

**Considered Opinions on U.S. Foreign Policy:
Evidence from Online and Face-to-Face Deliberative Polling**

Abstract

What would Americans' foreign attitudes be like if they knew and thought more about the issues? Would they change, belying claims that most people have already approximated their "full-information" preferences by simple cues and cognitive shortcuts? If so, in what direction? This paper examines the results from two parallel national Deliberative Polls, one face-to-face and one online. We also consider the more methodological question of how the effects of face-to-face and online deliberation, at least as represented in these two designs, may differ.

Actual citizenries bear little resemblance to the democratic ideal. Some variation by individual, issue, and circumstance notwithstanding, not many people know or think much about politics (Converse 1964, Luskin 1987, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Kinder 1998, Price 1999). As a rule, therefore, the public opinion revealed by everyday polling is neither particularly informed nor particularly thoughtful. But suppose more people did know and think more about politics. What would public opinion be like then?

Not, according to one prominent stream of literature, very different. Lupia (1994), Popkin (1991), and others have argued that people generally manage to approximate their “full-information” opinions by combining simple cues with heuristics or cognitive shortcuts. Other research, however, suggests that informed and uninformed opinions frequently diverge (Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Althaus 1998; see Luskin 2002 for a review). Some of the strongest evidence comes from Deliberative Polling, in which random samples are given balanced information and the opportunity of discussing the issues with people of widely varying views and backgrounds. Most issues show some aggregate change of opinion (Fishkin and Luskin 1999; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; see Fishkin and Luskin 2005, for a review). At this point, the more interesting question is not *whether* deliberation ever changes opinions, but *when* and *how* (Luskin 2002, 2003).

Here we examine the results from two parallel Deliberative Polls (hereafter, *DPs*) about U.S. foreign policy. The discussions focused on issues of military intervention, promoting democracy, foreign trade, helping other countries with problems like poverty and AIDS, and preserving the global environment. The face-to-face discussions took place in mid-January, 2003, the online discussions over the preceding month. The temporal setting, therefore, was the eve of the war with Iraq, although the questions concerned more general issues.

The two DPs differed in mode. One—the first ever such—was online, the other face-to-face. The online sample, from Knowledge Networks, was a true random sample (subject to the qualifications attaching to any “random sample” of human beings). So of course was the face-to-face sample, drawn and interviewed by the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley. The discussions addressed the same issues and spanned approximately the same period.¹ The briefing documents were identical, the questionnaires almost so.

Our questions are both substantive and methodological. On the first score, to what extent and how—in what directions—does deliberation affect public opinion on foreign policy issues? On the second, to what extent and how do the effects of online versus face-to-face deliberation differ?

Deliberation and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is an interesting domain for deliberation. Clearly, it harbors enough irreflection and ignorance to leave ample room for deliberation to change attitudes—indeed may seem at first glance to be particularly “spacious” in this regard. Foreign policy issues would seem to be particularly remote from everyday experience, the connections to one’s own life or community particularly difficult to see (Almond 1950). Certainly, they receive less media coverage. Between occasional soft news gully-washers at moments of crisis, we get distinctly less foreign than domestic news—and soft news is, well, soft (Baum 2004).² The public has therefore long been thought to be even more ignorant of foreign than domestic affairs (Kreisberg 1949).

The accuracy of this last impression is unclear. It is in the first place difficult to compare knowledge across domains: what are comparable facts to know or be ignorant of? The only hope is to compare large numbers of items, assuming an approximately random or at least an

approximately parallel sampling of items from both universes. But the most sweeping round-up of knowledge items (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) suggests that people are no more (indeed slightly less) ignorant of foreign than domestic affairs.³ Similarly, they appear to be no more (indeed slightly less) at sea in locating the Democratic and Republican parties' positions on foreign, as compared to domestic policy issues (Aldrich et al. 1989). At the aggregate level, foreign and domestic policy attitudes seem to be about equally structured and stable (Peffley and Hurwitz 1985, Shapiro and Page 1988). This evidence of roughly equal ignorance seems a bit odd in light of the disparity in news coverage, but perhaps the latter is not so relevant, in the face of widespread disinterest in serious political news of any variety. A near-teetotaler, after all, will be drunk on neither wine nor beer, regardless of whether the bar has equal stocks of both or decidedly more of one than the other.

The supply of information about foreign affairs is also relatively imbalanced. The news from abroad relies heavily on official sources. Reporters often find it hard to find credible alternatives, especially when the subject is national security. They may also be chary of questioning government policy, for fear of looking unpatriotic. Thus foreign policy coverage tends to be "indexed" to official sources (Bennett 1990, 1994; cf. Althaus 2003), which in turn gives the administration greater ability to persuade (Zaller and Chiu 2000, Jacobs and Shapiro 2003).⁴ Indexing may occasionally widen the gap between actual and considered opinions, but more typically should narrow it, to the extent that the administration's preferences tend to fall reasonably close to the foreign policy elite's (as casual observation and the correlations in Jacobs and Page 2005 suggest)⁵ and that the latter tend to mark where the public's more considered opinions would be (as we shall argue momentarily).

In sum, the gap between actual and considered opinions may average no wider—may indeed average slightly narrower—in the foreign than in the domestic policy domain. In fact, there is some, necessarily oblique, evidence to that effect. One intimation, again assuming that the opinions of foreign policy elites can be taken as signposting the public’s more considered opinions, lies in the public’s foreign policy attitudes’ tending to be paler (and sketchier) versions of foreign policy elites’—falling on the same side of the scale, just not as far out from the midpoint (Holsti 2004). This relative proximity is why Jentleson (1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998) can persuasively characterize the public’s preferences regarding military intervention as “pretty prudent”—they resemble the foreign policy elite’s, the standard by which prudence tends to be judged. More direct evidence comes from Althaus’s (1998) simulations of fully informed preferences, where the differences between the fully informed and actual public are somewhat narrower, and the reversals of majority preference distinctly fewer, on foreign than on domestic policy items.

No, foreign policy’s greatest distinctiveness for deliberation probably lies not in the *potential* for attitude change, but in the *direction* of change, which should be more predictable. This stems not from any difference in media behavior or public knowledge but from the nature of the issues. As a very general matter, deliberation should move people toward policy preferences consistent with their values and interests (both individual and common, broadly construed). But which way is that? Deliberative Polling results may be taken as *a posteriori* evidence of where most people’s values and interests should lead them, but on domestic policy issues it is difficult to forecast the direction without making highly contestable assumptions about what policies comport with a majority’s values and interests—the crux of most political debate (Luskin 2002, 2003).

Foreign policy is a different story. The relevant interests vary more by country and less by individual citizen. Broad goals, above all of national security and prosperity, are more widely shared. Values, too, accordingly, may carry weights that vary less from citizen to citizen. Thus while we still do not presume to know *a priori* where most people's interests lie, we do have an indicator. It is a fair presumption that the public, as it deliberates, should usually move toward where the foreign policy elite, with similar interests and mostly similar values but far greater information and reflection, already is (the more so where indexed media coverage has shifted public opinion in the direction of an administration at odds with the foreign policy elite). There will undoubtedly be exceptions, but this strikes us as a good zero-order prediction.

So where is the foreign policy elite vis-à-vis the mass public? Survey evidence suggests that it is more internationalist and multilateralist, keener on the U.S.'s taking up global responsibilities and doing so in concert with other countries and international institutions (Holsti 2004).⁶ Among other things, that entails greater enthusiasm for foreign aid for both humanitarian and economic purposes, for promoting democracy abroad, and for liberalizing trade. The mass public tends to agree—averaging out on the same sides of these issues—but less strongly.⁷ If we are correct, these are some of the directions in which deliberation can be expected to move public opinion.

All this is admittedly quite speculative, but an *amuse-bouche* of confirmation comes from Althaus's (1998) simulations of "fully-informed" public opinion. The fully-informed public is more willing to "concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world" (a straightforward measure of internationalism), less willing to see the U.S. go "to the brink of war" to "maintain its position as the world's most powerful nation" (an impure measure of multilateralism), and more

interested in seeing the U.S. “increase the pressure on the South African government to change its racial laws” (a measure of promoting democracy).⁸ Our results will say more.

Online versus Face-to-Face Deliberative Polling

A DP draws and interviews a random sample, providing its members with briefing documents laying out the arguments for and against policy alternatives, getting them to discuss the issues in small groups, giving them opportunities to question competing experts and policy-makers, and then gauging their opinions again (Fishkin 1991, Fishkin 1995, Fishkin and Luskin 1999, Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). Typically, a separate random sample, answering the same questions at the end of the process, provides a control group.⁹ The enterprise is both a vehicle of public consultation and a social-scientific quasi-experiment shedding light on deliberation’s effects on information, attitudes, and behavior.¹⁰

Until very recently, the deliberation in Deliberative Polling has been face-to-face. The small group discussions and questioning of policy experts and policy makers have taken place at a common site, typically over a weekend. Advances in information technology, however, now make it possible to implement Deliberative Polling online, provided a representative sample of the whole public, not just the online population, can be obtained.

Online Deliberative Polling has both advantages and disadvantages with respect to the traditional face-to-face design. The advantages include:

- *Cost.* Physically assembling a random sample for a weekend at a single site is both cost and labor intensive. The expenses, mounting into six, sometimes seven figures for national samples, include transportation, hotel accommodations, meals, and honoraria for participating. Online deliberations, by contrast, do not require participants to leave their homes. Those initially lacking online access must be given

computers, but a representative sample can still be recruited for a tiny fraction of the cost of transporting participants to a single location and lodging and feeding them there. This advantage, moreover, is likely to increase, as the proportion of the population already online and thus not needing to be given computers increases.

- *Duration.* Work, family, and other obligations may keep some prospective participants from being able to spend even a weekend away from home, and most would find more than a weekend impossible. For face-to-face deliberation, therefore, the late-Thursday-through-midday-Sunday span of the 1996 “National Issues Convention” is probably the limit. Online deliberations can extend much longer, indeed without any obvious limit.
- *Lead Time.* Face-to-face DPs require extensive logistics and preparation. Online versions can be organized much more quickly. This creates the possibility of deliberating about real-world events and decisions in something much closer to real time.
- *Instrumentation.* Much more of what the participants are doing is visible—and readily recorded—online than face to face. Their resort to the briefing documents, reading of the answers from expert panelists, and the like can be recorded automatically. This opens up new possibilities for unpacking the deliberative treatment’s effects.

One obvious worry for online designs concerns representativeness. Access to technology remains closely tied to socio-economic standing. This study, however, overcomes this “digital divide” by sampling randomly offline, then providing free access, including free equipment, to sample members not already online.

On the other side of the ledger, online deliberations are inevitably less social. They may use audio, even visual, channels but cannot achieve the same immediacy as face-to-face interactions. They are also confined to the formal sessions, whereas on-site deliberations spill over into causal conversations over meals and drinks. It is possible that the firsthand human contact in face-to-face events makes them more involving and that they convey certain kinds of information—about what other people quite different from oneself are like—more fully. Of course such differences may not militate entirely in favor of face-to-face designs. Perhaps the more mediated interactions in online deliberation are emotionally cooler, more cognitive, and perhaps that is to the good.

The question, in the end, is empirical. Online designs have obvious practical advantages, but what are we sacrificing in availing ourselves of them? Our parallel DPs speak to this question too.

Design

The face-to-face DP was conducted in collaboration with MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, which produced the event, and the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley, which drew the sample and conducted the initial interviews. The briefing materials, about “America’s Role in the World,” were prepared by the National Issues Forums and the Kettering Foundation. The on-site deliberations, termed the “National Issues Convention,” took place in Philadelphia from Friday, January 10 through Sunday, January 12, 2003. They focused on general issues of foreign policy, although the looming war with Iraq suffused the discussion.

The participants alternated between discussions in randomly assigned small groups led by trained moderators and putting questions to panels of policy experts and policy makers in plenary sessions. They then answered the same questions as when initially interviewed. At roughly the

same time (the end of that weekend), the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland asked most of the same questions of a separate random sample, which thus provided a post-test-only control group. The questionnaires, like the briefing materials, concerned general issues of foreign policy.

The online DP was administered by the Political Communication Lab at Stanford University. The samples of 280 for the treatment group and 219 for the control group were supplied by Knowledge Networks, Inc., which offers random samples free online access in exchange for regular participation in market research and opinion surveys. They were therefore already committed to participating in a series of online surveys, and those without computers had already received web TVs. This study took Knowledge Networks' largesse a step further, providing previously offline respondents with personal computers in return for their participation. Computer owners were given a cash incentive of \$300 instead. There was also a control group, also from Knowledge Networks, which completed the same questionnaire both before and after the deliberations but did not deliberate.

After completing an initial online questionnaire, the participants deliberated twice a week, an hour at a time, for four weeks in randomly assigned small groups led by trained moderators. The deliberations began the week of December 9-13, 2002, and ended the week of Jan 7 - 16, 2003. The discussion, via Lotus Sametime software, was voice- rather than text-based, both to avoid daunting the less literate and to allow more of the affective bonding and mutual understanding characteristic of face-to-face deliberations. The software permitted the participants to request and release the microphone and identified the speaker and the list of those wishing to speak. The *Online Newshour*, a partner in the online experiment, relayed questions

formed in the small groups to panels of competing experts and posted their answers on the *Online Newshour* web site.

In the main, then, the online design closely resembled the face-to-face design. The principal differences, apart from the online versus face-to-face nature of the discussions, were in the length and timing of the small group discussions, the identities of the expert panelists, the methods of recruitment, and the nature of the control groups. The face-to-face discussion consumed but were confined to a single weekend; the online discussions consumed only an hour apiece but were spread over the five preceding weeks. The “elapsed time” was therefore longer online, while the unbroken stretches of “processing time” were much longer face-to-face. The timing of the deliberative weekend also meant that the face-to-face discussions osmosed more of the issue of whether to go to war with Iraq. The expert panelists, selected in both cases for balance by the *Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, were different. The face-to-face participants were sampled from scratch, the online participants drawn from Knowledge Networks’ existing panels. The face-to-face control group was only surveyed at only after the deliberations, the online control group both before and after.

Data

The dependent variables for this study are policy attitudes, and the key explanatory variable is knowledge (which, shrugging off some subtle distinctions, we treat as synonymous with “information” and “sophistication”). The data afford a good many relevant items.

Policy Attitudes

We use questions about what the U.S. should or should not do, should give greater or lesser priority to, or do more or less of to construct nine policy indices. Each index makes use of

every item seeming to both measure the relevant concept and to cohere with the others seeming to do so. In a couple of cases, the “index” is only trivially an index, consisting of just a single item. In one other case, it consists only of two items. We wish in these cases that the data afforded more relevant, coherent items, but they do not. The largest number of items is ten.

The response categories are linearly scored on a [0, 1] scale, giving all the items a common metric. The indices, averaging the individual items composing them, thus also range from 0 to 1. Items that are “missing data”—either DK or NA— for a given respondent are excluded for that respondent.¹¹

In a number of cases, we “pre-average” subsets of items prior to averaging the whole set (effectively giving the individual items in the pre-averaged subset less weight than the rest). We do this for batteries of items significantly reflecting attitudes besides the one being measured. An example is a battery about the priority that should be given to foreign aid, increased trade, and a number of other possibilities as ways of promoting democracy. One might value democracy but think little of any specific proposal for promoting it. These items reflect attitudes toward foreign aid, increased trade, etc, as well as toward the goal of promoting democracy. The *average* response, however, *across* all six asked-about ways of promoting democracy may be taken as a reasonable measure of the respondent’s attitude toward the goal of promoting democracy.¹²

The indices and their component items are:

Protecting the Environment. This pre-averages two items asking whether the respondent supports or opposes “requiring higher mileage from automobiles even if that means less powerful automobile engines” and “requiring cleaner production of electricity, even if that means higher electricity rates” as ways of reducing greenhouse gases, then averages that with

items asking what priority, on a scale from 0 to 10, should be accorded “protecting the global environment” as “as a long range foreign policy goal” and to what extent “global warming is not really a problem so there is no need to do anything about it” versus “a serious problem [about which] we need to act now (both initially on 0 to 10 scales). Chronbach’s alpha is .78 face-to-face and .73 online.

Fighting Terrorism. This index pre-averages four items asking how much importance should the U.S. place on “encouraging more democracy in Middle East countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” “increased foreign aid to countries that may be breeding grounds for terrorism,” “working with other countries to identify and combat terrorism,” and “building up our intelligence capabilities” as “ways of reducing future terrorism directed against the U.S.” The remaining ingredients are items asking what priority, again on a scale from 0 to 10, should be accorded “preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction,” “fighting terrorism,” and “protecting the U.S. from attack” as “long range foreign policy goal[s]” and to “discouraging countries from trying to develop nuclear weapons” as a reason for “provid[ing] foreign aid to other countries.” Cronbach’s alpha is .82 face-to-face and .83 online.

Increasing Foreign Aid. This is a single item asking whether “the amount of money the U.S. is now devoting to foreign aid should be increased, reduced, or kept about the same.” Some of the items in the next index may also be thought relevant, but empirically this item, with its explicit reference to spending and silence about purposes, stands apart.

Fighting Poverty and Suffering. This variable specifically concerns foreign aid for food, medicine, and the alleviation of poverty. The index averages the priorities given to “providing food and medical help to poor countries” and “reducing world poverty” as “long range foreign policy goal[s],” and then pre-averages (a) the priorities given to “reducing hunger and disease in

poor countries” and “helping poor countries develop their economies” as reasons for “provid[ing] foreign aid to other countries” and (b) the responses to questions asking whether the U.S., “as a global leader,” should spend more money to help fight world hunger in developing countries” and “to help fight the AIDS epidemic in developing countries” versus “concentrate[ing] on dealing with problems at home first.” Cronbach’s Alpha is .84 face-to-face and .82 online.

Protecting Human Rights. This is a single item asking what priority should be given to “protecting human rights in other countries.”

Internationalism. Here too we have only a single item, in this case asking how much one agrees or disagrees that “this country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other areas of the world.”

Multilateralism. Two of this index’s ingredients are the differences between the strength with which the respondent supports or opposes American military action “with United Nations support” versus “acting alone” to “prevent mass killings in foreign countries” and to “prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to countries that might use them.” These differences then averaged with the responses to questions asking how strongly the respondent agrees or disagrees that “the only way to solve environmental problems like global warming is through international agreements, requiring countries to work together;” how important it is to “work with other countries to identify and combat terrorism”; whether it is best to “work with groups of countries through international institutions like the World Trade Organization,” “to work with other countries one by one to establish agreements,” or “to leave things as they are” in dealing with international trade; and whether “the U.S. acting by itself,” “the U.S. acting with close allies like NATO,” “the U.S. & its close allies acting through the United Nations,” “the United Nations,” or

“nobody” should “take the lead” in “trying to resolve international conflicts” and in “providing foreign assistance to other countries.”¹³ Cronbach’s Alpha is .63 face-to-face and .75 online.

Promoting Democracy. This index averages items asking whether the respondent agrees more that “the U.S. should be promoting democracy in other countries” or that “how other countries are governed is not our concern,” the priority that should be given to “helping newly democratic countries develop their democratic institutions” as a reason for “provid[ing] foreign aid to other countries,” and the pre-average of the importance that should be placed each of six “possible ways the U.S. might promote democracy outside of the U.S.” (“help[ing] with building democratic institutions,” “increasing trade,” “trade penalties for human rights violations,” “foreign aid,” “provid[ing] U.S. troops to help keep the peace,” and “increased support for organizations like the Peace Corps that send Americans abroad to help other countries”). Cronbach’s alpha is .77 face-to-face and .72 online.

Liberalizing Trade. This is a single item asking whether the U.S. should “repeal the North American Free Trade Agreement, called NAFTA,” “leave NAFTA the way it is,” “adopt agreements like NAFTA but with more Latin American countries.”

Knowledge

Our foreign policy knowledge index averages eleven items, in each scored 1 for the correct answer and 0 for all other responses, including Don’t-Know’s (DKs).¹⁴ The index is thus the proportion of items answered correctly. The items (and correct answers) are:

The Democratic and Republican parties’ positions on global warming (2 items).

Respondents were asked to place both parties on a 0-to-10 scale from “global warming is not really a problem so there is no need to do anything about it” (0) to “it’s a serious problem and we need to act now” (10). One item scores respondents as correct if and only if they place the

Democrats to the “act now” side of the midpoint. The other scores them as correct if and only if they place the Republicans to the “do nothing” side of it.¹⁵

Bush’s position on foreign aid. This question asks whether President Bush wanted to increase foreign aid, decrease it, or keep it the same. The correct response is that he wanted to increase it.

Bush’s position on international agreements to control greenhouse gases. This question asks whether President Bush supported or opposed recent international agreements to control greenhouse gases. The correct response is that he opposed them.

The percentage of the federal budget going to military spending. This question asks whether about 1 dollar, 5 dollars, 10 dollars, 20 dollars, or 30 dollars or more, out of every 100 dollars in the federal budget, go to military spending. The correct answer is 20 dollars.

The percentage of the federal budget going to foreign aid. This question asks whether about 1 dollar, 5 dollars, 10 dollars, 20 dollars, or 30 dollars or more, out of every 100 dollars in the federal budget, go to foreign aid. The correct answer is about 1 dollar.

The percentage of U.S. goods and services sold abroad. This question asks whether 4 dollars, 8 dollars, 12 dollars, 24 dollars out of every 100 dollars in goods and services produced by the U.S. are sold to customers abroad. The correct answer is 12 dollars.

The incidence of AIDS in Africa. This question asks whether “fewer than 5,” “about 10,” “about 20,” or “30 or more” of every 100 adults in “those African countries with the highest rates of infection” have “AIDS or the AIDS virus?” The correct answer is “30 or more.”

Whether the U.S. has a veto in the WTO. This question asks if it is true or false that “The U.S. has a veto on World Trade Organization decisions.” The correct answer is “false.”

Whether the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council. This question asks if it is true or

false that “The U.S. has a veto on the United Nations Security Council.” The correct answer is “true.”

The causes of global warming. This question asks whether global warming is “caused mostly by human activities like driving cars and burning fuel,” “caused by natural changes in the climate,” or “not occurring at all.” The correct answer is “caused mostly by human activities.”

We also have two items measuring more general political knowledge, unfortunately present in the face-to-face questionnaire only:

The Democratic and Republican parties’ positions on the liberal-conservative dimension (2 items). Respondents are asked to place the Democratic and Republican parties on a 0-10 scale, “where 0 is about as liberal as they come, 10 is about as conservative as they come and 5 is exactly in the middle.” As with the placement items on global warming, we treat these as separate items. The correct answers put the Democrats to the liberal side of the midpoint and the Republicans to the conservative side of it.

Deliberation’s Effects on Policy Attitudes

The first question concerns deliberation’s effects on these policy attitudes. If, as we expect, deliberation in this domain tends to move public opinion toward policy elite opinion, all the positions our policy indices are named for—protecting the environment, fighting terrorism, increasing foreign aid, fighting poverty and suffering, protecting human rights, internationalism, multilateralism, promoting democracy, and liberalizing trade—should see increased support (based on the characterizations of mass and foreign policy elite opinion in Holsti 2004).

One way of estimating deliberation’s effect is from the differences between the post-deliberation (T2) and pre-deliberation (T1) means. This affords estimates of the effect of

deliberating both face-to-face and online and also of the mode effect (the difference of the face-to-face and online effects). The results, in Table 1, show that deliberation had net effects on many policy attitudes in both modes. In the face to face treatment, seven of nine policy attitude

(Table 1 about here)

indices showed statistically significant change. In the online treatment, six of the nine did so. All the significant changes were in the expected direction, toward policy elite opinion. The face-to-face sample became far more internationalist, and both samples came to favor far greater spending on foreign aid. Both samples also showed more modest but significant increases in support for democratization, global development, and protecting human rights. Face-to-face but not online deliberation significantly increased support for anti-terrorism measures and multilateralism. Online but not face-to-face deliberation significantly increased support for environmental protection and free trade.

Generally speaking, the online and face to face results are quite similar—indeed remarkably so, given the design differences previously noted and further, inescapable, innumerable differences of detail. These were parallel but different events. The samples were different. The moderators were largely different. The content and tenor of the small group discussions were different. The expert panelists were different, as were the questions they fielded and answers they gave. Unsurprisingly, therefore, there were statistically significant differences in the magnitude of the policy attitude change on eight of the nine indices. Yet the broad pattern of change was strikingly similar. On four of the nine issues, there was statistically significant change in the same direction. On none of the nine was there statistically significant change in opposing directions.

A second way of estimating of deliberation's effect in each mode and the mode effect is

to compare the treatment and control groups at T2. This analysis is complicated by some differences in the control group questionnaires, which omitted a number of items in the face-to-face version. Indeed three of our nine indices cannot be computed at all face-to-face. Thus

(Tables 2 and 3 about here)

Table 2 presents the results just for the online mode, using all the items used in Table 1, while Table 3 presents the results for both online and face-to-face modes side by side, confining both the treatment and control group in each mode to those items available for the face-to-face control group.

The picture remains similar. In both modes, there is a deliberative effect. Online, using all the items, the treatment and control groups differ significantly on six of the nine indices. The reduced indices in Table 3 produce somewhat attenuated differences that still at least scrape conventional standards of significance on three of the six available indices on line and on five of the six face-to-face. In both tables, *all* the estimated effects, even the statistically insignificant ones, are positive, narrowing the gap between mass and foreign policy elite opinion. Again online deliberation dramatically increases support for foreign aid spending, and again face-to-face deliberation dramatically increases internationalism.¹⁶ Again, too, the fruits of online and face-to-face deliberation look similar. The effects on internationalism and on fighting poverty and suffering are significantly larger face-to-face than online. But these are differences only in magnitude. All the estimated effects are in the same direction.

Knowledge Gains

The next question concerns the origins of these attitude changes. We are particularly interested in the extent to which they are driven by the increases in information and thought that the deliberative process is designed to stimulate. Thought is difficult to capture, but we can

much more easily gauge information, specifically by the foreign policy knowledge index described above.

Regrettably, not quite all eleven foreign policy knowledge items were asked of everyone. Two items—about the Democratic and Republican parties' positions on global warming—were put only to the face-to-face treatment group, not to the face-to-face control group, nor to either the treatment or the control group online. Two additional items—about Bush's posture toward global agreements to control greenhouse gases and about the causes of global climate change—were put to the online treatment and control groups as well as the face-to-face treatment group but not to the face-to-face control group. Thus only seven of the all eleven foreign policy knowledge items can be used to compare the face-to-face treatment group (who were asked all eleven) with the face-to-face control group (who were asked only the seven) at T2, and only the nine put to both the online treatment and online control group can be used to compare them at T2 or to gauge the online information gain from T1 to T2.

We follow the same two strategies as in examining deliberation's effects on policy attitudes. First we look at the changes—the knowledge gains—from T1 to T2, then at the differences between the treatment and control groups at T2. Table 4A presents the participants'

(Table 4 about here)

knowledge gains for just the face-to-face participants, using all eleven knowledge items, then Table 4B presents them for both the online and face-to-face participants, using only the nine foreign policy knowledge items in the online questionnaire. Table 4B also shows the difference of differences, estimating the mode effect.

As can be seen, the participants learned significantly. Whether based on all eleven foreign policy items or only on the eight asked online, the face-to-face participants averaged

answering about 12% more of the items correctly after deliberating. The online gain, by contrast, was far more limited. The online participants emerged getting an average of only about 4% more of the foreign policy knowledge items correct. Even this more modest gain, however, was still statistically significant. The difference between the face-to-face and online gains was also statistically significant. The online treatment conveyed information, but the face-to-face treatment conveyed more.

Table 4C presents the contrasts between the online treatment and control groups, using the nine foreign policy knowledge items online; Table 4D for both the online and face-to-face experiments, using the seven items available for the face-to-face control group and thus for both treatment and control groups in both modes. The results, in tune with those in Tables 4A-4B, show statistically significant contrasts between the treatment and the control group in each mode. Depending on whether all nine items available for the online comparison or only the seven also available for the face-to-face comparison are included in the reckoning, the online participants average getting somewhere between 6.3 and 8.7% more of the foreign policy knowledge items than the online control group members. The face-to-face participants average answering 14.6% more of the items correctly than the face-to-face control group members. The mode effect of $14.6 - 6.3 = 8.3\%$ is sizable and significant. From this perspective, too, it seems, the participants learned online but learned more—indeed a great deal—face-to-face.

It is also worth noting the effect on general political information, as measured by an index averaging the two knowledge items based on the placements of the Democratic and Republican parties on a liberal-conservative scale. Even though we made no effort to acquaint them with terms like “liberal” or “conservative” or the conventional assignments of the parties to the sides of this dimension, our participants seemed to acquire a much clearer sense of the

parties' locations. The only contrasts we can form in this case are for the face-to-face experiment. There we find that the average percentage of our participants getting these two items right increased by 10.1% from T1 to T2 and that on average 18.0% more of the participants than of the control group got them right at T2. These are striking increases in general political literacy.

Policy Attitude Change in the Small Groups

Another possible explanation for the policy attitude changes lies in the small groups. Two hypotheses readily suggest themselves. One is that opinions homogenize. Whether from blind conformism or as a function of the balance of arguments, the variance of opinions within

(Table 5 about here)

the small groups shrinks. Table 5 presents the proportions of the 24 face-to-face and 15 online small groups showing a decrease in within-group variance, both issue by issue and across all 9 issues.

The results show that the variance does more often than not diminish both face-to-face and online but slightly more often face-to-face than online (72.7 versus 63.7% of the time). The stronger social component of face-to-face deliberation may make it more centripetal. There is some notable variation across issues, especially online, with some issues, particularly foreign aid in the online condition, exhibiting more increases than decreases. The issues for which the decreases are most and least pervasive tend to be the same whether the discussion is face-to-face or online. The members of given small groups came to agree distinctly more, both online and face-to-face, about fighting terrorism, fighting poverty and suffering, multilateralism, and promoting democracy and, to a lesser degree, about internationalism and protecting human

rights. They did *not* come to agree distinctly more, however, about protecting the environment or liberalizing trade and indeed came to agree distinctly less about increasing foreign aid.

Another hypothesis, in keeping with Sunstein (2000) and the jury studies he draws on, is that the groups tend to “polarize,” in the sense of becoming more extreme. A group’s T2 opinions look like its T1 opinions, only more so. The mean opinion moves further out on the same side as it started on. To test this notion, we must specify the origin (point of reference), with respect to which the group can be said to be becoming more or less extreme. The most natural origin is the midpoint—.5 on a 0 to 1 scale. An arguably more appealing alternative, however, is the grand mean (of the whole participant sample). A group averaging .7 on the fighting terrorism index counts as wanting to take more strenuous measures if the midpoint (.5) is the point of reference, but so does every group, since the grand mean is roughly .8 (both face-to-face and online). In relation to the grand mean, by contrast, a group whose mean is only .7 is relatively reserved about taking more strenuous measures.

Table 5 presents the proportions of the small groups becoming more polarized under each definition. If the point of reference is the midpoint, roughly two-thirds of the small groups do polarize face-to-face, although only about half of them do so online. If the point of reference is the grand mean, however, only about 40% of the small groups become more polarized, either face-to-face or online. There is some modest tendency, at least with the midpoint as the point of reference, for the polarization to be greater face-to-face, again perhaps in keeping with the stronger social component of the face-to-face interactions. Again, too, there is some considerable variation by issue, particularly if the point of reference is the midpoint. Here, however, there is not much resemblance between the face to face and online modes in the issues showing polarization versus moderation, especially if the midpoint is the point of reference.

Since Sunstein has made much of the alleged strong tendency of small group deliberations to be polarizing in his sense, presenting it as a drawback of deliberative democracy, it is worth underscoring that these results do relatively little to sustain his gloom. Moderated small group deliberations in which no decision, much less any unanimous decision, is required, and with a moderator making sure that all the major arguments are aired and considered, are quite different from juries. Balanced deliberation with the sole purpose of helping the participants clarify their own thinking does not seem to produce any consistent polarization.

Knowledge Gains, Small Group Influences, and Policy Attitude Change

These last results suggest some modest small group influences on policy attitude change. We have also already seen that there were major information gains. These sorts of influences can be combined in a more explicit individual-level model of policy attitude change as

$$P_2 - P_1 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 I_2 + \gamma_2 (P_1 - G_1) + u,$$

where P_1 and P_2 are the participant's policy attitudes before and after deliberation (at T1 and T2), I_2 is the level of knowledge he or she emerges with at T2, G_1 is the mean T1 attitude of the other members of his or her small group, and u is the customary disturbance or error term. We use observed T2 knowledge rather than the observed knowledge gain because it is a better measure of actual knowledge gain (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002). People who emerge with a lot of information have gained a lot—either observably, if they started off low at T1, or unobservably, if they started off high at T1.

Table 6 shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for both the online and the face-to-face participants. The signs in parentheses beside the regressors' names are those of the mean attitude change in the whole sample, first online, then face-to-face. These are also the

signs we normatively expect for the knowledge coefficients. If the attitude changes in the whole sample are information driven, they should be greatest for those who emerge knowing the most. That is, γ_1 should have the same sign as $\bar{P}_2 - \bar{P}_1$, the mean attitude change in the whole sample. To be sure, some of the attitude changes in the whole sample are statistically insignificant, and in these cases we may consider that there is no strong expectation as to the sign of γ_1 . The table denotes statistically significant attitude changes by double plus or minus signs. We also expect γ_2 to be negative, meaning that participants tend to narrow the gap between their own and their small group's position.¹⁷

The model appears to fit very well. The adjusted R^2 s are respectable-to-large for models of this sort, confined to survey measures of psychological variables, involving only two

(Table 6 about here)

regressors, and having a change score as the dependent variable. None of the coefficient estimates carries a statistically significant but anomalously signed estimate. Though always good, the fit is better, sometimes much better, face-to-face.

The results also confirm the expectation regarding the small group coefficient. The estimate is always negative, always significant. The more important regressor for us, however, is information. Online, there are six issues showing a statistically significant net attitude change in the whole sample and thus engendering a prediction about the sign of the information coefficient. Face-to-face, there are seven. In this critical respect, the model fares much better online than face-to-face. Face-to-face, only one of seven expectations as to sign is clearly met; online, five of six are. We hasten to add, since one-for-seven seems an extremely low batting average, that six of the seven face-to-face coefficient estimates for which we had an expectation were of the

right sign; it was just that five of those six did not attain the conventional .05 level of significance.

But these small group coefficients may give small group mechanisms too much credit. Both the small group regressor $P_1 - G_1$ and the dependent variable $P_2 - P_1$ include the T1 attitude P_1 , the former with a positive sign, the latter with a negative one, which builds in a certain negative covariance. What happens if we break $P_1 - G_1$ apart into P_1 and G_1 , entered separately? We should then expect a negative sign on the P_1 coefficient (indicating “regression toward the mean”) and a positive one on the G_1 coefficient. In other studies, we have found that the lion’s share of the composite small group variable’s estimated effect is actually just regression toward the mean (see Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002).

Table 7 shows the results of this divorce here. The information effects are scarcely affected, but the group mean variable is now significant only for one of the nine regressions in

(Table 7 about here)

the online sample and for none of the nine in the face-to-face sample. Information actually has the more important effect, both online and face-to-face, and by a wide margin online.

Why the face-to-face attitude changes rested less firmly on learning is unclear, but one speculation revolves around our impression that the online and face-to-face deliberations were qualitatively different in focus and affective charge. The latter, given their timing, seemed to dwell more on the decision to go to war and thus to be more partisan and heated. This may have had two relevant effects. First, the greater emotionality and partisan tie-in may have reduced information’s effect. Second, information’s effect, even if no smaller, may have been less detectible. Since only two of the eleven items in the foreign policy information index—the two asking what percentage of the federal budget goes for military spending and whether the U.S. has

a veto on the U.N. Security Council—had anything at all to do with the issues on which the face-to-face discussions much more heavily dwelt, the information the index captured may not have been as relevant for the face to face as for the online deliberations.

Conclusion

Public opinion's influence on foreign policy is a matter of lively debate. Some contend that office-holders can usually manage to frame their own preferred foreign policies in ways that achieve public support or acquiescence (Entman 2004, Jacobs and Page 2005), others that public opinion circumscribes the politically feasible options (Hartley and Russett 1992, Wlezien 1996, Sobel 2001). Doubtless both are right, as illustrated by Foyle's (2004) account of the run-up to the second Iraq War. So long as public opinion has at least some constraining effect on foreign policy, it deserves serious attention.

On the whole, our twin DPs suggest that deliberation increases internationalism, multilateralism, and support for protecting the global environment, fighting terrorism, promoting human rights, fighting poverty and suffering abroad, increasing foreign aid, promoting democracy in other countries, and liberalizing foreign trade. The increases show up in both DPs for promoting human rights, fighting poverty and suffering abroad, and increasing foreign aid spending, promoting democracy in other countries, and in one DP or the other for the rest. In broad strokes, a public that thought and knew more about foreign affairs would be more engaged with world problems and more supportive of using international institutions to deal with them.

These changes do not seem adventitious. Rather, they appear to stem, in some appreciable measure, from thinking and learning about the issues. The participants learn a good deal, and those changing the most are those who emerge knowing the most. The post-deliberation opinions do indeed appear to be more "considered" than those expressed in ordinary

polls and surveys. Thus the changes, like those from other quasi-experiments (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Fishkin and Luskin 1999, Barabas 2004) and simulations (Bartels 1996, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Althaus 1998), belie the extenuationist claim that most people manage to approximate their “full-information” preferences even without knowing or thinking much about the issues.

Without exception, moreover, the significant changes narrow the gap between public and policy elite opinion, as far as the latter can be judged from other evidence (reviewed in Holsti 2004). This, we have argued, is to be expected in the foreign policy domain, where interests and values are largely shared. Domestic policy is another story. There, too, deliberation can be expected to shift public opinion toward policies consistent with the majority’s values and interests, broadly defined. But there what serves the majority’s values and interests is less clear, leaving the direction in which the public can be expected to move a more open question. Liberals may be sure that most people, if they but knew and thought more, would move left, but conservatives equally sure that they would move right.¹⁸ Given some sense of where policy elite opinion lies, Deliberative Polling figures to be less suspenseful in the foreign than the domestic policy domain. Of course, less is not zero. We cannot really say what more informed and thoughtful public opinion would be like without measuring it. Future Deliberative Polling will probably turn up cases in which deliberation moves the public’s foreign policy attitudes away from the foreign policy elite’s, at which point be interesting to consider what accounts for the variation.

Methodologically, these results are encouraging for Deliberative Polling online. The online and face-to-face results are broadly similar. Both samples became more knowledgeable. On none of the nine issues we examine did they change significantly in opposite directions. On

about half they change significantly in the same direction. The policy attitude changes ran somewhat smaller but seemed if anything *more* information-driven online.

Other differences or similarities between modes remain to be explored. Does voice-based online discussion allow for the same mutual understanding and empathy we believe we detect in face-to-face discussion? Does it have the same stimulative effects on civic engagement? Does it increase the “proximity to single-peakedness,” at least for low- to moderate-salience issues, as in the face-to-face DPs examined in [reference deleted]? These are questions for another day.

The online design has great promise, combining a reasonable approximation of face-to-face deliberation with much lower cost. This was a maiden voyage. Some tweaking may enable it to yield attitude changes just as great as in the face-to-face version. For instance, these deliberations were arbitrarily limited to eight hour-long sessions over five weeks (counting a Christmas recess in the middle), but online deliberations could extend far longer. An online sample could continue deliberating for eight weeks or eight months. The cumulative effects of sufficiently protracted online deliberation could equal or surpass those from a mere weekend of deliberating face-to-face. It may not be too much to hope that, as the cost of providing computers and internet access continues to diminish, online Deliberative Polling may become an everyday deliberative complement to conventional polling.

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Table 1
The Effects of Face-to-Face Versus Online Deliberation:
T1-T2 Differences, Participants Only

	T1		T2		T2 – T1		Mode Diff.
	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	
Protecting the Environment	.778 (.011)	.686 (.014)	.771 (.012)	.715 (.014)	-.007 (.008)	.029*** (.010)	.037*** (.013)
Fighting Terrorism	.800 (.009)	.805 (.009)	.821 (.008)	.800 (.009)	.021** (.007)	-.005 (.007)	.026** (.010)
Human Rights	.701 (.012)	.584 (.015)	.727 (.010)	.630 (.013)	.026** (.011)	.046*** (.013)	.020 (.017)
Multilateralism	.733 (.007)	.735 (.009)	.786 (.005)	.748 (.008)	.053*** (.006)	.012 (.008)	.041*** (.010)
Fighting Poverty and Suffering	.589 (.010)	.448 (.009)	.683 (.009)	.478 (.009)	.094*** (.008)	.030*** (.007)	.064*** (.011)
Internationalism	.744 (.016)	.665 (.019)	.849 (.014)	.684 (.019)	.105*** (.016)	.019 (.019)	.086*** (.025)
Increasing Foreign Aid	.478 (.019)	.312 (.024)	.724 (.018)	.411 (.026)	.246*** (.019)	.098*** (.021)	.148*** (.029)
Promoting Democracy	.633 (.011)	.511 (.010)	.687 (.009)	.536 (.009)	.054*** (.009)	.025*** (.010)	.029** (.014)
Liberalizing Trade	.492 (.016)	.348 (.019)	.478 (.014)	.396 (.019)	-.014 (.018)	.047** (.020)	.061** (.027)

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 2
T2 Differences between Treatment and Control Groups
(Complete Indices, Online Only)

	Participants		Control Group		Difference
Protecting the Environment	.715	(.014)	.648	(.016)	.067***(.021)
Fighting Terrorism	.800	(.009)	.784	(.011)	.016 (.014)
Protecting Human Rights	.630	(.013)	.583	(.016)	.046** (.020)
Multilateralism	.748	(.008)	.720	(.010)	.028** (.013)
Fighting Poverty and Suffering	.478	(.009)	.426	(.010)	.051***(.014)
Internationalism	.685	(.019)	.650	(.020)	.036 (.028)
Increasing Foreign Aid	.414	(.024)	.289	(.024)	.125***(.034)
Promoting Democracy	.535	(.009)	.489	(.011)	.047***(.014)
Liberalizing Trade	.393	(.018)	.360	(.020)	.033 (.027)

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 3
T2 Differences between Treatment and Control Groups
(Indices Confined to Shared Items, Both Modes)

	Participants		Control Group		Difference		Mode Diff.
	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	<i>Face-to-Face</i>	<i>Online</i>	
Protecting the Environment	.744	.687	.712	.660	.031*	.027	.004
Fighting Terrorism	.828	.813	.809	.796	.011	.017	.006
Protecting Human Rights	.727	.630	.665	.583	.062***	.046**	.016
Multilateralism	.777	.752	.739	.720	.039***	.032**	.007
Fighting Poverty and Suffering	.723	.606	.642	.561	.080***	.045***	.035*
Internationalism	.848	.685	.682	.650	.167***	.036	.131***

*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

Table 4**Knowledge, T2 - T1 and Treatment - Control****A. Face-to-Face Participants (All Items), T2 - T1**

	T1	T2	T2 - T1
Knowledge	.373	.496	.123***

B. Online vs. Face-to-Face Participants (Shared Items), T2 - T1

	Face-to-Face			Online			Mode Diff.
	T1	T2	T2 - T1	T1	T2	T2 - T1	T2 - T1
Knowledge	.348	.467	.119***	.367	.406	.038***	.081***

C. Online (All Nine Available Items), Treatment - Control

	Treatment	Control	Diff.
Knowledge	.406	.319	.087***

D. Online vs. Face-to-Face (Shared Items), Treatment - Control

	Face-to-Face			Online			Mode Diff.
	Treatment	Control	Diff.	Treatment	Control	Diff.	
Knowledge	.427	.282	.146***	.354	.291	.063***	.083***

NOTE: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Table 5
Small Group Behaviors

	Face-to-Face			Online		
	Moving further out from the <i>midpoint</i>	Moving further out from the <i>grand mean</i>	Decreasing variance	Moving further out from the <i>midpoint</i>	Moving further out from the <i>grand mean</i>	Decreasing variance
Protecting the Environment	50.0	45.8	50.0	80.0	40.0	46.7%
Fighting Terrorism	75.0	37.5	75.0	40.0	26.7	100.0
Protecting Human Rights	58.3	25.0	58.3	93.3	40.0	66.7
Multilateralism	95.8	54.2	95.8	80.0	40.0	80.0
Fighting Poverty and Suffering	100.0	45.8	100.0	20.0	46.7	60.0
Internationalism	79.2	45.8	79.2	60.0	26.7	53.3
Increasing Foreign Aid	25.0	41.7	25.0	6.7	40.0	33.3
Promoting Democracy	79.2	37.5	79.2	40.0	40.0	80.0
Liberalizing Trade	25.0	29.2	25.0	6.7	53.3	46.7
Total	65.3	40.3	65.3	48.1	39.3	63.7

Note: Entries are percentages of the **xx** small groups.

Table 6

Policy Index		Online			Face-to-Face		
		Coeff.	S. E.	<i>p</i>	Coeff	S. E.	<i>p</i>
Protecting the Environment (++, -)	Constant	-.017	.024	.46	-.066	.024	.01
	t2 Info	.117	.053	.02	.125	.049	.01
	t1 Att. Distance*	-.228	.040	.00	-.261	.038	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.115			.124		
	<i>N</i>	245			340		
Fighting Terrorism (-, ++)	Constant	.002	.016	.88	.023	.018	.20
	t2 Info	-.020	.036	.29	-.004	.035	.46
	t1 Att. Distance	-.253	.049	.00	-.432	.034	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.094			.322		
	<i>N</i>	245			340		
Protecting Human Rights (++, ++)	Constant	.044	.025	.08	.039	.026	.14
	t2 Info	.005	.056	.47	-.028	.053	.30
	t1 Att. Distance	-.514	.044	.00	-.555	.038	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.359			.380		
	<i>N</i>	244			340		
Multilateralism (+, ++)	Constant	-.004	.016	.80	.039	.014	.01
	t2 Info	.043	.036	.11	.029	.028	.15
	t1 Att. Distance	-.480	.045	.00	-.590	.034	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.318			.470		
	<i>N</i>	245			340		
Fighting Poverty and Suffering (++, ++)	Constant	.004	.015	.77	.079	.021	.00
	t2 Info	.063	.034	.03	.031	.043	.23
	t1 Att. Distance	-.322	.042	.00	-.389	.037	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.191			.243		
	<i>N</i>	245			340		
Internationalism (+, ++)	Constant	-.014	.041	.73	.071	.039	.07
	t2 Info	.078	.092	.20	.070	.078	.19
	t1 Att. Distance	-.467	.057	.00	-.604	.044	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.221			.363		
	<i>N</i>	237			334		
Increasing Foreign Aid (++, ++)	Constant	.012	.050	.82	.033	.047	.48
	t2 Info	.208	.112	.03	.457	.094	.00
	t1 Att. Distance	-.270	.058	.00	-.566	.045	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.101			.341		
	<i>N</i>	194			313		
Promoting Democracy (++, ++)	Constant	-.009	.019	.64	.042	.023	.07
	t2 Info	.084	.044	.03	.026	.047	.29
	t1 Att. Distance	-.505	.051	.00	-.486	.039	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.284			.314		
	<i>N</i>	245			340		
Liberalizing Trade (++, -)	Constant	-.054	.046	.23	-.211	.039	.00
	t2 Info	.238	.098	.01	.418	.078	.00
	t1 Att. Distance	-.531	.057	.00	-.719	.045	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.296			.458		
	<i>N</i>	216			327		

Table 7
Attitude Change as a Function of t₂ Information, t₁ Group Mean, and t₁ Attitude

Policy Index		Online			Face-to-Face		
		Coeff.	S. E.	<i>p</i>	Coeff	S. E.	<i>p</i>
Protecting the Environment (++, -)	Constant	.143	.196	.47	.017	.123	.09
	t2 Info	.128	.055	.01	.135	.049	.00
	t1 Group Mean	.001	.279	.50	-.026	.151	.43
	t1 Att	-.243	.044	.00	-.285	.039	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.114			.131	
	<i>N</i>		245			340	
Fighting Terrorism (-, ++)	Constant	.315	.132	.02	.364	.129	.00
	t2 Info	-.028	.036	.22	-.012	.035	.37
	t1 Group Mean	-.107	.159	.25	.041	.152	.39
	t1 Att.	-.278	.049	.00	-.463	.036	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.110			.334	
	<i>N</i>		245			340	
Protecting Human Rights (++, ++)	Constant	.094	.158	.55	-.394	.134	.00
	t2 Info	.005	.056	.45	-.012	.053	.41
	t1 Group Mean	.431	.259	.05	-.555	.074	.09
	t1 Att.	-.518	.046	.00	-.591	.040	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.364			.392	
	<i>N</i>		244			340	
Multilateralism (+, ++)	Constant	.119	.230	.60	.376	.089	.00
	t2 Info	.044	.036	.10	.025	.028	.18
	t1 Group Mean	.322	.298	.14	.165	.116	.08
	t1 Att.	-.490	.049	.00	-.622	.034	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.316			.490	
	<i>N</i>		245			340	
Fighting Poverty and Suffering (++, ++)	Constant	.197	.086	.02	.314	.082	.00
	t2 Info	.069	.034	.02	.044	.043	.15
	t1 Group Mean	-.086	.186	.32	.012	.133	.46
	t1 Att.	-.348	.043	.00	-.420	.038	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.204			.260	
	<i>N</i>		245			340	
Internationalism (+, ++)	Constant	.183	.130	.16	.583	.120	.00
	t2 Info	.104	.093	.13	.095	.076	.10
	t1 Group Mean	.172	.193	.19	-.048	.151	.38
	t1 Att.	-.483	.057	.00	-.653	.044	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.226			.397	
	<i>N</i>		237			334	
Increasing Foreign Aid (++, ++)	Constant	.104	.078	.19	.320	.100	.00
	t2 Info	.235	.113	.02	.456	.093	.00
	t1 Group Mean	-.038	.208	.43	.010	.178	.48
	t1 Att.	-.294	.060	.00	-.613	.047	.00
	Adj. <i>R</i> ²		.101			.362	
	<i>N</i>		194			313	

Table 7 - Continued

Promoting Democracy (++, ++)	Constant	.240	.147	.11	.430	.089	..00
	t2 Info	.093	.044	.02	.025	.028	.18
	t1 Group Mean	.037	.279	.44	.165	.116	.08
	t1 Att.	-.531	.053	.00	-.622	.034	.00
	Adj. R^2		.290			.490	
	N		245			340	
Liberalizing Trade (++, -)	Constant	.015	.103	.88	.208	..086	.02
	t2 Info	.239	.098	.01	.390	.075	.00
	t1 Group Mean	.345	.254	.09	-.046	.147	.38
	t1 Att.	-.543	.059	.00	-.775	.044	.00
	Adj. R^2		.295			.502	
	N		216			327	

NOTES

¹The posttest survey in both experiments occurred during the same week in January of 2003.

²Foreign affairs coverage has dwindled since the end of the Cold War, as the international arena has metamorphosed from a bipolar contest between superpowers to a hodge-podge of “local” conflicts, and once gripping storylines have lost their relevance (Norris 1996, Moisy 1996).

³The media’s deference to government sources (Bennett 1990, Zaller and Chiu 2000, cf. Althaus 2003) may, however, make *misinformation*, as distinct from mere ignorance, more common in the foreign policy domain, as the case of the recent war in Iraq seems to illustrate (Kull et al. 2003).

⁴We do wonder, in these days of increasingly tame media, just how great the contrast between the domestic and foreign policy domains, even in this respect, actually is.

⁵Granted, correlation is not proximity.

⁶Of course the definition of “policy elite” is somewhat arbitrary. See Holsti (2004, ch. 6) for details.

⁷This may be part of the reason that public sees itself as far less multilateralist than it actually is (Todorov and Mandisodza 2004). It may be a contrast effect: the public is in fact less multilateralist than the foreign policy elite, most recent administrations, or the talking heads they provide, which may be the standard of comparison.

⁸Althaus reports results for seven distinct foreign policy items (one asked in two different surveys). One other besides the three just mentioned, shows a sizable difference between

actual and full-information preferences: a fully informed public would be less apt to support “using American military forces in the Middle East to protect oil shipments.”

⁹The design differs from those of Citizen Juries, Consensus Conferences, and assorted other, vaguely similar deliberative fora in a number of important ways, but perhaps most critically in the use of sizable random samples. Deliberative Polling can claim to be showing the views of a more informed and thoughtful *public*, not just a narrow, self-selected stratum thereof.

¹⁰Since the proceedings and results receive media coverage, it is also, less centrally, a vehicle for educating the public about policy issues and electoral choices. It may also be seen as a demonstration project for making real-world democracy more deliberative (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004).

¹¹Equivalently, respondents receive their average score on the items they do answer.

¹²We have tried using these items without pre-averaging them, but the index generally coheres less well than with the pre-averaging.

¹³Nobody’s taking the lead, chosen by only a few percent anyway, is treated as missing data.

¹⁴Note that this treatment of DKs is deliberately at odds with Mondak’s recommendation to treat DKs and incorrect answers as differently (effectively, by giving the latter part-credit), which other research shows to be ill-advised (Bennett 2001, [reference deleted]).

¹⁵These two items could be folded down into one, based on the relative placements of the two parties (scoring respondents putting the Democrats to the “act now” side of the Republicans as correct and all other respondents as incorrect), but other research

indicates that knowledge measures constructed from absolute placements—of each of each object (party, in this case) individually—fare better ([two references deleted]).

¹⁶We cannot say anything, from this perspective, about the face-to-face deliberation's effect on support for foreign aid spending, because the foreign aid item was not asked of the face-to-face control group.

¹⁷More precisely, the greater the (necessarily nonnegative) I_2 , the larger the opinion change, and the more positive (negative) the time 1 difference between the individual and his or her group, $P_1 - G_1$, the more negative (positive), the opinion change.

¹⁸For further thoughts on these lines, including speculation about possible nonmonotonicities, see Luskin (2002, 2003).