

Deliberative Democracy and the Deliberative Poll on the Euro

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Focus on the concept of deliberative democracy has increased rapidly within recent decades. However, the concept is weakly defined, if at all. ‘Deliberation’ is defined as an unconstrained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and potentially leads to a transformation of preferences. Throughout the 1990s several innovative democratic experiments have flourished focusing on citizens’ involvement and deliberation. The Deliberative Poll in focus here is, according to many parameters, the most ambitious one. The article presents the results from the Danish National Deliberative Poll on the single currency. In August 2000, 364 representative Danish citizens assembled to deliberate on Denmark’s participation in the single currency. The Deliberative Poll is described as a quasi-experiment set out to explore the empirical potentials of deliberative democracy. The focus is whether the claimed potential of deliberative democracy is present in the experimental setting. The participants’ answers reflect a deliberative process dominated by considerable changes in opinion, an increase in knowledge and an improved ability to form a reasoned opinion. Mutual understanding among the participants prevailed. At the same time, self-interest and domination were also part of the deliberative process. Thus, this article encourages the development of deliberative democratic theory in order to incorporate these features of politics.

Introduction

In August 2000 a Deliberative Poll on Denmark’s participation in the single currency took place in Odense.¹ The Poll was held one month before the Danish referendum on whether Denmark should join the European single currency – the euro. The deliberative focus accentuated by the experiment is part of the academic debate on deliberative democracy, which increased dramatically during the 1990s. From 1945 to 1993, only 84 academic articles were published in the field. From 1994 to 2002, 447 articles were published, according to the Social Science Citation Index.² Despite, and partly because of, the increased attention to deliberative democracy, the theory is still in its evolution and loosely defined.

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First, the article identifies several potentials adding deliberation to the political process. Second, the article evaluates the claimed potentials of deliberation in the context of the Danish Deliberative Poll on the euro. The experiment brought together a representative sample of citizens to deliberate with each other, leading politicians and experts. Four times throughout the experiment, the participants' opinions were polled. The methodological setting of the Deliberative Poll makes it possible to evaluate the effect of information and deliberation when ordinary citizens are given the opportunity to engage in highly complex political issues.

Democratic Theory on a 'Deliberative Turn'

Deliberation has always been a central feature of democracy. As early as in ancient Athens, deliberation was looked upon as a feature of the political process (Hansen 1991). Since then, prominent political thinkers such as John Stuart Mill, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey have discussed the concept, although from various perspectives and with different emphasis. The rediscovery of deliberation within the past decade among democracy theorists has shifted the rather entrenched debate between liberal and republican approaches to democracy to an academic debate allowing for several democratic theorists' approaches to democracy to seek common grounds for their arguments (e.g. Rawls 1993; Habermas 1996). Some also draw attention to innovative deliberative democratic practices (e.g. Fishkin 1991). As opposed to participatory democracy (e.g. Pateman 1970; MacPherson 1977; Mansbridge 1983; Barber 1984), participation in deliberative democracy is mainly emphasized as a means to encourage more deliberation in the different stages of public decision making and not as a goal in itself (Englund 2000; Hansen 2004).

Agreement on what deliberative democracy is cannot be found in the literature and, as a theory, it is still in its evolution and weakly defined. Many definitions of 'deliberation' have been advanced, reflecting various focuses of deliberative democracy. A relatively broad definition adopts 'deliberation' as 'an unconstrained exchange of arguments that involves practical reasoning and always potentially leads to a transformation of preferences' (Cooke 2000, 948). However, it seems a paradox and a contradiction to include 'always' and 'potentially' in the same definition. Second, since a deliberative process just as easily can lead to a reinforcement of initial preferences, 'always' should be excluded from the definition of deliberation.

The definition of deliberation emphasizes what seem to be common grounds for deliberative democrats, that is, practical reasoning through the exchange of arguments as a defining part of the deliberative process. Through practical reasoning deliberators potentially learn not only about their own preferences but also about the preferences of others. This process

can allow for the transformation of preferences. Practical reasoning through the exchange of arguments enables the creating of mutual understanding as the potential outcome of deliberation. Inspired by John Rawls (1993), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 52–53) refer to mutual understanding as reciprocity, that is ‘the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake’. Thus, the process of deliberation in itself is important in order to understand the normative idea of deliberative democracy. The justification of deliberative democracy is partly based on what is considered mutually accepted by others, meaning that deliberators must be responsive to others during deliberation, and partly on citizens’ experience of fairness in the deliberative process. Deliberation aspires to reach a political reasoning that is mutually justifiable based on citizens’ continuous seeking of fair terms of cooperation among equals, and encouraging them to continue the deliberation (Gutmann & Thompson 1996; Bohman 1996, 32). At the same time, each citizen is accountable to objections raised by other citizens and answerable to demands from other citizens to recognize other citizens’ concerns as well (Bohman 1996; 1999, 185). During deliberation the citizen is forced to think of what would count as good reasons for others involved in the process (Benhabib 1996, 71–72); that is, to appeal to reasons that fellow citizens in the specific context of deliberation can share. The transformation of preferences relates to the mutual acceptance of the concerns of other citizens. Deliberation may induce a shared preference structure and, thus, a shared sense of the problem being deliberated (Fishkin & Laslett 2003, 3). In this way, the preference structure of a deliberative process can be seen as coherent, consistent and stable because it balances what is considered mutually acceptable both in relation to mutual respect and understanding among the citizens and in relation to the experience of fairness in the deliberative process.

According to deliberative democrats, the unconstrained exchange of arguments involving practical reasoning underlines that citizens engaging in a deliberative process will be more reluctant to exchange arguments based on self-interest because these arguments will prove to be less convincing. Instead, citizens in a deliberative process will to a higher degree base their arguments on the common good and general principles because reasoning based on this line of argumentation will be more convincing to other citizens.

An unconstrained exchange of arguments implies that all participating citizens should have equal opportunity to express their opinions throughout the process. Opponents of deliberative democracy claim that deliberative processes are not equal processes, since participants capable of arguing on rational, measurable and objective grounds are favoured through these processes. Such participants are already over-represented in the political system (Phillips 1995; Young 1996, 122; Sanders 1997). Thus, it is important to meet this criticism by designing deliberative arenas that do not compromise the notion of ‘effective participation’ (Dahl 1989) and do allow different types of

arguments to be put forward. On the other hand, some may argue that it is an advantage to the deliberative process that rational and objective arguments are favoured as opposed to arguments based on feelings and mainly subjective arguments. This is also pinpointed by the notion of the force of the better argument, since some reasons are better than others in the sense that they are more convincing by referring to the common good (Manin 1987). It is often argued that deliberation will strengthen procedural legitimacy only as long as opinions are backed with reason (Habermas 1996, 448; Rättilä 2000). Thus, advocates of deliberation may find themselves in a trade-off. On the one hand, it is claimed that if opinions are well argued and reasoned, stronger democratic legitimacy is gained. On the other hand, this process of deliberation may compromise political equality.

The above definition of deliberation makes it possible to address various elements of deliberative democracy and its justification. But it also makes it possible to deduce certain potential effects of deliberation in a political process. The purpose of deducing potentials or qualities of deliberation from the definition of deliberation is to use them as hypotheses in order to assess to what degree the Deliberative Poll on the euro fulfils the potentials of deliberation.

The potentials should be interpreted only as *potential* aspects or outcomes of a deliberative process, since not all reasons will necessarily be present features of a deliberative process. By relating the potential aspects of deliberation to an empirical setting, it is possible to distinguish between more and less deliberative processes, as in Robert A. Dahl's (1989) argument that democratic processes can be more or less democratic. In this respect, the normative theory engages in a necessary relation with empirical issues. If this was not the case, deliberative democracy would risk being placed in a situation of focusing on arbitrary principles and engaging in endless abstract debates (Held 1996, 304).

Four broad potentials of deliberation are summarized in Table 1. The potentials are based on Benhabib (1996), Elster (1998), Fearon (1998), Gargarella (1998), Aars and Offerdal (2000), Cooke (2000), Fishkin and Laslett (2003) and Hansen (2004).

The four potentials of deliberation are related to and dependent on each other. Some of them may even be overlapping and some even contradictory. However, each of them posits reasons why deliberation should be a desired part of a political process. In the following, the four potentials of deliberation will be explored and elaborated by analysing the Danish Deliberative Poll on the

Table 1. Potentials of a Deliberative Process

Formation of coherent, stable and consistent preferences
Educating citizens
Increasing mutual understanding
Minimizing the use of arguments referring to narrow self-interest

euro. Focus is put on the effects of deliberation at the individual level. Before presenting the empirical findings from the Deliberative Poll, we will describe and discuss the experiment, its context and the methodological innovations.

The Deliberative Poll and Its Context

Any democratic system is founded on a number of different channels through which citizens can express their views. During the past decade, a number of methods for involving citizens and making their voices known to the political elite have been advanced. As opposed to more formalized channels of representative democracy (e.g. referendums), these supplementing arenas are *ad hoc* and non-institutionalized, deal with a limited agenda of issues, and are independent of the electoral procedure and primarily organized by someone other than the citizens themselves. A Deliberative Poll is one among these methods and is according to many parameters the most ambitious one.³ In the normative debate on deliberative democracy the need to create supplementary – not alternative – arenas for public deliberation has often been emphasized (e.g. Bohman 1996; Gutmann & Thompson 1996). A Deliberative Poll can be seen as a supplementary arena for political participation. Hence, a Deliberative Poll does not create a decision-making body but an arena for communicating reflective reasons and post-deliberative opinions of the participants to the established political system and to the public. A Deliberative Poll used in a deciding manner, and thus partly replacing or at least challenging other decision-making bodies, would compromise the notion of accountability as defined by representative democracy, in which the focus is on how elected officials are given a mandate to govern and are held accountable for their decisions through formal electoral procedures (Pitkin 1967; Hansen & Pedersen 2001). However, the consequence is that the outcome of a Deliberative Poll ought not to be binding for non-participating citizens. Non-participating citizens cannot hold the participants accountable for the decisions made at a Deliberative Poll.

A Deliberative Poll is, on the one hand, a setting designed to enhance a particular dimension of democracy – that is, deliberation and allowing different experiences to be part of the political process through practical reasoning and exchange of viewpoints. On the other hand, a Deliberative Poll is a setting for studying processes of deliberation and opinion formation – that is, a quasi-experiment. A Deliberative Poll is based on a simple idea: bring together a representative group of people, let them deliberate with each other and with politicians and experts and poll their opinions before, during and after the process (t_0 , t_1 , t_2). Thus, a Deliberative Poll combines the notion of political equality with the notion of deliberation: political equality in the form of a representative sample procedure, which resembles selection

by lot, since everyone has an equal chance of being selected (Fishkin 1997; Manin 1997); and deliberation in the form of citizens being subjected to balanced information and intensive debate with other citizens, leading experts and politicians.

A representative sample of 364 Danish citizens participated in the Deliberative Poll on the euro. The method of Deliberative Polling was based on and inspired by James S. Fishkin's model of Deliberative Polling (1988; 1991; 1997). It was number eight of its kind in the world held on a national level. Owing to the Danish national referendum on the single currency one month after the Deliberative Poll, public awareness of the euro issue, and thus also of the Deliberative Poll, was high. This public awareness also placed the experiment in a context of a highly political and debated issue, the referendum on the single currency being the sixth Danish national referendum on European integration within the past thirty years. The issue of European integration has divided the Danish public as well as the political elite into two rather entrenched positions. The division on European integration is found (1) within the public, (2) within the elite and (3) between the public and the elite. This division was emphasized by the close race at the Danish referendum on the single currency. Fifty-three percent voted against Denmark joining the single currency. Many of the arguments for and against European integration presented in the political debates preceding the five previous referendums were also presented in the euro debate (Buch & Hansen 2002). Accordingly, the Danish public, which on several occasions has taken a stand on the issue, already knew most of the arguments concerning European integration. Thus, it was expected that the participants of the Deliberative Poll would have a strong position beforehand. Furthermore, it was expected that the participants in the Danish Deliberative Poll would be better informed on the issue in advance compared with participants in other Deliberative Polls. Finally, as the results of opinion polls before the Deliberative Poll and the previous referendums on European integration indicated, the population was divided into two almost equally sized groups either supporting or not supporting further European integration. Thus, the claimed potential of deliberative democracy was tested on a rather 'critical case'. If the claimed potential of deliberative democracy was justified in the Danish context, it would also be likely to be found in contexts with less entrenched lines of conflict.

The Deliberative Poll process was launched by interviewing a representative sample of citizens selected by simple random sampling (t_0). At the same time, the respondents were invited to participate in a later event. At this event they were given the opportunity to discuss issues related to the EU and the euro with other participants, politicians and experts, including the Prime Minister, the Vice Prime Minister and all opposition party leaders represented in the Danish parliament. Before the event, the respondents who

Table 2. Recruitment to the Deliberative Poll on the Euro in 2000

	Date	Number of participants
	Initially contacted for recruitment interview	2,843
t_0	Recruitment interview (telephone interview)	1–8 August 1,702
	Acceptance of participation in the Deliberative Poll	8 August 732
	Possibly	526
	Information folder on the event sent to participants	8–11 August 732
	Second invitation by telephone	16 August 699
	Yes	375
	Possibly	81
	No	243
	Could not be reached	33
	Program and information material sent to participants	14–18 August 489
	Contacted by phone to confirm participation	17–22 August 489
	Participants enrolled	22 August 396
	Tickets sent to participants	21–25 August
	Participants enrolled	25 August 386
t_1/t_2	Participants in the Deliberative Poll	26–27 August 364
t_3	Participants re-interviewed (telephone interview)	27 November – 16 December 355

Note: Television spots on the Deliberative Poll were shown daily on national Danish television the week before the Poll. The recruitment interviews (t_0) were conducted by PLS Rambøll Management by telephone. The response rate was 60 percent with seven callbacks. The sampling was done through simple random sampling on telephone numbers. At a later stage, the surveys will be available from Danish Data Archives.

accepted the invitation received information on the single currency. The information material was carefully prepared in order to balance all arguments on the issue. All campaigning political parties and movements were invited to comment on the information material before its publication. The event took place on a weekend during which the participants deliberated in small groups and in plenary sessions with politicians and experts. The small groups were randomly composed and consisted of 18–20 citizens. A moderator was assigned to each group. In order to provide the public with insights into the event, part of the plenary session and part of the group discussions of two groups were transmitted by national television.

The participants' opinions were polled through self-administered questionnaires at the beginning (t_1) and the end (t_2) of the event. The questions asked in t_1 and t_2 were to a large extent similar to the questions asked in t_0 . However, they were supplemented with questions evaluating the information material (t_1) and the deliberation at the plenary session and in the small groups (t_2). The recruitment process is shown in Table 2.

Several adjustments compared with Fishkin's model (Fishkin 1997) were applied to the Danish project. First, the participants were not offered an honorarium for participating; instead a gift was offered (approximate retail

value €60) and three travel vouchers were provided by lot (approximate retail value €240 each). Second, the participants' opinions were polled four times (t_0 , t_1 , t_2 , t_3) compared with twice ($t_0 + t_2$) as in most of Fishkin's projects.⁴ The adjustments made it possible to differentiate between the effect of the deliberation during the weekend and the effect ascribed to the time prior to the weekend, e.g. the participants' increased knowledge gained from the information material. It also became possible to study the long-term effects of participation in the event, since the opinions of the participants were polled again three months after the event (t_3). Finally, a representative control sample of citizens was surveyed simultaneously with the gathering of the 364 participants of the Deliberative Poll (24 August–3 September, $N = 993$). The control sample allows us to assess the effect of deliberation and the effect of other factors such as, for instance, the public debate. In addition, more emphasis was put on the evaluation of the participatory and deliberative processes in the small groups in the Danish Poll. In contrast, Fishkin's focus (Fishkin 1997) has primarily been on the increase of knowledge and changes in attitudes among participants (Luskin et al. 2002). The adjustments of the method allowed a more thorough assessment of the process of deliberation and whether the claimed potentials of deliberative democracy were fulfilled in the Deliberative Poll on the euro.

The aim of the Deliberative Poll is not to allow the participants to act on behalf of the *demos*. Rather, it is to approximately mirror the *demos* in terms of sociodemographic characteristics and attitudes, thus bringing different social experiences into the deliberative process. The participants will, in this sense, mirror the *demos* at large before the deliberative process. As soon as the participants engage in the process, their opinions will start to mirror the specific process of deliberation and information set up in the quasi-experimental context and will differ from those of the population at large. In the Danish Deliberative Poll, the participants succeeded to a large extent in mirroring the Danish population (Table 3). However, even though there are strong resemblances between the electorate and the participants, self-selection procedures are inevitable, since participation is not mandatory. Of the 1,702 persons in the initial sample, 364 participated in the Deliberative Poll. The self-selection procedures were expected to create some bias, e.g. it is not surprising that the participants in the Deliberative Poll are more interested in politics than the general population measured by the total sample of the recruitment interview.⁵ As emphasized by Heinz Eulau (1969, 101), 'The very fact of their having been elected or selected – having "elevated" through some mechanism of choice from one position into another – makes the "chosen" fundamentally different from their choosers'. However, the resemblance between the initial sample and the participants justifies the assumption that the participants are a relatively good reflection of the population at large. Nevertheless, the characteristics

Table 3. Characteristics of the Participants, Recruitment Interview (t_0) (percent)

		Deliberative Poll	Recruitment survey
Gender* **	Male	58	49
	Female	42	51
Age*	18–30 years	17	23
	31–40 years	23	20
	41–60 years	41	34
	61+ years	19	23
Education*	None	2	3
	Lower secondary education	12	17
	Upper secondary education	51	51
	University degree	35	29
Occupation	Self-employed	5	4
	Private employee	57	58
	Public employee	38	38
Habitation	Rural area	5	5
	≤2,000 inhabitants	10	10
	2,001–10,000 inhabitants	18	21
	≥10,001 inhabitants	67	64
Member of a political party or group?	Yes	10	9
	No	90	91
Interest in politics (mean)**	Index (0–100)	59	50
Expected vote at the referendum*	Yes	45	39
	No	37	37
	Undecided	18	24

Note: In the Deliberative Poll 364 people participated. The recruitment survey was representative of the Danish electorate. The recruitment survey ($N = 1,702$) is based on weighted data.

* The difference between the groups is significant at $p < 0.05$ using a chi-square test for independence.

** The mean between the groups is significantly different at $p < 0.05$ using a test comparing the mean (two-tailed test). Age shows no significant difference the if mean is compared.

relevant to be mirrored in a sample are always debatable and will change over time and between contexts (Hansen & Pedersen 2001).

Characterizing the Deliberative Poll as a quasi-experiment makes it a unique design attempting to recreate processes of political life, though controlling to some extent the information and deliberation. At the same time, the setting of the Deliberative Poll is artificial, since it deviates from real-world deliberative processes. People act differently when they are part of an experimental setting. In the methodological literature, this is referred to as the ‘Hawthorne effect’ (e.g. Ladd 1996). However, a Deliberative Poll intentionally creates a setting in which people get the opportunity to act according to deliberative principles. Thus, it is intended that the participants come to deviate from the population at large with regard to attitudes, knowledge and behaviour arising from the experimental setting. The ‘artificial’ setting is,

accordingly, part of the experimental treatment (Merkel 1996). One effect is that internal validity is compromised, since total control of the treatment variable is lost (Campbell & Stanley 1963).

Now that we have described the method of Deliberative Polling, the context in which it was carried out and its implementation, the next section turns to the results of the Danish Deliberative Poll and the extent to which the experiment could be characterized as deliberative using the potentials of a deliberative process from Table 1 as a guideline.

The Four Potentials of Deliberation in an Empirical Context

Formation of Coherent, Consistent and Stable Preferences


Deliberation involves an exchange of arguments. Different experiences, knowledge and opinions are brought together and shared among the participants of the deliberative process. This can lead to an upsurge of new ideas and, thus, to change in opinions. Second, when citizens are given the chance to engage in deliberation, they will, through this experience, be able to relate to the different consequences of a decision, leading to a more coherent and consistent opinion structure. Finally, a consistent opinion structure may be more resistant to impulses from the outside and, therefore, deliberation will lead to more stable opinions.

The public's interest in the Danish Deliberative Poll was focused on how the 364 participants would vote on the question of Denmark joining the single currency. Consequently, the Deliberative Poll was seen as part of the general debate on the euro before the actual referendum on 28 September 2000. Before participating in the Deliberative Poll (t_0), 45 percent of the participants indicated that they would vote yes, 37 percent no and 18 percent did not take a stand. At the end of the Poll, 51 percent indicated they would vote yes, 40 percent no and only nine percent had not made up their minds. More people took a stand after participating in the Deliberative Poll. Figure 1 shows the voting intentions of the participants throughout the Deliberative Polling process.

As some participants changed their voting intentions more than once, Figure 1 overestimates the number of participants who changed their voting intentions. Actually, 23 percent of the participants changed between the categories at some time during t_0 , t_1 and t_2 .

To provide a comprehensive account of the underlying opinion fluctuations among the participants, Table 4 includes several key questions underlying voting intentions regarding the euro. The results support the idea that the participants form an opinion, since more participants took a stand by the

Figure 1. The Participants' Indicated Voting Intentions on the Euro Issue.



Note: $N = 332$, since only participants who answered the question in all rounds of questioning are included.

end of the Deliberative Poll (t_2) compared with the time of first contact (t_0). Second, by the end of the Deliberative Poll more participants claimed that they somewhat agreed or disagreed rather than strongly agreed or disagreed on a number of issues related to the single currency. Both the time up to the Deliberative Poll (t_0-t_1) and the period during the Poll contributed to these effects (t_1-t_2). Two interpretations of the changes in opinion structure are possible. According to the first interpretation, the participants form a more balanced view on the issues. Thus, the participants discovered that questions concerning the single currency and European integration in general are complex and many sided. As the participants incorporate more dimensions to their attitudes, somewhat agreeing or disagreeing becomes more likely. The second interpretation suggests that the participants, having been exposed to information and deliberation, become more insecure and confused about forming an opinion. It becomes more difficult for the participants to form an opinion because of the complexity of the topic. The two interpretations are not necessarily contradictory. Nevertheless, the drop in all 'don't know' categories suggests that the participants are capable of forming an opinion, thus supporting the first interpretation (Hansen 2004).⁶

Three months after the Deliberative Poll, the participants reverted somewhat to their initial opinion position. One interpretation is that by the end of the event the participants' opinion structure reflected the deliberative process, the impact of which declined when the participants returned to their everyday lives. Second, some participants may also have altered their opinion after learning the result of the referendum, owing to a 'bandwagon effect'.

Table 4. Net Change to Key Attitude Items (percent)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Mean
It is an important priority for the EU to include additional countries in the Union as soon as possible							
t ₀ – Recruitment interview	33	22	4	10	24	7	57
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	22	28	17	16	12	5	58
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	26	35	19	11	7	2	66**
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	33	31	3	15	12	6	65
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	28	22	5	10	24	12	55
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	26	22	7	10	24	9	53
Danish participation in the single currency reduces Denmark's independence							
t ₀ – Recruitment interview	34	9	3	10	34	10	50
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	26	24	4	12	29	5	52
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	24	20	5	19	30	2	47*
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	29	14	2	14	38	3	45
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	33	11	3	9	33	11	50
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	32	11	4	10	36	7	48**
Danish participation in the single currency lowers the current Danish interest rates							
t ₀ – Recruitment interview	14	11	4	6	19	46	49
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	14	13	24	8	10	31	53**
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	15	23	28	9	7	18	58**
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	15	12	7	13	22	31	46**
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	12	9	4	6	18	51	48
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	14	9	9	6	17	43	49

Danish participation in the single currency weakens the Danish welfare system

t ₀ – Recruitment interview	17	9	5	8	47	14	35
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	16	16	14	14	29	11	45**
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	13	22	13	15	30	7	43
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	19	13	3	18	38	9	39**
t ₁ – Control group at recruitment	16	8	4	11	44	17	35
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	19	10	6	11	41	13	39**

The single currency is a step toward ‘the United States of Europe’

t ₀ – Recruitment interview	50	18	5	5	14	8	71
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	35	26	13	8	14	4	65**
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	23	24	12	13	25	3	51**
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	40	21	2	10	22	5	62**
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	48	19	3	6	14	10	71
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	49	19	3	5	16	8	71

Note: *N* varies from 350 to 364. The mean is calculated on a scale where strongly agree = 100, somewhat agree = 75, neither agree nor disagree and don't know = 50, somewhat disagree = 25 and strongly disagree = 0.

* The difference from the previous round of questions is significant at $p < 0.1$.

** Significance at $p < 0.05$. (two-tailed test). The two control groups are independent. The control group at recruitment has *N* of 1,674/1,675 and the control group during the Deliberative Poll has *N* of 984. Both control groups are weighted according to the Danish electorate.

The two control groups can be seen as representing public opinion. Including the two control groups in Table 4 allows us to conclude that attitude changes among the participants in the Deliberative Poll were brought about by the process of the Deliberative Polling and not by a general development in public opinion. At the time of recruitment the participants in the Deliberative Poll reflect opinion representativeness when compared with the control group. Furthermore, the number of undecided in the control groups shows only moderate decreases compared with the larger drop in the number of undecided participants in the Deliberative Poll. A general effect from the ongoing campaign before the referendum on general public opinion is, accordingly, only moderately present, given the minor decrease in the number of undecided in the control group. Based on this, we conclude that the attitude change experienced by the participants is brought about by the process of the Deliberative Poll and not by a general development in public opinion.

Even though there are significant net changes throughout the process of the Deliberative Poll, the net attitude changes in Table 4 do not show changes at the individual level. An individual change of opinion in one direction may be cancelled out by an opposite change by another individual. Table 5 therefore includes the gross change of opinion at the individual level.

Changing opinion in the exchange of viewpoints with others during a deliberative process suggests that opinion is not a stable property but an ongoing process continuously developing as people engage with each other. Between 7 and 28 percent of the participants altered their view from agreeing to disagreeing or vice versa on a number of issues related to the single currency. Changes in opinion were also found before the deliberative phase

Table 5. Gross Change on Key Items (percent of participants who changed their views)

Changed category					Changed side				
t_0-t_1	t_1-t_2	t_2-t_3	t_0-t_2	At some point	t_0-t_1	t_1-t_2	t_2-t_3	t_0-t_2	At some point
If Denmark joins the single currency it cannot resign at a later point in time									
67	62	63	74	88	23	19	22	28	45
The cooperation within the single currency is undemocratic									
61	46**	54**	61	80	19	10**	15**	16	32
Danish participation in the single currency is beneficial to the Danish economy									
64	47**	60**	68	84	7	3**	6*	7	12

Note: All questions had a five-point scale and a 'don't know' option. 'Changed category' is defined as a change between the six points. 'Changed side' is defined as a change from 'agrees' to 'disagrees' or vice versa. Only respondents who answered the question in both relevant rounds of questioning are included. *N* varies from 327 to 364. 'At some point' refers to participants changing at least once between the four polls. All changes in the table are significant compared with no change.

** The number of participants changing opinion is significant compared with the previous phase at $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

* Significance at $p < 0.1$.

(t_0-t_1) as well as after the deliberative phase (t_2-t_3). The changes of opinion among the participants before t_1 are ascribed to among other things, the information material, discussions about the EU with friends and family and increased awareness of the public debate. The changes during the Deliberative Poll most likely owe to group discussions and the plenary sessions with politicians and experts.⁷ Fewer participants changed their opinion during the Deliberative Poll compared with before the event (t_0-t_1). When asked directly, 32 percent of the participants indicated that they had changed their opinion on one or more issues related to the single currency from the time of the recruitment to the end of the Deliberative Poll. Up to 22 percent of the participants changed their opinion after the Deliberative Poll (t_2-t_3). In this respect, the Deliberative Poll did not create stable opinions in the sense of the opinions remaining unchangeable after the deliberative process.⁸

A change of opinion can never in itself be a criterion for a successful deliberative process. The changes of opinion can also be a sign of manipulation or group conformity rather than a sign of informed opinion formation. However, careful analyses of the data of the Danish Deliberative Poll show no general effect of conformity or manipulation (Hansen 2004). Furthermore, 82 percent of the participants indicated that there was no pressure towards certain opinions (Table 6). Although many participants changed their opinion, they did not change it in one and the same direction or reach an agreement on the issue. (See also Table 7.)

The changes in opinion on the aggregated level have fostered more balanced opinion formation, since the answers in extreme categories (strongly agreeing or disagreeing) decrease. However, this may not be the same as a more consistent opinion structure. The correlation between pairing four analytically related statements in two sets in Table 8 may indicate an answer to this. The two statements in each set measure equivalent or strongly related items in an analytical as well as a theoretical sense. The first set relates Denmark's independence to further integration in terms of a United States of Europe. The second set relates the Danish economy to the workers' situation if the single currency is introduced. Generally speaking, increasing correlations are found between the statements in each set during the process of information (t_0-t_1) and the process of deliberation (t_1-t_2).

The point that the participants gain a higher degree of opinion consistency and coherence is confirmed. The opinion consistency and coherence are partly lost when the participants return to their everyday lives (t_3), but remain higher than before the deliberative experience.

Education of the Participants

The potential of deliberation for educating citizens is analysed by focusing on the participants' development of knowledge about the single currency.

Table 6. Participant Evaluation of the Deliberative Poll and Its Use (percent), t_2

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	<i>N</i>
Information				
Participating in the Deliberative Poll has increased my understanding of the euro	93	5	2	359
The Deliberative Poll did not add much to my knowledge about the euro	21	8	71	353
Balanced opinion and broad understanding				
Participating in the Deliberative Poll has balanced my opinion on the euro	74	12	14	355
Participating in the Deliberative Poll has increased my understanding of both yes and no arguments towards the euro	88	9	3	356
Pressure towards certain opinions				
There was a pressure towards changing one's opinion in a certain direction	6	12	82	357
The use of Deliberative Polling				
The result from the Deliberative Poll ought to be binding for political decisions, even when it is against a majority among the politicians	21	20	59	350
The results from the Deliberative Poll ought only to be one source of information among many available to the politicians	81	10	9	348
Deliberative Polls ought not to be used	3	7	90	352
Deliberative accountability				
As a participant in the Deliberative Poll you also speak for citizens who did not have the opportunity to participate	87	11	12	352
As a participant in the Deliberative Poll you speak only for yourself	29	11	60	351

Note: 'Agree' consists of strongly and somewhat agreeing, 'disagree' consists of strongly and somewhat disagreeing, and 'neutral' consists of neither agreeing nor disagreeing and 'don't know'.

There is a strong increase among the participants in the level of knowledge on the issues (Table 9). The increase in knowledge is ascribed to the information material the participants received before the event on 26–27 August (t_1) and to the deliberative process during the weekend (t_2). Furthermore, several participants indicate an increased awareness of the public debate thanks to the fact that they were invited to the Deliberative Poll and, thus, became more aware of the topic (Andersen & Hansen 2002). The education effect remains present after the Deliberative Poll (t_3), leading to the conclusion that the Deliberative Poll has an educating effect. Comparisons with the control groups suggest that the public experienced only a minor effect on their level of knowledge about the single currency. The smallness of this effect can be ascribed to the simultaneously ongoing referendum campaign.

Table 7. Deliberation in Group Sessions (percent), t_2

	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	<i>N</i>
Argumentation				
The participants in the group argued by referring to what would be best for themselves	25	26	49	354
The participants in the group argued for a case by referring to justice and general principles	57	25	18	355
The discussions were characterized by responsiveness towards each other's arguments	88	9	3	353
An understanding of the arguments opposing my own arguments was created	84	11	5	352
The participants in the group argued by warning against negative consequences of a yes or no to the single currency	54	18	28	352
The participants in the group argued by referring to what would be best and most fair for all citizens	70	18	12	354
All positions in the group were considered with equal respect	85	9	6	354
The arguments of the other participants were useful in forming my own position	69	17	14	356
Consensus				
From the beginning there was consensus in the group	25	21	54	346
Towards the end there was consensus in the group	27	21	52	344
There was consensus in the group on how to deliberate	82	10	8	351
It was difficult to agree on the questions to be asked in the plenary sessions	28	12	60	353
Discussions				
A few of the participants dominated the discussions	45	17	38	353
Alliances between some of the participants arose	31	24	45	353
The discussions were superficial	10	10	80	354
There was too little time to discuss	68	11	21	352
All aspects of the euro debate were covered in the group discussions	64	17	19	355

Note: Twenty groups with 18–20 members in each deliberated during the weekend in Odense, in four group sessions of 2–3 hours' duration and four plenary sessions of one hour. 'Agree' consists of strongly and somewhat agreeing, 'disagree' consists of strongly and somewhat disagreeing, and 'neutral' consists of neither agreeing nor disagreeing and 'don't know'.

Table 6 also shows that 93 percent of participants agreed that they experienced an increase in their understanding of the issue. In this way the educational effect of deliberation is confirmed by both self-assessed items as in Table 7 and through a test on knowledge as in Table 9.

Mutual Understanding

In order to assess whether deliberation on the euro was based on mutual exchange and understanding among the participants the level of political

Table 8. Correlation for Related Items (*N*)

	<i>t</i> ₀	<i>t</i> ₁	<i>t</i> ₂	<i>t</i> ₃
Danish participation in the single currency reduces Denmark's independence				
The single currency is a step toward 'the United States of Europe'				
Participants in the Deliberative Poll	0.288** (364)	0.446** (351)+	0.550** (347)	0.437** (355)
Two independent control groups	0.273** (1,675)		0.315** (986)	
Danish participation in the single currency is beneficial to the Danish economy				
Danish participation in the single currency would weaken the workers' situation				
Participants in the Deliberative Poll	-0.378** (364)	-0.466** (353)	-0.504** (352)	-0.472** (353)
Two independent control groups	-0.350** (1674)		-0.412** (986)	

Note: The questions' five-point scales and the 'don't know' options were merged into three categories. 'Agree' consists of strongly and somewhat agreeing, 'disagree' consists of strongly and somewhat disagreeing, and 'neutral' consists of neither agreeing nor disagreeing and 'don't know'. *t*₀ = time of recruitment, *t*₁ = at the beginning of the Deliberative Poll, *t*₂ = at the end of the Deliberative Poll and *t*₃ = three months after the Deliberative Poll.

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed).

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (one-tailed).

+ A bootstrapping procedure confirms that the correlation increases significantly from the previous wave at the 0.1 level (one-tailed).

tolerance was analysed. Two statements were presented in order to assess whether the process of the Deliberative Poll would increase the level of political tolerance among the participants (Table 10).

Fewer participants agree on the first statement by the end of the Deliberative Poll (*t*₂). This change may indicate that the participants became more tolerant through the process. More participants strongly agreed with the second statement at recruitment (*t*₀) than at the end of the Deliberative Poll (*t*₂). The participants changed towards their initial position on political tolerance when polled three months after the event, indicating, as stated earlier, that only few potentials of deliberation are fully maintained on a long-term basis. At first sight, the participants actually became less tolerant of others' viewpoints during the deliberative process according to the second statement. However, by the end of the Deliberative Poll (*t*₂), the participants might have felt that their own argumentation, owing to increased knowledge and awareness, was enhanced and thus have become more confident about their own arguments. This reflects a stronger belief in one's own argumentation rather than a lack of tolerance towards the argumentation of others. However, a reservation should be made about this interpretation. The item of political tolerance does not measure tolerance adequately, meaning that the validity of the item, in this respect, is not satisfactory. Still, there is no increase in the number of participants disagreeing with the second statement,

Table 9. Level of Knowledge (percentage of correct answers)

t_0 Recruitment	t_1 Beginning of Deliberative Poll	t_2 End of Deliberative Poll	t_3 Three months after Deliberative Poll	General recruitment survey (t_0)	Control group (t_2)
As a member of the monetary union, Denmark could be fined if the national fiscal deficit is too large (Yes)					
41	71**	80**	82	34	36
Denmark can decide its own interest rates if we join the monetary union (No)					
73	78	82**	83	72	74
Denmark can decide its own rates of taxation if we join the single currency (Yes)					
64	66	83**	75**	59	65
If we vote yes at the referendum on 28 September the single currency will enter into circulation starting in 2001, 2004, 2005 or 2007 (2004)					
51	83**	89**	88	48	53
If Denmark joins the single currency the Danish National Bank will be closed down, continue to operate as now or become part of the European Central Bank (ECB) (become part of ECB)					
59	55	66**	68	56	54
Will the euro coins have a national side? (Yes)					
53	91**	94**	92	49	76**
Is Denmark already involved in a monetary union where the member states help each other in situations of an unstable foreign exchange market? (Yes)					
83	78*	87**	88	73	75

Note: N varies from 354 to 364. In the general recruitment survey N varies between 1,669 and 1,672. The control group's $N = 984$. The general recruitment survey and the control group are weighted according to the Danish electorate. Correct answers in parenthesis.

* The difference from the previous round of questions is significant at $p < 0.1$.

** Significance at $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test). The two control groups are independent.

which suggests a group of politically tolerant people. Eighty-eight percent of the participants state that participating in the Deliberative Poll has increased their understanding of both yes and no arguments on the euro, and 74 percent feel that their own opinion on the single currency became more balanced as a result of their participation (Table 6). Based on this, the majority of the participants experienced a mutual understanding of differing viewpoints and the formation of a more balanced opinion.

Furthermore, the items in Table 7 support these interpretations. To a large extent the participants were sympathetic towards the arguments of other participants, an understanding of the arguments of others emerged, even though the arguments differed from the participants' viewpoints, and all viewpoints were considered with equal respect.

The increased understanding of the pros and cons of implementing the euro might be argued to increase the likelihood of the participants' understanding and acceptance of the final decision – in this case the result of the

Table 10. Political Tolerance (percent)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Mean
Lack of knowledge is the reason why other citizens have political viewpoints that differ from yours							
t ₀ – Recruitment interview	28	18	4	9	34	7	49
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	10	18	18	11	35	8	40**
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	9	16	16	14	38	7	36**
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	17	16	5	14	42	6	38
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	30	16	5	7	34	8	51
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	30	16	5	8	35	6	50
Other citizens have good arguments for supporting political viewpoints that differ from yours							
t ₀ – Recruitment interview	67	17	4	3	5	4	85
t ₁ – At the beginning of the Deliberative Poll	45	26	14	4	5	6	75**
t ₂ – At the end of the Deliberative Poll	47	30	9	5	4	5	78
t ₃ – Three months after the Deliberative Poll	64	23	2	4	3	4	86**
t ₀ – Control group at recruitment	66	17	3	2	5	7	85
t ₂ – Control group during the Deliberative Poll	68	17	4	3	4	4	85

Note: $N = 353-364$. N for the control groups are 1,664 and 982. The mean is calculated on a scale where 'strongly agree' = 100, 'somewhat agree' = 75, 'neither agree nor disagree' and 'don't know' = 50, 'somewhat disagree' = 25 and 'strongly disagree' = 0.

* The difference from the previous round of questions is significant at $p < 0.1$.

** Significance at $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

referendum. On the other hand, participating in a deliberative process may also create an expectation among the participants that their post-deliberative advice should be integrated into the political process in general (Bohman 1996, 17). Otherwise, the participants may feel that their work has been overruled and they may come to oppose the final decision. But the purpose of the Danish Deliberative Poll was not to reach a collective decision, since it was never the intention to replace the result of the later national referendum. For this reason, it is unlikely that such an expectation was created.

As argued previously, the Deliberative Poll is supplementary to other representative institutions because of the lack of formal accountability. Table 6 shows that the majority of the participants in the Deliberative Poll agree with this line of argument. According to the majority of the participants, the results of a Deliberative Poll should not be binding for political decisions. Rather, the result of the Deliberative Poll should be one among many different sources of information available to the politicians.

However, the participants in the Deliberative Poll display a special sense of accountability that goes beyond the arena of the Deliberative Poll. Three-quarters of the participants agree that they speak on behalf of citizens who did not get the opportunity to participate in the Deliberative Poll. This relates to a deliberative form of accountability (Gutmann & Thompson 1996, 128–32). In the Deliberative Poll the participants will be deliberatively accountable to the degree that they listen to and consider the objections made by other participants towards their own arguments in the process of justifying the reasons for their own opinions. The deliberative accountability is therefore a dialectical process between the participants in which arguments are met with counter-arguments in the search for justifying one's opinions in the most convincing way. A majority of the participants agree that other participants' arguments were useful in forming their own opinion (Table 7). Combined with a high degree of responsiveness and the use of arguments referring to the common good, deliberative accountability was present in the Deliberative Poll.

The positive view of the Deliberative Poll shown in Table 7 is subject to one methodological reservation. The outcome may owe to the participants evaluating the event as a positive experience rather than evaluating the deliberative process on its merit. In general, however, the Deliberative Poll succeeded in creating mutual understanding among the participants even though the dichotomous division on the single currency probably had a pluralizing effect on the participants too.

Minimizing the Use of Arguments Referring to Narrow Self-Interest

As argued above, a deliberative setting will minimize the use of arguments based on self-interest. Table 7 shows that not all of the participants think that

self-interest is eliminated from the Deliberative Poll on the euro. Arguments referring to self-interest were, however, not dominant in the process. Rather the participants had an open-minded outlook, and hence engaged with more general principles and the consequences of joining the single currency for all Danish citizens. One reservation should be made. It can be claimed that to promote self-interest the participants might use arguments referring to common interests strategically. On the other hand, however, the deliberative setting will improve the chance of revealing and preventing such strategy. Similarly, it may be argued that creating an arena in which participants mainly argue by referring to general principles in itself improves the deliberative aspect of a democratic process (Fearon 1998, 54–55).

The participants did not agree on the issue either before (t_1) or after (t_2) the Deliberative Poll (Table 7). The dichotomy of the single currency was sustained throughout the deliberative process. But at the same time, the vast majority of the participants claim that they agree on the form of deliberation. The participants seem to agree to a much higher degree on the procedures of deliberation than on the issue. Eighty-two percent of the participants indicate that there was consensus on the procedures of deliberation. This strong agreement also suggests that deliberation is possible even when participants are entrenched on the issue. The only thing the participants had to agree on was the questions they wanted to ask the politicians and experts at the plenary sessions. Twenty-eight percent of the participants felt that it was difficult to agree on these questions. The requirement to a deliberative process voiced by some deliberative democrats saying that the participants as a minimum have to agree to disagree seems to have been fulfilled at the Deliberative Poll.

However, the constraints on the Deliberative Poll, such as scarce time resources and dominating participants, must not be neglected (Table 7). Thus, the ideal deliberative process interacts with real-world deliberation. Some obstacles to an ideal situation of deliberation are – as in other political settings – present in an arena like the Deliberative Poll. In the American National Deliberative Poll in 1996, a few participants dominated the deliberation (Merkel 1996; Smith 1999). As the Deliberative Poll represents an artificial setting in which much effort was made to provide the participants with the opportunity to act according to deliberative ideals (e.g. the use of moderators and balanced information), and as domination, scarce time resources and pluralized opinion structures were still present, it is reasonable to assume that these elements will also be present in other, less controlled deliberative arenas and in everyday talk, which is not moderated. Instead of trying to eliminate these elements, or simply overlook them as in some accounts of deliberative democracy, it is important to understand these sources of inequality, power and domination, and to try to incorporate these ineradicable features of deliberation into the theory of deliberative

democracy and to confront these features in the institutional design when future deliberative settings are designed (Mansbridge 1996; Mouffe 1996).

Conclusion

A representative sample was successfully assembled in the Danish Deliberative Poll, allowing for a range of different experiences to be brought into the deliberative process. In this respect, there is no reason to assert (in Bell 1999, 86) that citizens are not able and willing to engage in deliberation on complicated matters such as the single currency. The quasi-experimental design of the Deliberative Poll qualified the participants to take a stand and form reasoned opinions. The participants changed their views during the ongoing deliberative processes. The participants were capable of reasoning and forming a consistent opinion on the highly complex issue of the single currency. Their knowledge about the issue as well as their capabilities to engage in political debates increased.

A Deliberative Poll does not and should not create an ideal deliberative speech situation. However, on a number of issues it provides an arena in which a range of arguments based on principles of deliberation have the opportunity to flourish. The prevalent principles in the Deliberative Poll were an increased understanding of different reasons for Denmark's participation in the single currency and increased responsiveness to other arguments. At the same time, elements from real-life politics were also present in the Deliberative Poll, concerning plurality, coalitions, self-interest and domination. These core and defining elements of politics cannot be eliminated from political processes and, thus, not from a Deliberative Poll. What is needed is an elaboration of how these features of politics interact with deliberation and how they are inter-related. The lack of elaboration of these features is one of the main critiques raised against more normative approaches of the theory of deliberative democracy. The results of the Deliberative Poll on the single currency pinpoint the need for a theoretical elaboration and development in order to obtain increased understanding of deliberative processes. The first step in doing so would be to incorporate and accept the so-called 'obstacles' as part of a democratic process – empirically as well as theoretically. Only through this approach is it possible to benefit from innovative deliberative experiments through which political deliberation without highly idealistic requirements of the process or outcome can take place.

The result of the Danish referendum on the single currency showed a majority against Denmark's participation. The result of the Deliberative Poll showed a majority for Denmark joining the single currency. The referendum and the Deliberative Poll are two distinct institutions of democracy. The referendum is a Danish constitutionally secured right for making decisions on,

for example, ceding sovereignty. The Deliberative Poll, on the contrary, is a supplementary arena for public deliberation and a method of communicating citizens' post-deliberative views to the public and to the established political institutions in a way that is supplementary to, for example, traditional opinion polls. The Deliberative Poll does not in any way substitute for the referendum. Whether, in the future, the Deliberative Poll will become an arena for supplementing and qualifying the public debate in relation to referendums, and political processes more broadly in a representative democracy, remains an open question.

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NOTES

1. James S. Fishkin has registered 'Deliberative Poll' and 'Deliberative Polling' as trademarks. The Danish National Deliberative Poll was conducted as a joint project between the Department of Political Science and Public Management at the University of Southern Denmark and the House of Mandag Morgen. PLS Rambøll Management conducted the recruitment and the control group interviews. All questionnaires were devised by the authors of this article. The Danish Broadcast System (Danmarks Radio) covered the media broadcasting of the Poll (radio, TV and internet). The following organizations, parties and companies financed the project: Nævnet vedr. EU-oplysning, the European Parliament, the Danish Institute of International Affairs, the Danish State Information Service (SI), Danish State Railways (DSB), the Confederation of Danish Industries, LO (The Danish Confederation of Trade Unions), Dansk Metal, Dansk Folkeparti, the Danish Bank, ISS (a large Danish-based facility services company), Novo Nordisk, Danfoss, Group 4 Falck, Coloplast, VELUX, Chr. Hansen, Grundfos, Danisco, Unimerco, J. Lauritzen, Bestseller A/S and the European Commission.
2. The number is based on a search on the terms 'deliberative' or 'deliberation' and 'democracy' in the title, abstract or keywords in Social Science Quotations Index (26 June 2003; Hansen 2004).
3. Citizens' Juries[®], Consensus Conferences[®] and Planning Cells are other examples of such methods (e.g. Smith & Wales 2000; Andersen & Jæger 1999; Diemel & Renn 1995).
4. Aars and Offerdal (2000) introduced the t_1 measure in their deliberative experiment in 1998.
5. See Hansen (2004) for more analyses on this issue.
6. One could assume that the participants simply changed from the 'don't know' to the 'neither nor' category during the Deliberative Poll. However, the share of the 'don't know' category at the time of recruitment does not correspond to the higher share of the 'neither nor' category at the beginning of the Deliberative Poll. Second, the movements between these categories are no more frequent than any other individual movement.
7. The change in attitudes may owe to polling methods – telephone (t_0 and t_3) versus self-administered questionnaire (t_1 and t_2). However, this cannot explain the changes from t_1 to t_2 , where the polling methods were identical (Hansen 2000). Fishkin (1997) has also found changes from t_0 to t_2 with identical methods.
8. These patterns of opinion change will undergo careful analysis in Hansen (2004).

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