movements by members of the other party (assuming something like the US context with two major parties). Taking account of these two questions, we can distinguish two kinds of de-polarization:

- a) *Partisan de-polarization*: when the majority of members of a given party are on one side of the partisan divide and a majority of members of the other party are on the other side, partisan de-polarization occurs if the mean position of the members of one party moves toward the mid-point or crosses it, while the other party members show no significant movement toward the mid-point.

- b) *Bi-partisan de-polarization*: when the majority of members of one party are on one side of the mid-point and a majority of the members of the other party are on the other side, bi-partisan depolarization occurs if the means of both parties move closer together on the scale or if they move to the same side of the scale.⁵

In other words, if the partisans of only one party moderate toward the mid-point, then it is partisan de-polarization. But if the partisans of both parties move toward each other it is bi-partisan de-polarization. Our focus here will be on what we are calling bi-partisan de-polarization, but there are a few cases where the one-sided movement will be worth noting. Note some further complexities. Suppose the mean position of a given party not only moves toward the mid-point with deliberation but crosses it, so that the two parties (in their mean positions) end up on the same side of the issue. We will consider that de-polarization even though the movement at some point will not be toward the mid-point but away from it (as it moves beyond the midpoint after crossing it) The parties have now joined each other on the same side of the issue.

In addition, suppose members of one party, say Republicans, move from opposition to support for a proposal (in terms of their mean position) while Democrats move from a degree of support to even stronger support. In that case, the movements for Republicans and Democrats might both be significant but the two parties might not end up closer together at the end in terms of their mean position

⁵ Our use of the term “bi-partisan” is not meant to imply agreement across the partisan divide, but simply to signal that the means of both parties are moving in the way specified.

(because the Democrats moved even more than did the Republicans and they were both moving in the same direction). In this hypothetical, the fact that the two parties end up on the same side of the issue will be considered sufficient to constitute de-polarization. The mean positions of the two sides no longer disagree about whether a proposal should be supported or opposed. They only disagree on how strongly to support or oppose it. This possibility suggests that we can distinguish de-polarization in terms of changing distance (so that the two parties end up closer in their mean positions on the 0 to 10 scale) , and de-polarization in terms of changing sides (so that the two parties end up on the same side). The latter case will make only a brief appearance in the data discussed below, but conceptually it is a possibility.

Research Questions

The existing literature offers a basis for sharply contrasting expectations about what is likely to happen when discussion across party lines is engaged on issues of extreme partisan polarization. What will be the effect on issue-based polarization among party members, and, in particular, among those party members taking the most extreme positions? In addition, what is the effect on affective polarization? The increasing dislike of the two parties for each other has added to our evident state of deadlock and division. (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). The growing literature on affective polarization shows that it is distinct from issue-based polarization so the effects must be evaluated independently (Iyengar et al 2019). We can distill these topics into a series of research questions and hypotheses.

Research Question 1: On issues of extreme partisan polarization, will cross-party discussion lead to more or less polarization on those issues?

When members of opposing parties discuss issues that are highly polarized along partisan lines, will the partisan-based polarization on the issues increase or decrease? More specifically, will the mean positions of the members of each party move farther away from each other, or will they move closer together?

There are two main arguments predicting *increased* polarization with cross-party discussion on specific issues that are already highly polarized. The first expects that partisanship is likely to fuel “directional” or “partisan” motivated reasoning. As Taber and Lodge found, partisans “counterargue the contrary arguments and uncritically accept supporting arguments, evidence of a disconfirmation bias.” In addition, by seeking out supporting arguments they will tend to exhibit confirmation bias (Taber and Lodge 2006, p. 755). These patterns are both part of *directional* motivated reasoning to support positions they are already invested in (Kunda 1990). Such processes are likely to push party members to more extreme positions on each side of the polarized divide. (Druckman 2012; Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Levendusky, Druckman and McClain 2016).

Sunstein’s “law of group polarization” provides a second argument that discussion is likely to increase polarization, especially on issues where there are already deep divisions. Building on earlier work with juries and some new experiments, he and his collaborators identify two causal factors that are likely to increase polarization-- the “imbalance in the argument pool” and a “social comparison effect.” (Sunstein 2002; 2009). More recently he has generalized the problem from juries and jury-like settings to the condition of the

citizen in mass society getting information from social media (Sunstein 2017). Because of partisan selectivity, the bias in our social media “news feeds” and the algorithms in our “filter bubbles,” partisans are especially likely to get a strong imbalance in the argument pool to which they are exposed (Sunstein 2009, Pariser 2011) Weighing those unbalanced arguments, they are likely to move to further extremes in the direction supported by the imbalance. With partisan selectivity and the partisan cast of filter bubbles, Republicans live in one social world, Democrats in another. Members of each party are more likely to be in touch with other partisans, so their effective engagement with the argument pool about an issue will be skewed so as to increase polarization. Further, the social comparison effect (as they compare their views to their friends and associates and fellow partisans; Asch 1955) will, in effect, create bandwagon effects (Goidel, Robert K.; Shields, Todd G. (1994), a spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann 1984), and added pressure to move to the extreme of the side they were already on.

However, these arguments apply most clearly to unstructured everyday talk and cross-party encounters in natural settings. The deliberative mini-public investigated here, the Deliberative Poll, has a specific design. Consider the argument that this design responds to the dynamics just sketched and provides reason to think that organized deliberation with an appropriate design may likely decrease rather than increase polarization. The design offers a basis for the opposite expectations both about motivated reasoning and the law of group polarization.

As Kunda first hypothesized, there are two distinct kinds of “motivated reasoning”—“directional” and “accuracy based” (Kunda 1990). The argument that polarization will increase on issues of extreme partisan polarization relies on directional motivated

reasoning. But if an experimental treatment could encourage the second kind of motivated reasoning—accuracy-based—then reasoning on the merits would likely result. Further, if on issues of extreme partisan polarization, people have arrived at positions without seriously considering (or even encountering) arguments on the other side, then we might well expect accuracy-based reasoning to de-polarize by overcoming the legacy of previously one-sided reasoning. The expectation here is not that deliberation will always de-polarize, but that it will likely de-polarize on issues of extreme partisan polarization.

In experiments in a variety of social contexts, Kunda (1990: p. 481) concluded that subjects were motivated to be accurate when they “expected to be evaluated, expected to justify their judgments, expected their judgments to be made public or expected their evaluations to affect the evaluated person’s life.” In other words, when people think their views will matter, and when they have to share the reasons supporting their views, they become more attentive to accuracy goals.

And these are precisely the motivations that the Deliberative Poll is designed to foster. The task of each of the randomly assigned small groups is to discuss the arguments for and against each policy proposal and then formulate group questions for the balanced panels of competing experts in the plenary sessions, all so that the participants can come to their own, individually considered judgments. Groups could also submit additional questions to neutral fact checkers who would reply during the deliberations. The whole design encouraged the small groups to seek and weigh relevant information and then for the members to come to their individual considered judgments.

A parallel argument can be made about how the Deliberative Poll design blunts the directional force of Sunstein's "law of group polarization" (Sunstein 2009, pp. 55-57). The design engages the small group discussions with balanced materials, presenting pros and cons for each proposal. On each proposal, the moderators attempt to cover the agenda of competing arguments in the briefing materials and to solicit added arguments from the randomly assigned members of the small groups. The plenary sessions are explicitly balanced with experts representing alternative views (and often the two contending major parties). In this way the problem of imbalances in the argument pool should be minimized. As for the social comparison effect, the participants only express their final judgments in the concluding confidential questionnaire. The moderators encourage the participants to consider, and give voice to, the arguments on either side without ever having to express their final decision. There is no "show of hands" or other voting on the proposals. Hence the social pressures to go along with the crowd should be blunted.

These aspects of the design can be expected to blunt the dynamics of both directional motivated reasoning and imbalanced argumentation (Sunstein's "Law of Group Polarization"). But blunting the dynamics toward more polarization is not the same as de-polarizing. Why would the process actually de-polarize on issues of extreme partisan polarization? Our expectation is that partisans have developed their views going into the deliberations on the basis of one-sided argumentation, without ever having taken seriously, or perhaps even considered, the arguments on the other side of the partisan divide. If the design of the treatment can stimulate an accuracy-based motivation and get them engaged with the other side in a substantive way, they are likely to adjust and move somewhat in the direction of the other party.

Hence we hypothesize:

H1 On issues of extreme partisan polarization, deliberation with an appropriate design will de-polarize substantive differences between the parties.

This de-polarization can be “partisan,” with just one set of party members moving toward the mid-point (or past it). Or, it can be bi-partisan, with the means of both parties moving closer toward each other (or to the same side of the mid-point on that issue). The Deliberative Poll is the design examined here but it as an open empirical question whether other mini-public designs might have similar properties.

This hypothesis is formulated in terms of party members for the two main parties. Consider now not just party members in general, but those party members who take the most extreme positions. Should we also expect them to de-polarize?

On the one hand, some might expect those taking the most extreme positions to be the least likely to de-polarize. Their previous thinking has already pushed them as far as possible to the limits of the scale. Their partisan loyalties have likely supported motivated reasoning and imbalanced argumentation in their natural environments. Of all the partisans on either side it seems we should expect them to be the most dug in. Or, they may even polarize further to the extent possible (Wojcieszak, 2011). It seems we should expect less de-polarization from them than from party members in general.

Still, there is another perspective. If the design of the treatment stimulates accuracy-based motivated reasoning and balanced argumentation, perhaps those initially taking the most extreme positions will also be susceptible. The very fact that in their natural

environments they have arrived at the most extreme positions on the scale may suggest they have been least exposed previously to serious engagement with the other side of the partisan divide. At least on these issues of extreme partisanship, they may be fully as susceptible to de-polarization as are the less extreme party members. This idea suggests:

H2 On issues of extreme partisan polarization, deliberation with an appropriate design will de-polarize substantive differences among those members of each party who took the most extreme positions before deliberation.

Again, this de-polarization could be just the partisans on one side or it could be what we are calling bi-partisan de-polarization, so that the means of the two groups who take maximum positions at either side of an issue move closer together (or move to the same side).

Now let us turn to affective as distinct from issue-based polarization. Will the same pattern hold?

Research Question 2: On issues of extreme partisan polarization, will cross-party discussion lead to more or less affective polarization?

It could be argued that cross party discussion on issues of extreme partisan polarization will likely exacerbate affective divisions between the parties, by triggering the dynamics of in-group/out-group identity that increase hostility toward the outgroup (in this case, the other party) (Tajfel 1981). Stimulating outrage across the partisan divide has become a major part of our political culture in the media, social media and campaign advertising (Berry and Soberieraj 2014; Mutz 2015).

On the other hand, it is arguable that the same deliberative design we hypothesized could foster both accuracy-based motivated reasoning and balanced argumentation can also be expected to engage another dynamic. There is a line of research about contact across deep divisions that indicates that under certain conditions, contact yields liking, which would imply decreased affective polarization. Not just any contact but contact satisfying certain conditions. Going back to pioneering work by Allport, a specific design that fosters “equal status between groups, common goals, cooperation and institutional support” for the importance of the interactions will likely lead the two groups to a reduction in prejudice (Allport 1954). These four conditions are not all essential but in meta-analyses they were held to work best in combination (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006, 2011, Hewstone and Swart 2011.)

The deliberative design employed in “America in One Room” clearly fosters equal status, emphasizing that everyone’s opinion counts and deserves to be listened to, that the participants are meant to cooperate together to consider competing arguments and come to their own informed conclusions, to pose their common questions of greatest concern for presentation on behalf of their group in the plenary sessions. The whole project offered institutional support for these efforts, and the evident media interest in the event added to the sense of informal support for the project.

The contact hypothesis has not previously been applied specifically to the Deliberative Poll treatment for the question of change in affect. However, it has been applied to changes in policy attitudes affecting the Roma in Bulgaria and the Aboriginals in Australia. In those projects the dependent variables were policy proposals affecting the minority groups. Data on affect was not available but something like the effect on affect we are positing seems plausible, or at least compatible with the changes in policy attitudes (Kim et

al 2018). Other organized discussions have provided added support to the contact hypothesis in cases of extreme group division such as between Israelis and Palestinians (Moaoz 2000).

On this basis we hypothesize:

H3: On issues of extreme partisan polarization deliberation between members of different parties conducted with an appropriate design can be expected to reduce affective polarization.

In other words, the thermometer ratings for the party opposite will move higher (or the gap between the in-group and out-group thermometer ratings will be lower) after deliberation. The group discussions moderated to ensure mutual respect and a context of equality combined with the common task of formulating questions for the competing experts will lower the temperature of the heated partisan divisions and change the way the in-group feels about the out-group.

This hypothesis applies to party members generally. What of those who take the most extreme positions on either side of the partisan divide. Will they lower their affective division? In theory, the psychology of in-group/outgroup division should be even stronger for the “extremists,” so one might expect them to be less susceptible to the contact hypothesis. On the other hand, they might be the very people who have had less contact, at least under these constructive conditions, with members of the other party. On that basis we might expect the contact hypothesis to come into play for them as well:

H4: On issues of extreme partisan polarization, deliberation between members of different parties conducted with the appropriate design can be expected to reduce affective polarization among those in both parties initially taking the most extreme positions.

What Happened?

Again, 26 of the 49 policy proposals fit our criteria for extreme partisan polarization. These proposals came from all five issue areas. There is not space to discuss the substantive results for every issue but we can discuss a few illustrative examples. The magnitude of the de-polarizing changes on such contentious issues deserves attention. The results for all 26 proposals are in Tables 1-5.

Table 1 shows the opinion changes broken out by party for the five polarized proposals on immigration. For each question, the table shows the means before and after deliberation for Democrats and Republicans overall and for the extremes (those Democrats and Republicans answering either 0 or 10 before deliberation). In almost every case, the changes are statistically significant, not only for the treatment group, but also in difference-in-difference analyses that include the control group. The control group showed very little substantive change between T1 and T2. These comparisons to the control group are presented in the Online Appendix with a difference-in-difference analysis. All of these changes are for party members. We observe similar changes when the “lean Republicans” are included with the Republicans and the “lean Democrats” are included with the Democrats. Those results are also in the online Appendix.

Immigration

On immigration, all five of the extreme partisan proposals produced massive changes with deliberation. For example, on question 2a “Reduce the number of refugees allowed to resettle in the U.S”, 65% of Republicans initially supported this proposal (mean 7.05 on the 0 to 10 scale). This support dropped 31 points to 34% (mean 4.720) after deliberation. On the Democrat side, opposition to this proposal increased significantly from 58% (mean of 3.3) to 75% (2.39), an increase of 17 points. The mean position of Republicans who initially took the most extreme position (in favor) went from 10 to 6.49, while the mean position for Democrats who initially took the most extreme position in opposition, went from 0 to 0.725. Republicans and Democrats, as well as those taking the most extreme positions, moved significantly closer together as shown in the last column of Table 1. This pattern applies to all five immigration proposals.

Table 1: Immigration

No.	Question	Pre			Post			Post-Pre		
		Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D
Q2A	[Reduce the number of refugees allowed to resettle in the US.]	3.300	7.050	3.750 ***	2.390	4.720	2.330 ***	-0.910 ***	-2.330 ***	-1.420 ***
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	0.725	6.490	5.765 ***	0.725 ***	-3.510 ***	-4.325 ***
Q2C	[Provide aid to reduce poverty and violence in Central America.]	7.450	3.770	-3.680 ***	7.190	4.730	-2.460 ***	-0.260	0.960 ***	-1.220 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.375	2.652	-5.723 ***	-1.625 ***	2.652 ***	-4.277 ***
Q2E	[Increase the number of visas for low-skilled workers to move to the US for industries that need them, like agriculture and service.]	7.280	4.520	-2.760 ***	8.170	6.380	-1.790 ***	0.890 ***	1.860 ***	-0.970 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	9.211	4.333	-4.878 ***	-0.789 ***	4.333 ***	-5.122 ***
Q2H	[Continue DACA, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which protects people who were brought to the US as children when their parents entered the country illegally.]	8.740	4.640	-4.100 ***	9.250	6.110	-3.140 ***	0.510 ***	1.470 ***	-0.960 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.0	-10.000 ***	9.787	3.667	-6.120 ***	-0.213 *	3.667 ***	-3.880 ***
Q2I	[Undocumented immigrants should be forced to return to their home countries before applying to legally come to the US to live and work permanently.]	3.3	7.9	4.670 ***	2.44	5.32	2.880 ***	-0.820 ***	-2.610 ***	-1.790 ***

	Extremes	0.000	10.0	10.000 ***	0.870	6.621	5.751 ***	0.870 **	-3.379 ***	-4.249 ***
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Another highly contested proposal on immigration was the proposal to continue DACA (the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program). Among Republicans, only 36% (mean 4.64) supported this proposal before deliberation. After deliberation support among Republicans for continuing DACA rose 25 points to 61% (mean 6.11). Support among Democrats also increased from the initially high level of 89% (mean 8.74) to 95% (mean 9.25). The mean position of Republicans who initially took the most extreme position in opposition went from 0 to 3.667 while Democrats who initially took the most extreme position moved only slightly from it (mean went from 10 to 9.787). Overall, Republicans and Democrats not only moved closer together but they moved to the same side of the issue, as Republicans changed from opposition to support.

Consider a third immigration topic, perhaps the most intensely contested among the polarized proposals: “Undocumented immigrants should be forced to return to their home countries before applying to legally come back to the US to live and work permanently.” Before deliberation the support for this proposal among Republicans was at 79% (with a mean of 7.9). After deliberation it dropped in half, to 40% (a mean of 5.32, a drop of 39 points). Democratic opposition to the proposal increased with deliberation, from 63% (mean 3.3) before deliberation to 78% (mean 2.44) after. For those initially taking the most extreme positions, the Republican mean in support dropped from 10 to 6.621 and the Democratic mean in opposition increased from 0 to 0.870 (a higher number means less opposition) .

The sample did not have any undocumented immigrants since it included only registered voters. But many participants had family or acquaintances who were undocumented and these perspectives were part of the discussion. While every effort was made to provide a balance of perspectives in the briefing materials and the plenary sessions, the opinions shifted markedly in a direction more sympathetic to the plight of the undocumented as well as of refugees and immigrants more generally. On all five immigration issues, Republicans and Democrats moved significantly closer together as can be seen in the last column of Table 1. Hence there was bi-partisan de-polarization on every question. Similarly, those Republicans and Democrats taking the most extreme positions also moved significantly closer together after deliberation. There was bi-partisan de-polarization among those who initially took the strongest positions for every question in our immigration category.

Environment

There were six environmental proposals that satisfied our criteria for extreme partisan polarization. Most of the proposals focused on what to do about climate change, but fossil fuels and energy independence were also discussed.

The changes for the environment proposals can be found in Table 2. Consider “The US should commit to the 2014 Paris Agreement to combat climate change.” Support among Democrats began very high and stayed high: 89% (a mean of 8.9) before deliberation and 91% (a mean of 9.06) after deliberation. Republicans on the other hand, greatly decreased their opposition. They went from 56%

opposed (mean of 3.7) to only 40% opposed (mean 4.54). For those taking the strongest positions on either side, Democrats declined slightly from a mean of 10 in support to 9.608, while Republicans increased more substantially, from 0 in opposition to 2.27.

Table 2: Environment

No.	Question	Pre			Post			Post-Pre		
		Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D
Q3A	[The US should commit to the 2014 Paris Agreement to combat climate change.]	8.9	3.7	-5.210 ***	9.06	4.54	-4.520 ***	0.130	0.820 **	-0.690 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	9.608	2.27	-7.338 ***	-0.392 ***	2.270 ***	-2.662 ***
Q3B	[The US should go beyond the Paris Agreement and aim for more significant cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions.]	8.5	4.2	-4.300 ***	8.66	4.92	-3.740 ***	0.160	0.720 *	-0.560
	Extremes	10.000	0.0	-10.000 ***	9.291	2.258	-7.033 ***	-0.709 *	2.258 ***	-2.967 ***
Q3C	[The US should use taxes or other market incentives to achieve emissions reductions.]	8.0	4.2	-3.830 ***	8.2	5.19	-3.010 ***	0.180	1.000 ***	-0.820 **
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.617	2.483	-6.134 ***	-1.383 ***	2.483 ***	-3.866 ***
Q3D	[A Green New Deal to commit to major investments in infrastructure and renewable energy.]	8.1	3.5	-4.590 ***	7.94	2.96	-4.980 ***	-0.140	-0.530	0.390
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.649	0.889	-7.760 ***	-1.351 ***	0.889 **	-2.240 ***

Q3E	[The US should expand oil and gas production.]	3.9	7.0	3.070 ***	3.21	6.47	3.260 ***	-0.670 ***	-0.480	0.190
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	0.538	8.852	8.314 ***	0.538 **	-1.148 **	-1.686 *
Q3H	[The US should mandate zero carbon emissions for cars, trucks, and buses.]	6.9	3.25	-3.660 ***	6.09	3.15	-2.940 ***	-0.820 ***	-0.100	-0.720 *
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	7.511	0.838	-6.673 ***	-2.489 ***	0.838 *	-3.327 ***

Overall, three of the six polarized issues on the environment saw bi-partisan depolarization, as documented in the last column in Table 2. In addition, the proposal for “Moving beyond the Paris agreement” experienced partisan de-polarization. Finally, all six of the proposals showed bi-partisan de-polarization among those beginning with the most extreme positions.

The Economy and Taxes

Seven of the economic issue proposals exhibited extreme partisan polarization. Several of these were progressive proposals that lost support from the Democrats after deliberation. Democrats expressed concerns about the expense of some proposals in light of the national debt and also about imposing a national policy that did not account for local variation. Recall that the sample came from all over the country where an issue like minimum wage suggests very different expectations, depending on local context.

The most dramatic drop was on: “The government should fund a bond for each child born that will accumulate in value until the child turns 18 to then become usable for higher education or other essentials for a start in life.” This so-called “Baby Bonds” proposal was a centerpiece in the campaign of one of the presidential candidates.⁶

The Baby Bonds proposal was initially supported by 62% of the Democrats (mean 6.82), but this support plummeted to 21% after deliberation (mean 3.51), a drop of 41 points. Republican support started low (15%, mean of 2.68) and dropped lower (5%, mean of

⁶ Senator Cory Booker. The proposals were not identified with candidates but formulated in the briefings so that participants could consider them on the merits.

1.35). Democrats who took the strongest position in support went from a mean of 10 to 4.556. Republicans who took the strongest position in opposition went from 0 to .388.

Table 3: Economy and Taxes

No.	Question	Pre			Post			Post-Pre		
		Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D
Q4A	[Capital gains -- income earned when an investment that has increased in value is sold -- should be taxed the same as ordinary wage income.]	6.35	4.61	-1.740 ***	6.49	4.58	-1.910 ***	0.140	-0.030	0.170
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	7.773	2.347	-5.426 ***	-2.227 ***	2.347 **	-4.574 ***
Q4B	[The US should impose a wealth tax on the richest taxpayers, requiring them to pay a small portion of their wealth on an annual basis.]	8.16	3.83	-4.330 ***	7.33	3.91	-3.420 ***	-0.830 ***	0.080	-0.910 *
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.256	1.804	-6.452 ***	-1.744 ***	1.804 ***	-3.548 ***
Q4C	[The US should repeal the estate tax, which currently taxes deceased individuals worth at least \$11 million and deceased couples worth at least \$22 million.]	3.33	5.66	2.330 ***	3.27	5.42	2.150 ***	-0.060	-0.240	-0.180
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	1.705	6.896	5.191 ***	1.705 ***	-3.104 ***	-4.809 ***
Q4F	[Lower the corporate tax rate from 21% to 15%.]	2.5	5.77	3.270 ***	1.57	3.45	1.880 ***	-0.930 ***	-2.320 ***	-1.390 ***
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	0.741	6.167	5.426 ***	0.741 ***	-3.833 ***	-4.574 ***

Q4G	[Increase federal minimum wage from \$7.25/hr. to \$15/hr.]	8.31	3.26	-5.050 ***	6.34	2.57	-3.770 ***	-1.970	-0.690	-1.280 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	7.208	0.956	-6.252 ***	-2.792 ***	0.956 ***	-3.748 ***
Q4H	[The government should cover the cost of college tuition at public universities for all students who could not otherwise afford it.]	7.58	2.59	-4.990 ***	6.47	2.65	-3.820 ***	-1.110 ***	0.060	-1.170 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	7.837	1.254	-6.583 ***	-2.163 ***	1.254 ***	-3.417 ***
Q4I	[The government should fund a bond for each child born that will accumulate in value until the child turns 18 to then become usable for higher education or other essentials for a start in life.]	6.82	2.68	-4.140 ***	3.51	1.35	-2.160 ***	-3.310 ***	-1.330 ***	-1.980 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	4.556	0.388	-4.168 ***	-5.444 ***	0.388 **	-5.832 ***

Another ambitious proposal was to “increase the federal minimum wage from \$7.25 an hour to \$15/hour.” Democratic support for this proposal dropped 23 points from 82% (mean of 8.31) to 59% (mean of 6.34). Republican opposition increased from 63% (mean of 3.26) to 71% (mean of 2.57). Republicans and Democrats ended up closer together because while Republican opposition increased, Democratic support dropped much more. As for those who took the strongest positions, Democrats who started out at 10 in support went down substantially, to a mean of 7.208. Republicans who started out at 0 in opposition went up only slightly to 0.956.

Of the seven economic proposals, five produced bi-partisan de-polarization between Republicans and Democrats. Among those starting with the strongest positions on either side, all seven of these proposals showed bi-partisan de-polarization.

Health Care

Five of the proposals on health care fit the criteria for extreme partisan polarization. There was a mix of proposals including some strongly supported by Republicans (and opposed by Democrats) and others strongly supported by Democrats (and opposed by Republicans). Consider “The Affordable Care Act should be repealed.” Support for this proposal, to eliminate “Obamacare”, was initially at 69% among Republicans (mean of 7.52). After deliberation, it dropped 21 points among Republicans to 48% (mean of 5.72). Democrats were strongly opposed both before and after (76%, opposed, mean of 1.87 before deliberation; 80% opposed, mean of 1.84 afterwards). Republicans taking the strongest position in support moved much more, from a mean of 10 to 7.345. Democrats taking the strongest position in opposition moved only slightly, from 0 to 0.776. Before deliberation, 48% of Republicans took the strongest position in support of eliminating the ACA, while after, only 22% did. Before deliberation, 58% of Democrats took the strongest position in opposition to this proposal; afterwards it dropped to 50%.

Consider now a Democratic-leaning health care proposal, sometimes termed “Medicare for All”: That “People should be automatically enrolled in a more generous version of Medicare.” This started high among Democrats (70% support, mean of 7.39), but dropped 14 points to 56% after deliberation (mean of 6.41). Republicans opposed this both before and after (63% to 66%, mean of 3.04). Democrats who took the most extreme position initially moderated their views appreciably, going from a mean of 10 to 7.758. Republicans who took the most extreme position in opposition changed from a mean of 0 to 1.147

Table 4: Healthcare

No.	Question	Pre			Post			Post-Pre		
		Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D
Q5A	[The Affordable Care Act should be repealed.]	1.87	7.52	5.650 ***	1.84	5.72	3.880 ***	-0.030	-1.800 ***	-1.770 ***
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	0.776	7.345	6.569 ***	0.776 ***	-2.655 ***	-3.431 ***
Q5B	[Repeal the Affordable Care Act and replace with grants to state Governments to create their own systems.]	2.25	5.62	3.370 ***	2.38	5.03	2.650 ***	0.130	-0.590	-0.720
	Extremes	0.000	10.000	10.000 ***	1.292	6.739	5.447 ***	1.292 ***	-3.261 ***	-4.553 ***
Q5C	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the poor should be increased.]	7.72	3.54	-4.180 ***	7.65	4.6	-3.050 ***	-0.070	1.060 ***	-1.130 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.753	3.071	-5.682 ***	-1.247 ***	3.071 ***	-4.318 ***
Q5D	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the middle class should be expanded to include more people.]	7.86	4.21	-3.650 ***	7.94	5.58	-2.360 ***	0.080	1.370 ***	-1.290 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	8.802	4.292	-4.510 ***	-1.198 ***	4.292 ***	-5.490 ***
Q5H	[People should be automatically enrolled in a more generous version of Medicare.]	7.39	3.48	-3.910 ***	6.41	3.04	-3.370 ***	-0.980 ***	-0.440 ***	-0.540 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	7.758	1.147	-6.611 ***	-2.242 ***	1.147 ***	-3.389 **

Of the five health care proposals that fit our criteria for extreme partisan polarization, three showed what we are calling bi-partisan de-polarization and one (Medicare for All) showed partisan de-polarization. In that case, the Democrats moved in a more moderate direction toward the midpoint but the Republicans did not.

Foreign Policy

On foreign policy only three of the policy proposals fit our criteria for extreme partisan polarization. Consider two which are probably the most contentious--the Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

On “The US should recommit to the Iran Nuclear Agreement” Republican opposition dropped dramatically, from 63% (mean of 3.09) to 41% (mean of 4.52), a decline of 22 points. Democratic support for this proposal increased slightly, from 78% (mean of 7.93) to 83% (mean of 8.5). For those taking the most extreme views, Republican opposition decreased a lot, from a mean of 0 to 2.79, while Democratic support decreased only slightly, from 10 to 9.46.

Table 5: Foreign Policy

No.	Question	Pre			Post			Post-Pre		
		Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D	Dem	Rep	R-D
Q6A	[The US should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trading agreement between 12 countries excluding China.]	7.16	4.24	-2.920 ***	8.56	6.15	-2.410 ***	1.400 ***	1.910 ***	-0.510
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	9.659	5.047	-4.612 ***	-0.341 **	5.047 ***	-5.388 ***

Q6F	[The US should recommit to the Iran Nuclear Agreement.]	7.93	3.09	-4.840 ***	8.5	4.52	-3.980 ***	0.570	1.430 ***	-0.860 **
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	9.462	2.79	-6.672 ***	-0.538 **	2.790 ***	-3.328 ***
Q6G	[Presidents should be required to obtain explicit congressional approval for sending US troops into combat situations.]	8.69	4.11	-4.580 ***	8.5	5.38	-3.120 ***	-0.190	1.270 ***	-1.460 ***
	Extremes	10.000	0.000	-10.000 ***	9.243	3.826	-5.417 ***	-0.757 ***	3.826 ***	-4.583 ***

On the proposal, "The US should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trading agreement between 12 countries excluding China," Democrats started high (66% with a mean of 7.16) and went dramatically higher (88% with a mean of 8.56). In other words, Democratic support increased by a third. Meanwhile, Republicans rose even more dramatically from 23% (mean of 4.24) to 62% (mean of 6.15), an increase of 39 points. Republicans in this case actually crossed from a mean position of opposition to one of support –de-polarizing in the sense that after deliberation both sides supported the same policy. For the extremes, Democrats who took the strongest possible position in support started at 10 and went down only slightly, to 9.659. Republicans who took the strongest possible position in opposition (0) at the beginning went to 5.047—one of the two biggest changes in average support among the “extreme” advocates of any position in our Deliberative Poll.⁷ Opposition to the TPP collapsed with deliberation, and support for international cooperation on this and other items increased dramatically. The TPP is a case where the gap between Republicans and

⁷ The “baby bonds” proposal produced a comparable drop in average support (5.44) among the Democrats initially taking the most extreme position.

Democrats on the scale decreased. But the decrease was not significant because while Republicans moved from opposition to support, Democrats moved to even stronger support. Since Republicans changed sides on this issue, we classify it as bi-partisan de-polarization as noted earlier.

Overview of Issue-Based Results

Table 6-Partisan De-polarization

		R & D become closer	R & D become significantly closer (or move to same side)	R&D become Significantly Closer Compared to Movements in Control Group			
Party Members Overall		22	19	20			
Extremes		26	26	26			

Overall, there were 26 proposals that fit our criteria for extreme partisan based polarization. Table 6 provides a simple scorecard of results for the effect of deliberation.

For party members, Republicans and Democrats moved closer on 22 out of the 26 proposals. In 19 of those, the movements were significant.⁸ The 19 includes one case, the TPP, where the distance between Republicans and Democrats while less, was not significantly so, but this was only because the two parties ended up on the same side after their significant movements, rather than on opposite sides of the issue. Republicans moved or de-polarized so much that they crossed the mid-point to the same side as the Democrats.

For those initially taking the strongest possible positions, either in support or opposition, there was bi-partisan de-polarization for 26 out of the 26 proposals. When difference-in-difference analyses are included, 20 out of the 26 proposals are significant for party members⁹ and 26 out of 26 proposals remain significant for those starting at the extremes (see the online appendix for the difference in difference analyses). These results from a national field experiment in deliberation offer support for both hypotheses 1 and 2.

Affective Polarization

⁸ Significance at least at the .05 level with two-tailed tests.

⁹ This count includes the TPP question because the two parties moved to the same side.

Let us now turn to the separate question of whether deliberation has an impact on affective polarization. The dynamics of the two kinds of polarization are distinguishable (Iyengar et al 2019) and we have offered separate accounts for why we believe deliberation may have an effect on the affective variant. H3 hypothesized that deliberation between members of different parties can be expected to reduce affective polarization when the deliberations are conducted with an appropriate design. We argued that the Deliberative Polling design satisfies the four criteria originally put forward by Allport and supported by later meta-analyses (Allport 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Hence there is a basis in the contact hypothesis for expecting a reduction in affective polarization. Table 7 shows what happened for party members in general.

Table 7

	Participants					Control						
	T1	T2	T2-T1	Sig.		T1	T2	T2-T1	Sig.			
Democrats										P T2-T1 - C T2-T1	Sig.	
Own Party	71.35	73.91	2.56	0.035		70.13	69.33	-0.80	0.302		3.36	0.030
Other Party	19.49	32.56	13.07	0.000		21.75	21.06	-0.69	0.551		13.76	0.000
Affective Polarization Measure	52.11	41.22	-10.89	0.000		48.71	47.92	-0.79	0.652		-10.10	0.000
Republicans										P T2-T1 - C T2-T1	Sig.	
Own Party	67.28	65.84	-1.44	0.409		71.47	71.00	-0.47	0.645		-0.97	0.608
Other Party	20.16	34.63	14.47	0.000		19.47	19.05	-0.42	0.712		14.89	0.000
Affective Polarization Measure	46.97	31.19	-15.78	0.000		51.44	51.04	-0.39	0.791		-15.39	0.000

Affective polarization can be measured in at least two ways: thermometer ratings for the other party, and the difference in thermometer ratings for one's own party minus the other party (Iyengar et al 2019). Both measures are pictured in Table 7 and the results are essentially the same. Among the participants there is only modest change in the ratings of one's own party but there are large and significant changes in the ratings of the other party. Democrats' thermometer ratings of Republicans go up 13 points with deliberation. Republicans' thermometer ratings of Democrats go up 14 points. As pictured in the table, the thermometer ratings for the control group were essentially unchanged. On either measure, H3 is supported by our results for party members overall. These are large and significant effects by the standards of other experiments at de-polarization (see Levendusky 2018a and 2018b for some imaginative efforts).

What about affective polarization for those starting out with the most extreme views? See Tables 8 and 9 for even larger effects on the feeling thermometer for the out-party on the part of those initially taking the most extreme positions. For Democrats, those who answered 11 or more extreme answers (out of 26 questions) rose 16 points or more on the feeling thermometer toward Republicans. For Republicans, those who answered 11 or more extreme answers rose 17 points or more on the feeling thermometer toward Democrats.

Table 8: Extremity and Democrats' Feelings Toward Republicans

(Higher Score = Warmer Feeling)

# of polarized questions where respondents give extreme answers at T1	N	T1 Feelings Toward Other Party Mean	T2 Feelings Toward Other Party Mean	T2-T1
None	13	37	40	+3
1-5	37	27	37	+10*
6-10	44	23	36	+13**
11-15	46	14	30	+16***
16-26	38	8	24	+16***

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.000; two tailed test

Table 9: Extremity and Republicans' Feelings Toward Democrats
 (Higher Score = Warmer Feeling)

# of polarized questions where respondents give extreme answers at T1	N	T1 Feelings Toward Other Party Mean	T2 Feelings Toward Other Party Mean	T2-T1
None	18	33	43	+10*
1-5	36	26	38	+12**
6-10	32	18	34	+16***
11-15	24	10	27	+17***
16-26	10	5	29	+24**

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.000; two-tailed test

Overall, Tables 8 and 9 show a clear relation between extremity at time 1 (as measured by the number of most extreme answers on the 0 to 10 scales) and change in the thermometer ratings toward the other party. The more extreme were respondents' issue positions before deliberation, the more their thermometer rating toward members of the other party rose with deliberation as measured at time 2. Hence the contact hypothesis seemed to work, not just for party members in general, but for members of each party who took the most extreme positions before deliberation. These results support H4. Perhaps those who took the strongest positions at time 1, whether

Republicans or Democrats, were even more isolated from serious contact with the other side than party members in general. We believe these results are striking and present an agenda for future research.

Conclusion

These results from a national field experiment offer proof of concept that deliberation, with an appropriate design, can dramatically de-polarize Republicans and Democrats on issues afflicted by the divisions of extreme partisan polarization. We say “dramatically de-polarize” because many of the changes are so substantial as to be surprising, even on the most contentious issues, and even to researchers who expected a depolarizing effect to some degree. The Deliberative Poll seems to be one such appropriate design. Added research will show if there are others.

Can participation in this kind of organized design be scaled to a larger population? Dealing with the actual problems posed by the combination of substantive and affective polarization would require many people to de-polarize. Those numbers are obviously far greater than those who can be drawn in a random sample. A critic might say that while this field experiment shows that the deliberative process can have a major effect, the effect is limited to so few people that it is hardly of any use.

In our view, this limitation should be a prod to institutional design and innovation. There is no reason why we cannot foster opportunities for many more people to deliberate. There is now a large global community of researchers and practitioners fostering experiments with deliberative democracy (for a comprehensive compendium see Bachtiger et al 2018). There have already been

productive experiments with introducing deliberative designs into the schools as a form of civic education¹⁰ with engaging mini-publics for local public policy consultations, for meetings with elected representatives and candidates (Neblo et al 2018), for televising deliberations on key national issues, and for experimenting with the effect of exposure to the results of deliberating mini-publics (Rasinski, Bradburn and Lauen 1999; Már and Gastil 2020). In addition, online deliberation, with video-based discussions, opens up the possibility of proliferating deliberative mini-publics in a much more cost-effective way (no need to pay for transportation or hotels for those who connect online).

In addition, technology may provide a method of much less costly scaling to large numbers of deliberators who engage in small group discussions comparable in their design to those in a Deliberative Poll. Large numbers of video-based small group discussions can be accommodated by an automated moderator platform (Fishkin et al 2019). They could be part of a large Deliberative Poll or they could be a method of realizing the idea of Deliberation Day, a proposal to have very large numbers of small group discussions convened before a national election (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004). What is utopian in face-to-face discussion, because of the cost of face-to-face logistics, might be made practical online. If the essential treatment is moderated discussion with diverse others, then there is no need for the participants to be drawn in a random sample so long as the participants are recruited at scale and assigned by algorithms to ensure diversity in each small group. Discussions with participants who were not randomly drawn, would not be intended to be representative of a larger population, but they might help create a more thoughtful and substantive form of public opinion when

¹⁰ See, for example, <https://cdd.stanford.edu/2016/deliberative-polling-for-summit-public-schools/>

brought to scale. Our results suggest that the challenge now is to create a more deliberative society, if aspirations for less polarized public opinion and more mutually respectful citizenship are to be realized. We need more institutions that encourage evidence-based, thoughtful public discussion across our deep divisions. If one imagines “America in One Room” not as a mini-public, but as an image of what needs to be brought to scale, one sees the potential for a deeper and more thoughtful democracy. Deliberation can engage citizens in choices that are based on more than partisan conformity, one-sided argumentation or a mere impression of sound bites and headlines. Our findings suggest it is possible, at the level of mass public opinion, to build a democracy that transcends partisan deadlock. This field experiment is a pilot for how we can begin to reimagine democratic possibilities.

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Online Appendix

This Online Appendix presents additional information in three parts:

- 1. Issues of Design and Recruitment**
- 2. Representativeness**
- 3. Comparison of Changes Between Treatment and Control Group (Difference in Differences)**

1. Issues of Design and Recruitment

The A1R project employs an experimental design using treatment and control groups. The treatment in the project involved being invited to and then participating in A1R as a “delegate.” The control group, also a representative sample of registered voters, was not invited to participate in A1R and therefore did not receive the treatment. The respondents in the treatment and control groups were selected using stratified random sampling from NORC’s probability-based AmeriSpeak® Panel panel. The project selected a nationally representative sample of registered voters from the panel, and then randomly assigned the registered voters to the treatment and control groups. The AmeriSpeak Panel panel is an address based sample of approximately 35,000. The members of the panel were recruited by mail, telephone and personal visits and are paid a small honorarium for participating in surveys. They are promised confidentiality of their responses. The research protocol is approved by the IRB responsible for NORC. In addition, all of the travel and living expenses for the delegates to A1R were paid by the project, plus a modest honorarium.

Using the panel as the probability sample source, we identified the delegates and controls in separate and independent processes to meet their respective requirements for targeted sample size. The control sample was selected first under a systematic stratified random sample design to ensure a balanced sample with respect to age, gender, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, political party identification, geography, and other dimensions. After the control sample was selected, the delegate sample was identified from the rest of the sample frame using the same sample stratification procedure. The independent samples were drawn to create representative treatment and control samples that correspond to U.S registered voter population benchmarks derived from the November 2018 Current Population Survey or the 2018 General Social Survey.

The treatment and control group samples were administered the same pre-event survey. All control group pre-event survey completions were retained for the post-event follow-up survey. All treatment group pre-event survey completions were potentially eligible for selection to the A1R event. NORC sub-sampled treatment group completions for selection to receive an invitation to participate in the A1R. The “final delegate” sample was selected from the pool of treatment pre-event survey completions who stated a willingness to be part of the event or were initially reluctant to participate but later changed their minds. To ensure that the final delegates who participate in A1R fully represent the diversity of the registered voting population, we set a sample size quota for key subpopulations defined by age, gender, race/ethnicity, geography, educational attainment, party identification, and LGBT status. NORC employed a “concierge” method, assigning a specific researcher to assist them with any travel or logistical issues related to their participation in the event. Additional funds were available to help respondents with special needs (compensation for child-care at home, companions who might assist those who lacked mobility, etc). The participants were informed that they were participating in a social science investigation of their opinions collected in confidential questionnaires.

The two surveys are designed to measure opinion and knowledge shifts that could occur in the time period elapsing between the administrations of the two surveys. The pre-event survey was administered to the treatment (n=2,741 completions) and control (1,101 completions) groups between July 9, 2019 and August 5, 2019 in English and Spanish. 1,566 participants in the treatment group were randomly selected within the relevant sub-populations to receive an invitation. 605 accepted and registered for the event. 560 booked travel (at the expense of the project) and 526 made the trip with 523 completing the final survey. The post-event survey was administered to the control group (n=844, 76.7% follow-up rate) between September 10 and September 20, 2019. The A1R delegates completed the post-event survey on September 22, 2019 at the event itself using a self-administered paper survey. Of the 526 delegates attending A1R, 523 completed the post-event survey (99.4% completion rate).

Participants’ individual privacy rights are maintained in all published and written data resulting from the study. Participant’s confidentiality is maintained through confidential questionnaires and recordings producing anonymized transcripts. All data collected is for research purposes only, anonymized, and stored on an encrypted and password protected device.

2. Representativeness

The following tables present data on the demographic representativeness of the treatment and control group samples compared to Census Benchmarks (A1), and the self-reported political party identification of the treatment and control groups (A2).

Table A1 Treatment and Control Group Demographic Comparison to Census Benchmarks¹¹

U.S. Registered Voters, Unweighted and Weighted (in %)

	Treatment "Delegates" (n=523)		Control Group (n=844)		Population Benchmark (Nov 2018 CPS)
	Unweighted	Weighted	Unweighted	Weighted	
Gender					
Male	48.4	46.6	51.5	46.6	46.6
Female	51.6	53.4	48.5	53.4	53.4
Age					
18 - 24	10.1	7.1	6.6	7.1	7.1
25 - 29	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.7	6.7
30 - 39	14.9	14.3	17.3	14.3	14.3
40 - 49	14.3	15.7	16.1	15.7	15.7
50 - 59	19.9	18.9	17.7	18.9	18.9
60 - 64	10.7	10.2	10.9	10.2	10.2
65 +	23.1	27.1	24.8	27.1	27.1
Race/Ethnicity					
Non-Hispanic White	63.9	72.8	71.8	72.8	72.8
Non-Hispanic Black	16.4	11.9	9.7	11.9	11.9
Hispanic	10.1	9.6	11.3	9.6	9.6
All Other	9.6	5.7	7.2	5.7	5.7
Education Level					
High School or Less	9.8	26.9	20.5	26.9	26.9

¹¹ Courtesy of NORC.

Some College	39.0	29.7	34.7	29.7	29.7
College Degree	51.2	43.4	44.8	43.4	43.4
Census Region					
New England	4.8	4.9	3.6	4.9	4.9
Middle Atlantic	9.0	12.5	12.1	12.5	12.5
East North Central	14.0	15.4	17.2	15.4	15.4
West North Central	8.6	7.2	6.4	7.2	7.2
South Atlantic	20.1	20.2	19.7	20.2	20.2
East South Central	5.7	5.9	3.8	5.9	5.9
West South Central	12.6	10.5	10.9	10.5	10.5
Mountain	6.9	7.7	8.4	7.7	7.7
Pacific	18.4	15.6	18.0	15.6	15.6
Metro/Non-Metro					
Non-Metro Areas	12.2	13.6	12.1	13.6	13.6
Metro Areas	87.8	86.4	87.9	86.4	86.4

Table A2: Self-Reported Party Identification for Treatment/Delegates and Controls (Unweighted)¹²

Party ID	Treatment "Delegates" (n=523)	Control Group (n=844)
Democrat	36.9	34.5
Republican	24.9	29.5
Independent	38.2	36.0

¹² Courtesy of NORC

3. Comparing Changes in Treatment and Control Group (Difference in Differences)

Table A3 Comparison of Changes in Treatment and Control Group for Party Members

This table shows the mean opinion change difference in difference results for Democratic and Republican party members for the 26 items for which there was extreme polarization. The first column shows the mean opinion change among participants minus the mean change in the control group for Democrats. The second column shows the mean opinion change among participants minus the mean change in the control group for Republicans. The third column, “R-D” shows the change in the gap between Republicans and Democrats, time 2 minus time 1 (the difference in difference of means). The asterisks indicate the significance of the change. The “Overall Mean Difference” rows refer to the difference in means for the members of a given party overall. The “Extreme Mean Difference” refers to the difference in means for those members of a given party taking the most extreme positions at Time 1. The asterisks indicate statistical significance with two-tailed tests as follows: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .000$; ns = not significant.

		POST-PRE (Delegate-Control)			
		Democrats	Republicans	Independents	R-D
Q2A	[Reduce the number of refugees allowed to resettle the US.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.813	-1.897	-1.613	-1.084
		***	***	***	***
	Extremes' Mean Difference	-0.404	-2.669	-0.805	-2.266
		ns	***	ns	***
Q2C	[Provide aid to reduce poverty and violence in Central America.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.184	0.840	0.521	1.024
		ns	**	*	***
	Extremes' Mean Difference	-0.092	1.240	0.231	1.332
		ns	*	ns	***
Q2E	[Increase the number of visas for low-skilled workers to move to the US for industries that need them, like agriculture and service.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean D Difference	0.855	1.739	1.386	0.884
		***	***	***	**
	Extremes' Mean Difference	0.330	2.468	1.208	2.139
		ns	***	*	***
Q2H	[Continue DACA, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which protects people who were brought to the US as children when their parents entered the country illegally.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.659	1.471	1.196	0.812
		***	***	***	**
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.381	2.810	0.708	2.428
		**	***	**	***
Q2I	[Undocumented immigrants should be forced to return to their home countries before applying to legally come to the US to live and work permanently.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.886	-2.721	-1.939	-1.835
		***	***	***	***

		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.315	-2.737	-1.746	-2.422
			ns	***	***	***
Q3A	[The US should commit to the 2014 Paris Agreement to combat climate change.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	0.067	0.859	0.239	0.792
			ns	***	ns	**
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.166	1.543	0.067	1.709
			ns	***	ns	***
Q3B	[The US should go beyond the Paris Agreement and aim for more significant cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	0.091	0.705	0.202	0.614
			ns	*	ns	*
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.190	1.104	0.179	1.295
			ns	*	ns	***
Q3C	[The US should use taxes or other market incentives to achieve emissions reductions.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.100	1.082	0.455	1.182
			ns	***	*	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.620	0.795	0.748	1.416
			*	ns	*	***
Q3D	[A Green New Deal to commit to major investments in infrastructure and renewable energy.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.101	-0.379	-0.879	-0.278
			ns	ns	***	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.780	0.349	-1.073	1.129
			***	ns	***	***
Q3E	[The US should expand oil and gas production.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.391	-0.330	-0.225	0.061
			*	ns	ns	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.128	-0.164	-0.275	-0.036
			ns	ns	ns	*
Q3H	[The US should mandate zero carbon emissions for cars, trucks, and buses.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?					
		Overall Mean Difference	-1.207	-0.127	-0.820	1.079
			***	ns	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.568	0.139	-0.631	1.706

		***	ns	ns	***
Q4A	[Capital gains -- income earned when an investment that has increased in value is sold -- should be taxed the same as ordinary wage income.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.376	-0.204	0.183	-0.580
		ns	ns	ns	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.500	0.398	-0.129	-0.102
		ns	ns	ns	*
Q4B	[The US should impose a wealth tax on the richest taxpayers, requiring them to pay a small portion of their wealth on an annual basis.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.529	-0.171	-0.630	0.358
		*	ns	**	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.445	0.817	-0.580	1.263
		ns	*	ns	***
Q4C	[The US should repeal the estate tax, which currently taxes deceased individuals worth at least \$11 million and deceased couples worth at least \$22 million.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.454	-0.238	-0.428	-0.692
		ns	ns	ns	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.294	-0.150	-0.610	-0.444
		ns	ns	ns	***
Q4F	[Lower the corporate tax rate from 21% to 15%.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-1.150	-2.319	-1.175	-1.169
		***	***	***	**
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.314	-2.244	-0.382	-1.929
		ns	**	ns	***
Q4G	[Increase federal minimum wage from \$7.25/hr. to \$15/hr.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-1.767	-0.456	-1.654	1.311
		***	ns	***	***
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-2.174	0.127	-1.510	2.301
		***	ns	***	***
Q4H	[The government should cover the cost of college tuition at public universities for all students who could not otherwise afford it.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-1.050	0.023	-0.630	1.073

		***	ns	**	***
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.242	0.733	-0.793	1.975
		***	**	*	***
Q4I	[The government should fund a bond for each child born that will accumulate in value until the child turns 18 to then become usable for higher education or other essentials for a start in life.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-3.184	-1.110	-2.893	2.074
		***	***	***	***
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-4.235	-0.325	-2.787	3.910
		***	ns	***	***
Q5A	[The Affordable Care Act should be repealed.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.069	-1.578	-0.936	-1.509
		ns	***	***	***
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.001	-1.961	-0.559	-1.962
		ns	***	ns	***
Q5B	[Repeal the Affordable Care Act and replace with grants to state Governments to create their own systems.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.391	-0.886	-0.025	-1.277
		ns	**	ns	*
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.587	-1.261	-0.466	-1.848
		*	ns	ns	***
Q5C	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the poor should be increased.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.032	1.149	0.679	1.117
		ns	***	**	**
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.052	1.571	0.775	1.623
		ns	**	ns	***
Q5D	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the middle class should be expanded to include more people.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.335	1.212	0.764	0.876
		ns	***	***	**
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.286	2.554	0.548	2.268
		ns	***	ns	***
Q5H	[People should be automatically enrolled in a more generous version of Medicare.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.937	-0.427	-0.958	0.510

		***	ns	***	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.090	0.074	-1.123	1.164
		**	ns	*	***
Q6A	[The US should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trading agreement between 12 countries excluding China.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	1.071	2.122	1.564	1.050
		***	***	***	*
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.373	4.757	1.180	4.384
		ns	***	*	***
Q6F	[The US should recommit to the Iran Nuclear Agreement.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.886	1.186	1.838	0.299
		***	***	***	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.577	1.804	1.755	1.228
		*	***	***	***
Q6G	[Presidents should be required to obtain explicit congressional approval for sending US troops into combat situations.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
	Overall Mean Difference	0.088	1.126	0.195	1.037
		ns	***	ns	***
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.039	2.426	0.201	2.387
		ns	***	ns	***

Table A4: Comparison of Changes in Treatment vs Control for Party Members Plus Leaners

This table shows the mean opinion change difference in difference results for party members plus leaners for the 26 items showing extreme partisan polarization. Democrats include “Lean Democrats” and Republicans include “Lean Republicans.” The first column shows the mean opinion change among participants minus the mean opinion change in the control group for Democrats (plus Leaners). The second column shows the mean opinion change among participants minus the mean change in the control group for Republicans (plus leaners). The third column, “R-D” shows the change in the gap between Republicans and Democrats, time 2 minus time 1 (difference in difference of means). The asterisks indicate the significance of the change. The “Overall Mean Difference” rows refer to the difference in means for the members of a given party (plus leaners) overall. The “Extreme Mean Difference” refers to the difference in means for those members of a given party (plus leaners) taking the most extreme positions at Time 1. The asterisks indicate statistical significance with two-tailed tests as follows: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.000; ns = not significant.

			POST-PRE (Delegate-Control)		
			Democrats	Republicans	R-D
Q2A	[Reduce the number of refugees allowed to resettle the US.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				

		Overall Mean Difference	-0.891	-2.004	-1.112
			***	***	***
		Extreme Mean Difference	-0.300	-2.472	-2.172
			ns	***	***
Q2C	[Provide aid to reduce poverty and violence in Central America.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.068	0.933	1.000
			ns	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.164	1.213	1.378
			ns	**	***
Q2E	[Increase the number of visas for low-skilled workers to move to the US for industries that need them, like agriculture and service.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.848	1.701	0.853
			***	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.428	2.972	2.544
			*	***	***
Q2H	[Continue DACA, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which protects people who were brought to the US as children when their parents entered the country illegally.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.673	1.696	1.022
			***	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.306	2.887	2.580
			**	***	***
Q2I	[Undocumented immigrants should be forced to return to their home countries before applying to legally come to the US to live and work permanently.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				

		Overall Mean Difference	-1.022	-2.681	-1.660
			***	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.588	-2.619	-2.031
			*	***	***
Q3A	[The US should commit to the 2014 Paris Agreement to combat climate change.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.137	0.750	0.613
			ns	***	**
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.164	1.171	1.334
			ns	***	***
Q3B	[The US should go beyond the Paris Agreement and aim for more significant cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.072	0.636	0.708
			ns	**	**
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.237	0.801	1.038
			ns	*	***
Q3C	[The US should use taxes or other market incentives to achieve emissions reductions.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.121	0.912	1.034
			ns	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.349	0.825	1.174
			ns	*	***
Q3D	[A Green New Deal to commit to major investments in infrastructure and renewable energy.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				

		Overall Mean Difference	-0.362	-0.471	-0.110
			*	*	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.058	0.243	1.301
			***	ns	***
Q3E	[The US should expand oil and gas production.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.269	-0.409	-0.140
			ns	*	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.065	-0.492	-0.427
			ns	ns	**
Q3H	[The US should mandate zero carbon emissions for cars, trucks, and buses.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-1.159	-0.175	0.984
			***	ns	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.400	0.003	1.402
			***	ns	***
Q4A	[Capital gains -- income earned when an investment that has increased in value is sold -- should be taxed the same as ordinary wage income.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.409	-0.193	-0.603
			ns	ns	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.133	0.361	0.227
			ns	ns	**
Q4B	[The US should impose a wealth tax on the richest taxpayers, requiring them to pay a small portion of their wealth on an annual basis.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				

		Overall Mean Difference	-0.803	-0.112	0.690
			***	ns	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.899	0.814	1.712
			***	**	***
Q4C	[The US should repeal the estate tax, which currently taxes deceased individuals worth at least \$11 million and deceased couples worth at least \$22 million.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.257	-0.321	-0.578
			ns	ns	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.431	-0.650	-1.081
			ns	ns	***
Q4F	[Lower the corporate tax rate from 21% to 15%.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.872	-2.201	-1.329
			***	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.222	-1.861	-1.638
			ns	**	***
Q4G	[Increase federal minimum wage from \$7.25/hr. to \$15/hr.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-1.897	-0.584	1.313
			***	**	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-2.388	0.154	2.542
			***	ns	***
Q4H	[The government should cover the cost of college tuition at public universities for all students who could not otherwise afford it.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-1.088	0.018	1.106

			***	ns	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.441	0.509	1.950
			***	*	***
Q4I	[The government should fund a bond for each child born that will accumulate in value until the child turns 18 to then become usable for higher education or other essentials for a start in life.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-3.342	-1.348	1.995
			***	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-4.523	-0.351	4.172
			***	*	***
Q5A	[The Affordable Care Act should be repealed.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.144	-1.479	-1.335
			ns	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.014	-1.738	-1.724
			ns	***	***
Q5B	[Repeal the Affordable Care Act and replace with grants to state Governments to create their own systems.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.224	-0.476	-0.700
			ns	ns	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.314	-1.006	-1.320
			ns	ns	***
Q5C	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the poor should be increased.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.137	1.081	0.944

			ns	***	**
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.136	1.501	1.637
			ns	***	***
Q5D	[The federal subsidies in the Affordable Care Act that help the middle class should be expanded to include more people.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.281	1.225	0.945
			ns	***	***
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.220	2.275	2.054
			ns	***	***
Q5H	[People should be automatically enrolled in a more generous version of Medicare.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	-0.991	-0.432	0.558
			***	ns	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	-1.311	0.678	1.988
			***	*	***
Q6A	[The US should rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trading agreement between 12 countries excluding China.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	1.158	2.001	0.843
			***	***	*
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.603	3.281	2.678
			**	***	***
Q6F	[The US should recommit to the Iran Nuclear Agreement.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	1.062	1.324	0.263

			***	***	ns
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.550	1.742	1.192
			*	***	***
Q6G	[Presidents should be required to obtain explicit congressional approval for sending US troops into combat situations.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?				
		Overall Mean Difference	0.012	0.794	0.783
			ns	***	**
		Extreme's Mean Difference	0.018	1.802	1.784
			ns	**	***

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		POST-PRE (Delegate-Control)		
		Democrats	Republicans	R-D
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	Overall Mean Difference	-0.891	-2.004	-1.112
		***	***	***
	Extreme Mean Difference	-0.300	-2.472	-2.172
		ns	***	***
Q2C	[Provide aid to reduce poverty and violence in Central America.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?			
	Overall Mean Difference	-0.068	0.933	1.000
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	Extreme's Mean Difference	-0.164	1.213	1.378
		ns	**	***
Q2E	[Increase the number of visas for low-skilled workers to move to the US for industries that need them, like agriculture and service.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?			
	Overall Mean Difference	0.848	1.701	0.853
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	Overall Mean Difference	0.673	1.696	1.022
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			***	ns	***
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			ns	*	ns
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			ns	ns	**
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			***	ns	***
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			***	**	***
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			ns	ns	ns
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			***	***	***
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			ns	**	***
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			***	**	***
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		ns	ns	***

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	Overall Mean Difference	1.158	2.001	0.843
		***	***	*
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		**	***	***

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		***	***	ns
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.550	1.742	1.192
		*	***	***
Q6G	[Presidents should be required to obtain explicit congressional approval for sending US troops into combat situations.] How strongly would you oppose or favor these?			
	Overall Mean Difference	0.012	0.794	0.783
		ns	***	**
	Extreme's Mean Difference	0.018	1.802	1.784
		ns	**	***

