

"Deliberative Public Opinion in Presidential Primaries:
Evidence from the Online Deliberative Poll"*

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Media coverage of political campaigns typically highlights the horserace and strategic aspects of campaigns at the expense of the candidates' positions and records on matters of policy and governance. Reports on the latest polls or behind-the-scenes strategic maneuvers far outnumber reports on the candidates' worldviews, policy pledges, or previous records of decision-making (for a review of the evidence, see Iyengar et al., 2004).

These tendencies are especially pronounced during the early stages of nomination campaigns. With a relatively large field of sometimes unfamiliar candidates, the task of delineating platforms and records is even harder than in November. Reporters find it far easier to use poll numbers, fund raising data, and attendance at campaign events to handicap the contest (Zaller, 2004; Polsby, 1983; Amundson et al., 1988). In contrast to the candidates' policy pronouncements on the issues, which are important but repetitive, the state of the horse race is *new news*.

The media's focus on the horse race makes the results from the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary disproportionately influential. These first real tests of public support generate a torrent of reports on the "winners" and "losers" and the future trajectory of the race (Robinson and Sheehan, 1983; Adams, 1987; Busch and Mayer, 2003), which can lead either to dramatic surges in subsequent electoral support or rapid winnowing from the race. The 2004 Democratic primaries have provided textbook examples. Over the space of just a few weeks, beginning with the Iowa caucuses, John Kerry rose from a self-financed, under-achieving candidate to the presumptive nominee, while Howard Dean fell from front-runner to "underdog" to certain loser. Thus horse race coverage grants disproportionate influence to small samples of voters from two small, unrepresentative states.

For their part, the media are partly following voters, who, whatever they *say*, exhibit a strong behavioral preference for reading and hearing about the horse race, rather than policy issues (Iyengar et al., 2004). The horse race is what attracts the most viewers and sells the most newspapers and magazines. But that is partly because, as decades of survey research have shown, most voters know so little about policy issues and the candidates' positions on them, which may in turn be a function of media behavior (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Kinder, 1998; Pierce, 1999). Given what they see, hear, and read, all but the most determined voters have little choice but to rely heavily on the candidates' sheer visibility and appearance of electability (Bartels, 1988; Brady and Johnston, 1987). It is, in short, a vicious circle.

The relative invisibility of issues in primary campaigns may also be attributed to the candidates, who often prefer not to emphasize their policy positions, which may not in fact differ much from those of their co-partisan opponents (Aldrich, 1980). Instead, they often campaign on the basis of background and personality, seeking to present themselves as likeable, competent, and the best bet to win in November. But in doing so they are partly responding to incentives set by media behavior regarding what is newsworthy. It is another vicious circle.

These unfortunate tendencies have lately been exacerbated by "frontloading:" the concentration of primaries during the early stages of the campaign (Busch and Mayer, 2003). The rapid-fire succession of contests leaves less time for reporters to attend to anything beyond the horse race implications of the most recent results, and the abbreviated length of the whole sequence leaves less time for candidates to repeat their policy positions often enough to reach many voters or for voters to absorb them.

The dearth and seeming irrelevance of issues in primary campaigns raises serious normative questions. Primaries were adopted as a means of strengthening the responsiveness of

the eventual nominee to the policy preferences of rank and file partisans (Polsby, 1983). In practice, however, primary voting shows little trace of policy- or performance-based voting. It is dominated instead by perceptions of the candidates' personal qualities and vote-getting prowess. Evaluations of the candidates tend to be "primitive"-- lightly informed, undifferentiated, and therefore unstable and relatively disconnected from "basic" predispositions (Gelman and King, 1993; Mayer, 1996; Bartels, 1988). As Brady and Johnston (1987) put it,

Citizens ... learn too slowly about every aspect of the candidates except their viability. And, one of the major reasons that citizens learn quickly about viability is the enormous emphasis placed on the horse race by the media, especially right after the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary. (1987, p. 184)

The implications for the outcome are similarly troubling. Either voters attach themselves to a front-runner whose early successes force competitors out of the race and who wins the nomination with little serious scrutiny, or, as in 2004, they gravitate to a relatively unknown candidate who does surprisingly well in the early contests. Neither scenario entails widespread comparisons of the candidates on issues or their credentials.

One useful way of evaluating this state of affairs is to consider the impact of a counter-factually enhanced information environment. That is, how might the candidates' standings in the polls and chances of achieving the nomination be altered if voters were given greater opportunity and incentive to learn, think about, and discuss the candidates' positions on the issues during the period of the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary?

We address this question. To simulate a more informed and thoughtful public, we conducted an online Deliberative Poll during the first few weeks of the campaign, with the deliberations running from mid-January to mid-February. The participants, meeting online, discussed the candidates' positions, were given information about them, as well as the opportunity to seek clarification or explanation from a panel of non-partisan issue experts. This

is quite different from the experience of voters exposed only to the real-world campaign. Policy information is more readily available, and discussions of the campaign are more frequent, focus more on policy information, are more balanced, and involve more heterogeneous interlocutors. We estimate the effects of exposure to these conditions on candidate preferences and the evaluative processes behind them.

Our results suggest that deliberating about the candidates' positions on the issues increases the weights voters give issues and thus their evaluations of the candidates. This suggests that more substantive media coverage would produce more substantively oriented decision-making by voters -- and, at least sometimes, depending on exactly how the relevant substantive considerations play out, would produce different outcomes.

Experimental Design

Our intent was to create an online intervention that matched face-to-face Deliberative Polling as closely as possible. Face-to-face Deliberative Polls assemble random samples of citizens in a single location to deliberate over policy issues or electoral choices. The participants are sent balanced briefing materials, laying out the principal arguments for and against the principal options. Then, on site, they deliberate in randomly assigned small groups led by trained moderators and put questions raised in the small group discussion to panels of experts, policy-makers, or politicians in plenary sessions. There have been national-level face-to-face Deliberative Polls in the U.S. (2), the U.K. (5), Australia (2), Denmark, and Bulgaria (see Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002 for one report).

Based on these previous studies, we know that deliberation both imparts substantial amounts of information and often produces significant opinion change (Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002). The more informed and thoughtful opinion resulting

from deliberation can be quite different from the public opinion we know. But do these same effects obtain in the context of the electoral choices in nomination campaigns? Although the “National Issues Convention” Deliberative Poll of 1996 involved appearances by several Republican presidential candidates and then Vice President Al Gore, the British national Deliberative Poll of 1997 concerned the general election of that year, and the Australian national Deliberative Poll of 1999 and the Danish national Deliberative Poll of 2000 both concerned referendum choices, the present online Deliberative Poll is the first ever to focus on the choices in a presidential *nomination* campaign.¹

Why Online Deliberation?

Online deliberation has sizable practical advantages. It costs substantially less, in man-hours or dollars. A random sample can be assembled online for a small fraction of the cost of assembling it in the flesh. From a participant’s perspective, online deliberation reduces the inconvenience and opportunity costs of participation. Our online participants did not have to travel and did not have to give over whole weekends to the process (for more on the advantages of online Deliberative Polling, see Fishkin et al., 2003).

Granted, large numbers of Americans still lack home access to the Internet (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002), raising concerns about the representativeness of the participant pool. But this “digital divide” can be overcome. We began by drawing a random sample of voting-age citizens, not just Internet users, then provided the “offline” group with free Internet access. The substitution of online for face-to-face deliberation thus entailed no loss of sampling rigor.

¹The National Issues Convention was held during but was not *about* the nomination campaign. The discussion and questionnaire were just about the issues. There were no questions about the candidates.

The Sample

Approximately 750 adult Americans, selected at random from the national panel maintained by the research firm of Knowledge Networks, were invited to participate in the study. The 40,000-strong panel, all recruited by telephone methods, is offered free Web TV service as an incentive for their regular participation in market research. The Knowledge Networks panel is equivalent to a standard RDD sample.² As a platform for administering surveys, moreover, Web TV has significant advantages over the telephone, including reduced random measurement error, increased differentiation of responses, and reduced social desirability response bias (Chang and Krosnick, 2003).³

A random sub-sample of the panel were provided varying descriptions of the study, depending on the condition to which they were randomly assigned. The 500 respondents assigned to the control group were told that the study concerned voter attitudes towards the presidential candidates, the approximately 250 assigned to the treatment group that it was an attempt to establish an online platform for citizen discussion of the presidential candidates and their positions on the issues.

A significant number (some 20 percent) of the respondents assigned to the treatment were without Internet access. This group was offered a free computer and a two-month trial ISP membership in exchange for their participation in this study. The remaining participants were offered a financial incentive of \$200. Control group participants, whose obligations were limited to completion of two thirty-minute surveys, were offered a smaller incentive of \$40.

² In fact, the Knowledge Networks panel covers slightly less than the 95 percent of the population with a working telephone. This is because the design excludes residents of areas not serviced by a Web TV ISP (see Chang and Krosnick, 2003).

³ Even though observed KN response rates compare favorably with several reputable telephone-based surveys, the actual response rate is in fact lower because less than two-thirds of those invited to join the panel in fact do so (see Chang and Krosnick, 2003).

In addition to the 250 fresh recruits, the treatment condition also included 125 participants from a previous online Deliberative Poll, conducted a little more than a year earlier. These veteran participants had spent four weeks (in mid-December 2002 through mid-January 2003) considering “America in the World”-- a broad-ranging discussion of the goals of U.S. foreign policy (including national security, global development and democratization, and international trade) with no reference whatsoever to the presidential election (for further details, see Fishkin et al., 2003). We included the veteran participants for two reasons. First, we were interested in observing the delayed effects, if any, of foreign policy deliberation on evaluations of the 2004 presidential candidates. Having been primed with information about foreign policy, these participants may have followed ensuing events in Iraq more closely. They may also have entered the campaign period with a head start, at least with respect to their familiarity with the candidates’ positions on U.S. military intervention and international trade, both of which were central to both the previous deliberative Poll and the nomination campaign. Second, we sought to investigate whether familiarity with the online process conditions the effects of online deliberation. Perhaps relatively “experienced” deliberators are less distracted by the demands of the technology (or the novelty of the experience) and thus more likely to learn from the materials and discussions. Of the 200 “deliberators” in the 2003 poll, 125 participated. Thus our 2004 design effectively included two levels of treatment, corresponding to novice and veteran online deliberators.

Briefing Materials

Once participants had consented to participate, they were sent briefing materials.⁴ These included a document prepared by MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, our media partner in the project, describing the full range of policy options facing the U.S. in the areas of national security and international trade.⁵ In the case of the former, the discussion summarized the case -- both for and against -- multilateral and unilateral military intervention. It then examined the invasion of Iraq as a case study of the choices facing the Bush Administration. For the trade issue, the document compared the protectionist and “free trade” arguments, along with a discussion of the economic consequences of each position for various groups and industries (e.g. workers, businessmen, farmers, consumers, etc.).

In addition to this non-partisan and balanced exposition of the national security and trade policy alternatives, we mailed each treatment group member a multimedia CD featuring the ten declared presidential candidates (President Bush and nine Democrats). The CD provided biographical information on the candidates and outlined their positions on national security, trade, healthcare, taxes, and the economy. The candidates’ positions, which were taken from their stump speeches, televised interviews or debates, were presented to maximize their comparability. In the case of healthcare and the economy, for instance, all nine Democrats responded to the identical questions posed by the AFL-CIO (e.g. “What steps will you take to

⁴ Of course, “offline” participants were sent their computers considerably in advance (no later than two weeks before the first online session). We also sent them a checklist of items to complete in preparation for the first session as well as a schedule of “practice” online sessions.

⁵ A team at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton prepared the non-partisan briefing document on international security and economics for *By the People*, an initiative of MacNeil/Lehrer Productions. It can be found on the PBS web site at <http://www.by-the-people.org>.

create and retain good jobs?”). We approximated President Bush’s “answers” by using excerpts from speeches, interviews, or press releases.

Unlike news media treatment of the campaign, the CD provided roughly equal coverage of each candidate and each of the five issues.⁶ The sole instance of unequal candidate treatment concerned TV ads -- those candidates with no advertisements were disadvantaged. Using the average number of “candidate pages” as a rough gauge of coverage, Al Sharpton, Carol Mosely-Braun and Dennis Kucinich (all with no advertisements) were allocated fifteen pages each, while the rest of the field (all with ads) was allocated an average of twenty pages. Thus, the CD provided somewhat greater exposure for “serious” candidates.

Small Group Discussions

Beginning January 19 (coincidentally, the day of the Iowa caucuses), participants attended five weekly hour-long online meetings, each devoted to a specific policy topic. They selected a group from a list of sixteen based on their own scheduling preferences and remained with the group for the duration of the study. This was a small departure from the practice in face-to-face Deliberative Polling, where the small groups are randomly assigned. The small groups varied in size between twelve and twenty-one and averaged fourteen.

The weekly group discussion agendas corresponded to the content of the briefing materials. Week 1 focused on the Iraq War and the question of unilateral versus multilateral military intervention. In Week 2, the focus shifted to the candidates’ positions on Iraq and the use of military force. Week 3 dealt with international trade, and Week 4 with taxes, the economy, and health care. Week 5, the last session, provided the participants an opportunity to sum up and synthesize what they had learned about the issues and the candidates.

⁶ The amount of issue coverage ranged from 40 pages (trade) to 48 (national security).

A key feature of our design was the use of voice- rather than text-based discussions. The software (Lotus Sametime) permitted a moderator to regulate the order (as well as frequency) of speech, thus precluding simultaneous comments by multiple participants. In most instances, participants would form a “speaking queue” and the microphone would be passed accordingly. When discussion lagged, the moderator would pose questions or otherwise attempt to stimulate discussion.⁷ As in other Deliberative Polls, the moderators also attempted to prevent anyone from dominating the discussion.

As in face-to-face Deliberative Polling, each small group was encouraged, during the last fifteen minutes of each session, to formulate some key question that would likely affect their position on the policy under discussion. The group’s moderator submitted these questions electronically to the *Online Newshour with Jim Lehrer*, our media partner in the project, which in turn relayed them to policy experts representing both Democratic and Republican perspectives. The experts’ answers were then posted on the small group’s website in advance of the next online session.

Measurement

We relied on a standard two-group, pretest-posttest design to estimate the impact of the intervention. Some time in advance of the first online meeting, participants in both conditions completed a web-administered pretest survey encompassing a wide range of factual and opinion questions.⁸ Immediately following the conclusion of the fifth discussion session, participants were sent the posttest survey, which consisted primarily of the survey items used previously, but with the addition of several new questions.

⁷ Our moderators (all Stanford graduate students) were experienced hands with Sametime, having moderated in the previous online Deliberative Poll focusing on U.S. foreign policy.

⁸ The median date on which the pretest was completed was January 5.

Overall, this design replicates conventional face-to-face Deliberative Polling quite closely. The only major difference concerns the length of the intervention. In face-to-face Deliberative Polling, the small group deliberations normally total five or six hours, spread over roughly two days. In this online version, participants deliberated for the same amount of time, but spread over five weeks. Thus our online participants had both more time to think and more time to forget.

In the analysis that follows, we initially present T2-T1 differences to document the extent of factual learning, opinionation, and opinion change in this study. Later, we report the results of a posttest-only analysis of candidate preference showing that exposure to online deliberation significantly elevated the impact of policy issues on candidate choice.

The Effects of Deliberation on Campaign “Preparedness”

We begin by reporting the effects of the treatment on several “civic resources” -- cognitions and beliefs necessary for the exercise of electoral choice.

Information

The most basic resource is information. Our instrument included two measures of information. The first is based on seven questions tapping respondents’ familiarity with economic conditions (the impact of President Bush’s tax policy on investment income and changes in the rate of unemployment since Bush took office), trade issues (the reason for the termination of US steel tariffs and the Bush Administration’s position on the FTAA), previous experience of the primary candidates (asked only of Richard Gephardt and Wesley Clark), and the conflict in Iraq (the number of Americans killed since the invasion). We summed over correct responses and rescored the index to a 0-1 metric.⁹

⁹ Coefficient Alpha for the post-test factual information index was .72.

Our second measure of information tapped participants' ability to place President Bush and five of the Democratic candidates (Clark, Dean, Edwards, Kerry, Sharpton) on four issue scales. The scales were defined with contrasting endpoints of "free trade" -- "protect US industries," "military intervention on our own" -- "intervention with UN approval," "increased defense spending/decreased domestic spending" -- "decreased defense spending/increased domestic spending," and "lower taxes, fewer services," -- "higher taxes, more services."¹⁰ The effects of online deliberation on both measures of information are summarized in Table 1.

¹⁰ The scales were worded as follows: (1) Some people think the federal government should provide fewer services such as health and education in order to lower taxes. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel it is important for the federal government to provide more services even if it means higher taxes. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (2) Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense and focus much more on solving domestic problems. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Other people feel that defense spending should be greatly increased even if it means reduced spending on domestic problems. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? (3) Some people feel the United States should intervene militarily when its interests are threatened without working through international organizations such as the U.N and NATO. Other people feel that we should not intervene without first obtaining international approval and cooperation. Using the scale shown below, where would you place yourself, or haven't you thought much about this? (4) Some people feel that we should pursue increased free trade even if we may lose some existing jobs. Other people feel that we should subsidize American industries even if that means we lose markets for our goods abroad. And of course, other people fall somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this issue, or haven't you thought much about this?

We positioned President Bush at one side of the four scales (lower taxes, increased defense spending, unilateral military intervention, and free trade) and all five Democrats at the opposite side. In operational terms, placements of Bush falling between "1" and "3" were scored as "correct," while placements of the Democrats falling between "5" and "7" were scored as correct. After computing average opinionation scores for each candidate, we summed across the six candidates and four placements and converted the resulting "placement accuracy" score to a 0-1 metric. Using each candidate as the individual indicator, Cronbach's Alpha (at the post-test) was .91.

Table 1: T1-T2 Changes in Factual Information and Accuracy of Candidate Placement

| | Control Group (N: 460) | | Treatment Group New Participants (N: 166) | | Treatment Group Repeaters (N: 116) | |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------|--|-----------|---|-----------|
| | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 |
| Index of Information (0-1) | .45 | .47 | .44 | .54** | .57 | .67** |
| Candidate Placement Index (0-1) | .26 | .34 | .29 | .43** | .35 | .53** |

**Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .01$

Clearly, deliberation increased information by both measures. The fresh participants increased their factual information scores by more than 10 percent, and their accuracy in locating the candidates on the issues by some 15 percent. The veterans learned just as much, despite starting with considerably higher information scores; their accuracy on the placement index improved by 18 percent. Regardless of participants’ level of experience with the online process, or their pre-existing command of political information, exposure to online deliberation produced substantial learning.

Opinionation

We also examine “opinionation” -- simply having an opinion—about the candidates. Opinions about a candidate’s intelligence or empathy with ordinary people, although not necessarily grounded in factual information, are core ingredients of candidate preference.

Lacking information about the candidates' policy positions or records, a great many people fall back on trait-based judgments as the basis for voting (for a review, see Kinder, 1998).

Thus we computed our respondent's opinionation about each candidate's personal characteristics. We asked participants to apply the terms "intelligent," "sincere," and "thinks like I do" to President Bush and the five Democrats.¹¹ We scored substantive responses as 1 and DKs as 0 and averaged across these three personality trait items for each candidate. In early January, as Table 2 shows, impressions of the candidates' personal characteristics were nearly as scarce as factual information (see Table 2). Virtually everyone could offer impressions of President Bush, but only minorities had impressions of any of the Democrats. As the campaign progressed, our participants gained more of an impression of them -- as, for that matter, did our control group, from the real-world campaign (for similar findings, see Bartels 1988, Brady and Johnston 1987). But our participants gained far more, effectively closing the "image gap" with President Bush.

¹¹ The next section concerns your impressions of the various candidates running for President. First we have a set of questions about how you would describe some of these candidates. For each candidate we want to know first if the word "**sincere**" describes him extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all? Or if you don't feel you've seen enough of the candidate to say, just check "don't know."

Table 2: T1-T2 Changes in Ability to Rate Candidates on Traits

| | Control Group (N: 460) | | Treatment Group New Participants (N: 166) | | Treatment Group Repeaters (N: 116) | |
|---------------------|---------------------------|-----|---|-------|--|-------|
| | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 |
| George Bush | .91 | .89 | .92 | .91 | .95 | .95 |
| Wesley Clark | .49 | .61 | .46 | .70** | .68 | .88* |
| Howard Dean | .60 | .70 | .58 | .80** | .78 | .92 |
| John Edwards | .40 | .68 | .38 | .81** | .52 | .91** |
| John Kerry | .53 | .75 | .54 | .86** | .61 | .95** |
| Al Sharpton | .62 | .67 | .64 | .71* | .62 | .67 |

**Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .01$

* Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .05$

The dramatic emergence of Kerry and Edwards as major contenders in the aftermath of the Iowa caucuses is mirrored in the increased opinionation about their personal qualities. In January, Howard Dean and Al Sharpton were the only Democrats about whom a majority of voters had formed any impression. By mid-February, however, the proportion of respondents with opinions of Kerry’s and Edwards’ traits reached nearly three quarters, even in the control group. In both treatment groups, the rate of learning for Edwards was spectacular and exceeded 100 percent in the case those deliberating for the first time. And among our “senior” deliberators, all the Democratic candidates except Al Sharpton were as familiar as President Bush.

Policy Positions

It also helps for voters to have positions on the issues themselves. Thus our final measure of preparedness is the expression of non-DK positions on the policy issues. Table 3 shows the results.¹²

Table 3: T1-T2 Changes in Issue Opinionation

| | Control Group (N: 460) | | Treatment Group New Participants (N: 166) | | Treatment Group Repeaters (N: 116) | |
|--|---------------------------|-----|---|-----|--|-------|
| | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 |
| Percent with Opinion | | | | | | |
| Taxes-Services Scale | .66 | .68 | .68 | .71 | .68 | .78** |
| Defense-Domestic Spending Scale | .62 | .62 | .57 | .61 | .63 | .62 |
| Military Intervention Scale | .72 | .77 | .72 | .79 | .80 | .88** |
| Free Trade- Protectionism Scale | .63 | .60 | .61 | .66 | .66 | .73 |
| Overall Issue Average | .66 | .66 | .65 | .70 | .70 | .75* |

**Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .05$

*Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .06$

Exposure to the online issue discussions did not substantially increase position-taking on the issues among our fresh participants. We should note this is a particularly easy indicator of preparedness. Even in the control group, two-thirds of the participants placed themselves on the policy scales as early as the pretest. Deliberation increased that proportion but not by much. The veteran participants, however, were another story. They expressed significantly more opinions on both taxes and military intervention after deliberation.

¹² In this analysis we have included respondents who placed themselves at the midpoint of each scale as opinionated.

All told, the results suggest that our efforts to replicate face-to-face Deliberative Polling online were successful. Substantial information gain is a signature effect of the Deliberative Poll, and past face-to-face Deliberative Polling in the context of an election campaign has also increased voter awareness of the candidates' positions on the issues (Luskin, Fishkin, Jowell, and Park, 1999).

Our results also suggest that familiarity with the technology does not condition the effects of online deliberation. Our veteran participants began this study with more political information and better-developed opinions on the candidates but were generally affected in the same ways and to the same degree as the fresh participants. Not once did the observed effects differ significantly between the two treatment groups. Even in the case of policy positions, where significant learning occurred only among the veterans, the differences between veteran and novice deliberators proved insignificant. Given the uniformity of effects in the two treatment conditions, we pool across the two for all ensuing analyses.

Effects on Candidate Preference

The opportunity to read balanced, substantive presentations about the candidates, to participate in small group discussions, and to seek clarification from Democratic and Republican experts clearly created more informed and engaged citizens. But information often changes attitudes and preferences in turn. In previous Deliberative Polling, we have frequently found more informed opinion to be significantly different from uninformed opinion -- not on every issue, nor always in the same direction, but about two-thirds of the time. Thus we anticipated that the deliberative treatment would benefit some candidates and penalize others. Other things being equal, the bottom-tier candidates, who generally get short shrift in real-world campaign coverage but were accorded relative parity of exposure in the briefing materials, might be

expected to enjoy higher standing among informed voters. Conversely, the candidates benefiting in the real world from the media's preoccupation with their standing in the horse-race (namely, Kerry and Edwards) might be expected to receive less of a boost among more informed voters. In the remaining analyses, because the focus is directed at evaluations of the Democratic primary field, we excluded Republicans.

Feeling Thermometer Ratings

As indicators of candidate support, we use the NES "feeling thermometers" for Bush and the five Democrats.¹³ As shown in Table 4, President Bush's standing held steady among all three groups. Among the Democrats, Kerry and Edwards both registered meteoric increases in support among our control group participants. Despite the substantial increase in the control group, the Edwards thermometer score increased still more in the treatment condition.¹⁴ The second-tier candidates, Howard Dean and Wesley Clark, both tended to drop in the control group as their real-world campaigns faded, but managed to hold on to most of their support in the treatment group. The more issue-oriented environment may have insulated their standings from the horse race. Finally, Al Sharpton persisted as the least popular candidate despite receiving a significant boost among deliberators.

¹³ The item was presented as follows. Next, we'd like to get your feelings toward the presidential candidates using what is sometimes called a "feeling thermometer." Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the candidates. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable that you don't care too much for that candidate. You would rate the candidate at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold. If you don't know enough to rate a given candidate, just check "can't say."

¹⁴ In the case of Kerry, the significance of the difference was marginally significant ($p < .105$).

Table 4: Thermometer Ratings at T1 and T2

| | Control Group | | Pooled Treatment Group | |
|---------------------|---------------|----------|------------------------|-----------|
| | T1 (N) | T2 (N) | T1 (N) | T2 (N) |
| John Kerry | 50 (138) | 60 (226) | 48 (104) | 65 (180) |
| John Edwards | 48 (100) | 58 (197) | 46 (78) | 64* (163) |
| Howard Dean | 53 (159) | 44 (193) | 55 (122) | 51 (170) |
| Wesley Clark | 56 (129) | 47 (172) | 55 (103) | 49 (150) |
| Al Sharpton | 27 (153) | 26 (167) | 25 (128) | 31* (147) |

* Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .05$

Thus deliberation did not counter the effects of “momentum.” Instead, the combination of policy information with real-world horse race cues boosted Kerry and Edwards even further. On the other hand, Clark and Dean, who lost ground in the control group, lost less in the treatment group. Overall deliberation seems to have stemmed negative momentum but accelerated positive momentum.

These results suggest that in a campaign environment characterized by frequent dialogue over the issues, John Kerry and John Edwards would likely have emerged as the leading contenders, although Howard Dean and Wesley Clark may have been able to survive for some additional time. But the average thermometer ratings tell us little about which candidate would eventually have gained the nomination, and why? The simplest approach to the “which,” though it misses the “why,” is to contrast the mean post-deliberation difference in preference for Kerry versus Edwards in the control and treatment groups. We can examine the difference in raw thermometer scores and the difference in forecasted votes, defined as 1 (a Kerry vote) if the Kerry thermometer score is strictly greater than the Edwards thermometer score, 0 (undecided) if the scores are equal, and -1 (an Edwards vote) if vice versa. As can be seen, in Table 5, both measures show deliberative preferences as moving slightly toward Edwards. Kerry’s average

edge on the feeling thermometer declines from two-and-a-half degrees to under one degree, and his advantage in forecasted votes drops from 7% to 5%.

Table 5: T2 Contrasts in Preference for Kerry vs. Edwards*

| | Control Group | Treatment Group |
|---|----------------------|------------------------|
| | T2 (N) | T2 (N) |
| Kerry – Edwards Thermometer | 2.52 (192) | .88 (162) |
| Kerry – Edwards Forecasted Vote Choice | .07 (192) | .05 (162) |

*DKs excluded.

A Model of Vote Preference

Further light can be shed on these questions (the “why” as well as the “which”) by estimating a more explicit multivariate model to explain vote preference. We only have the respondents’ already-cast or intended vote choices for a small minority of the control and treatment samples, but we can approximate vote choice by taking the difference between the Kerry and Edwards thermometer scores. The correlation between the thermometer difference and vote choice, for respondents on whom we have the latter, is .60.¹⁵ This, then, is our dependent variable.

On the explanatory side, we might expect the degree of preference for Kerry or Edwards to depend on:

- *The difference in the distances between the voters’ policy positions and their perceptions of Kerry’s and Edwards’.* We reckon the distances by the usual

¹⁵ Respondents who lived in states holding primary elections and who indicated that they intended to vote in the primary, were then asked “Which presidential candidate will you vote for in the primary?”

Euclidian formula, then subtract the distance from Kerry from the distance from Edwards (so that voters who are closer to Kerry receive positive scores and voters who are closer to Edwards receive negative ones, consistent with the scorings of the dependent variables and other regressors). We use the four seven-point policy scales, so that, in this original metric, each distance score runs from 0 to 12, and the difference from -12 to +12. If politics is, in Lasswell's phrase "who gets what," this is what voters should be giving greatest weight.

- *The difference in the candidates' perceived electability.* Media accounts of the primary and caucus results suggested that many Democratic voters were deciding their votes on the basis of which candidate they thought would stand the best chance of defeating President Bush in November. Ideally, therefore, we would have asked for ratings of each candidate's prospects of prevailing in a contest against President Bush. At least we did ask "Who do you think will be elected President in November?" We use the responses to construct a variable scored -1 for answers of Edwards, +1 for answers of Kerry, and 0 for all other answers. This too is a sensible criterion, at least for Democrats, the great majority of whom would prefer any Democratic candidate to Bush. It does little good for the party to nominate one's most preferred candidate if he or she cannot beat Bush in November.
- *The difference in their perceived personality traits.* We averaged the three trait ratings for each candidate—as "intelligent," "sincere," or "think[ing] like me" -- then subtracted the Edwards score from the Kerry score. Empirically, this seems

to be the most powerful influence, in this age of media politics, on vote choice, but normatively it is the least valuable of these voting criteria.

- *Whether the voter resides in the South.* Especially in the control group, where voters are as starved as usual for policy information, we might expect Edwards' Southern origins to help him with Southern voters. Operationally, this is a dummy variable scored 1 for Southerners and 0 otherwise.
- *Whether the voter is a Democrat or Independent.* According to plausible media accounts, Kerry, the more liberal of the two last serious candidates, had relatively greater appeal among Democrats, while Edwards, the more moderate of the two, had relatively greater appeal among independents. This is a dummy variable scored 1 for Democrats and 0 for independents. (Republicans are excluded.)
- *Experimental condition.* We don't expect the deliberative experience to move voters toward or away from either Kerry or Edwards per se. (In fact, we have seen that both Kerry and Edwards gained more-or-less equally among deliberators.) We do, however, expect it to heighten the effect of policy issues on preference for Kerry or Edwards.

We expect all these variables, except the Southern dummy, to have positive effects. The Southern dummy should have a negative effect, with Southerners less inclined to prefer Kerry to Edwards. In the control group, based on what we know about primary voting under normal circumstances, electability and image should dominate policy voting (Bartels, 1988; Williams, et al., 1976; Gopoian, 1982). But we expect the effect of the difference of policy distances to be much greater for respondents in the treatment condition. Without as firm an expectation, we also allow the effects of the traits and electability variables to be different in the treatment condition.

It would be normatively appropriate if deliberation reduced the role of candidate personality in vote choice, but past evidence from models conditioning on information suggests that this is unlikely (Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, and Sullivan, 1990; Pierce, 1993; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk, 1986; Glass, 1985). By and large, these studies suggest that image-related factors dominate all others -- for the well and poorly informed alike. Some even go so far as to suggest that the better informed weigh the candidates' personalities *more* heavily. Overall, these studies fail to show the effects of policy on candidate preference as increasing with information, although Luskin and Globetti (2002) argue that the failure is artifactual and provide results showing the theoretically expected interaction.

Thus we estimate the equation:

$$KE = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 TREAT + \gamma_2 DEM + \gamma_3 SOU + \gamma_4 TRAIT + \gamma_5 ELECT + \gamma_6 POLICY + \gamma_7 TRAIT * TREAT + \gamma_8 ELECT * TREAT + \gamma_9 POLICY * TREAT + u,$$

where KE = the Kerry thermometer rating minus the Edwards feeling thermometer rating, TREAT is a dummy variable scored 1 for members of the treatment group and 0 for members of the control group, DEM is a dummy variable scored 1 for Democrats and 0 for independents, SOU is a dummy variable scored 1 for residents of the South and 0 otherwise, TRAIT is the difference of the respondent's mean rating of Kerry on the three personality traits and his or her mean rating of Edwards on the same traits, POLICY is the Euclidian distance between the respondent's own positions and his or her perceptions of Edwards' positions minus the Euclidian distance between his or her own positions and his or her perceptions of Kerry's positions, ELECT is the electability variable, the γ 's are the coefficients, and u is the usual disturbance or error term.

The coefficients for DEM, SOU, TRAIT, ELECT, and POLICY ($\gamma_2, \gamma_3, \dots \gamma_6$) are those variables' effects in the control group. In the treatment group, we assume DEM's and SOU's

effects to be unchanged (still γ_2 and γ_3), as preliminary estimations suggested, while TRAIT's, ELECT's, and POLICY's effects are $\gamma_4 + \gamma_7$, $\gamma_5 + \gamma_8$, and $\gamma_6 + \gamma_9$, respectively. By the same token, the differences that being in the treatment group makes to TRAIT's, ELECT's, and POLICY's effects are γ_7 , γ_8 , and γ_9 . The effect of the treatment, similarly contingent, is $\gamma_1 + \gamma_7\text{TRAIT} + \gamma_8\text{ELECT} + \gamma_9\text{POLICY}$. In sum, the difference deliberation makes depends on the individual's policy orientations and perceptions of the candidates' personalities and chances of winning in November.

The ordinary least squares estimates are in Table 6. As can be seen, electability and candidate traits have statistically significant effects in the control group, whereas policy proximity does not. The electability and candidate effects are not significantly different in the treatment versus the control group, however, whereas the policy effect is significantly greater. The estimated effects of electability, traits, and policy, respectively, are 8.58, 40.5, and 29.2 in the control group and 8.39, 46.4, and 106.8 in the treatment group. The effect of being a Southerner is significantly negative, as expected, at -5.66, and the effect of being a Democrat significantly positive, also as expected, at 5.20.

Table 6

Explaining the Kerry-Edwards Thermometer Difference

| Variable | Coeff. | Std. Err. | P | E_t | E_e |
|----------------------------|--------|-----------|-------|------------|-----------|
| Constant | -.540 | 2.144 | .801 | — | — |
| Treatment | -1.13 | 2.64 | .270 | See below | — |
| Electability | 8.58 | 2.31 | .000* | 17.2/16.8 | 16.5/16.1 |
| Policy Proximity | 29.2 | 29.0 | .158* | 58.4/213.6 | 6.56/24.0 |
| Candidate Traits | 40.5 | 4.63 | .000* | 81.0/92.8 | 44.9/60.7 |
| Electability*Treatment | -.187 | 3.40 | .956 | — | — |
| Policy Proximity*Treatment | 77.6 | 40.5 | .028* | — | — |
| Candidate Traits*Treatment | 5.91 | 7.28 | .670 | — | — |
| South | -5.66 | 2.18 | .005* | -5.66 | — |
| Democrat | 5.20 | 2.10 | .007* | 5.20 | — |

$N = 340$, Adj. $R^2 = .508$, $F = 39.852$, $p = .000$.

*One-tailed; the entries separated by slash marks are the first differences in the control group to the left of the slash mark and in the treatment group to the right of it.

To get some perspective on these numbers, recall first that the range of the dependent variable, the Kerry – Edwards thermometer difference, is -100 to +100. Next consider the theoretical and effective ranges of the regressors. The theoretical range is from the minimum possible to maximum possible value, for example from -1 to +1 for electability, traits, and policy. The effective range or greatest likely range can be defined in a number of different ways, of which the most familiar, at least in the way it works out in linear, additive models, is from c standard deviations below to c standard deviations above the mean ($c > 0$). Now we can compute the “first differences” (in the expected value of the dependent variable) for either the theoretical or the effective range of each regressor. In a linear, additive model, the choice of c standard deviations above and below the mean as the effective range makes the first differences

divided by the difference between c standard deviations above and below the mean on the dependent variable (equivalent to the familiar standardized regression coefficients). Here the interactions break up that equivalence (see Luskin, 1991). At any rate, Table 6 reports the first differences based on both the theoretical and the effective range (E_t and E_e , respectively). We calculate E_e only for regressors not heavily occupying much of their theoretical range -- thus not for the dummy variables South, Democrat, and Condition.

Our principal reason for reporting E_e as well as E_t is that the theoretical first difference for policy is misleadingly large. It indicates what a change from -1 (maximally distant from Kerry and at the same point on every issue as Edwards) to +1 (the reverse) could be expected to do to the Kerry – Edwards thermometer difference. The estimate is that, in the treatment group, it would move the latter by *more* than its range. That is of course impossible, but the reason for this anomalous estimate is that POLICY does not in fact ever come close to either -1 or +1. Its observed minimum is actually only -.26, its observed maximum only .22. Thus while E_t for the treatment group is 213.6, E_e is only 24.0. ELECT, by contrast, often hits -1 or +1, and TRAIT occasionally does so. Assessing all three of these effects through the lens of E_e , we find the patterns we expect. In the control group, TRAIT's effect towers over any other, followed at some considerable distance by ELECT's. In the treatment group, however, POLICY's effect draws much closer to TRAIT's, moving past ELECT's, although TRAIT's remains the most important.

The E_t for TREAT, too long an expression to fit in its table cell, is $.270 - .187 * \text{ELECT} + 5.91 * \text{TRAIT} + 77.6 * \text{POLICY}$. Its size and sign are thus mostly governed by the size and sign of POLICY. For example, for a participant who sees Kerry and Edwards as equally appealing

(TRAIT = 0) and equally electable (ELECT = 0) but agrees distinctly more with Kerry on policy (Policy = say .2, not far from its largest observed value, though well short of its theoretical maximum) the treatment effect is roughly 15.8 degrees. For an otherwise similar participant who agrees distinctly more with Edwards (TRAIT = ELECT = 0 but POLICY = -.2), the treatment effect is roughly -15.3 degrees. Thus, the effect size for issues among deliberators, as reported in Tables 5-6, is constricted by the relative similarity of Kerry and Edwards on the issues. Had we substituted a relatively “distant” Democrat (i.e. Lieberman) for Edwards, the effect of issue proximity on vote choice would necessarily be enlarged. The effect of the treatment on the forecasted Kerry vs. Lieberman vote, for instance was to boost Kerry’s margin by eight points. In the case of Wes Clark, the effect increased the Kerry margin by sixteen points (both of which were statistically significant). Hence, depending on the issue differences among the candidates, the differences can lead to substantial changes in voting preferences among the deliberators.

Effects on Policy Preferences, Perceptions of Personal Traits, and Assessments of Electability

Online deliberation may also have had indirect effects. We have just seen that it greatly increased the role of policy issues in voters’ decisions. But it may also have affected their views of the candidates’ traits and electability and their sense of policy closeness to Kerry versus Edwards.

Traits of Individual Candidates

Table 7 presents the T1 and T2 mean trait scores for Kerry, Edwards, Dean, Clark, and Sharpton. The scale, again, runs from -2 to +2. In keeping with their thermometer scores, Edwards and Kerry registered spectacular gains; in the treatment group, they moved upward by 20 percent of the scale metric! The lower-level candidates were also rated more favorably among deliberators. In fact, at the posttest, all the Democrats save Dean were significantly more

highly rated in the treatment than in the control group. Even Sharpton’s ratings become less negative.

Table 7: Trait Perceptions at T1 and T2

| | Control Group (N: 298-305) | | Pooled Treatment Group (N: 194-199) | |
|---------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------|--|-----------|
| | T1 | T2 | T1 | T2 |
| John Kerry | .10 | .35 | .15 | .56** |
| John Edwards | .05 | .35 | .07 | .55** |
| Howard Dean | .10 | .07 | .20 | .22 |
| Wesley Clark | .13 | .10 | .17 | .24* |
| Al Sharpton | -.25 | -.21 | -.28 | -.10* |

**Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .01$

*Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .05$

Participants’ Policy Positions

Based on standard “message-based” models of persuasion (as in Zaller, 1992), we expected the participants, with their increased awareness of the candidates’ policy positions, to change their own views in the direction of the candidates’ preferences. Except for Lieberman, the Democratic candidates all agreed on the importance of multilateral over unilateral military intervention, protecting American jobs from outsourcing, cutting back on tax cuts to strengthen social services, and reduced levels of defense spending.¹⁶ The participants can be expected to have moved in those directions. The results are shown in Table 8.

¹⁶ In each case, the scales were scored so that 7 represented the Democratic position (i.e. multilateral intervention) and 1 the Administration position.

Table 8: Changes in Policy Positions at T1 and T2

| | Control Group | | Pooled Treatment Group | |
|--|---------------|---------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| | T1 (N) | T2 (N) | T1 (N) | T2 (N) |
| Unilateral or multilateral intervention | 5.12 (271) | 5.19 (271) | 4.94 (186) | 5.54** (186) |
| Free trade or protect US jobs | 4.76 (248) | 5.00 (248) | 4.71 (175) | 5.08* (175) |
| Increased or decreased defense spending | 4.65 (271) | 4.58 (271) | 4.54 (185) | 4.66 (185) |
| Lower taxes or more domestic services | 4.65 (267) | 4.61 (267) | 4.79 (184) | 4.78 (184) |

**Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .01$

*Treatment group change > control group change, $p < .05$

The most clear-cut case of opinion change occurred on the issue most central to this Deliberative Poll. The Iraq War and the competing perspectives on the appropriate use of military force accounted for two of the five weekly discussions. Trade was also granted a full hour on the agenda, while domestic issues (including tax cuts, healthcare, and government spending) were compressed into a single session. The pattern of results is thus consistent with an exposure-based gradient of opinion change. There is quite a bit of change toward multilateral intervention, some change toward protectionist trade policy, and no change at all on domestic issues. These shifts should also be greater among Democrats than among independents. And on tax cuts and military intervention, at least, that was precisely the pattern.

Kerry – Edwards Differences

The more important questions, however, concern the ingredients of the model of candidate preference. What did deliberation do to the participants' views of Kerry's versus Edwards' personality traits and electability and to their sense of policy proximity to Kerry versus Edwards? Table 9 shows the contrasts between the control and treatment groups on all three.

The effects were small. So, in fact, the main difference that deliberation made was to elevate the role of policy issues in voters' decision calculi.

Table 9: T2 Kerry-Edwards Differences in Traits, Electability, and Issue Proximity

| | Control Group | Treatment Group |
|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|
| | T2 (N) | T2 (N) |
| Viability | .40 (307) | .46 (200) |
| Traits | -.003 (300) | -.004 (192) |
| Issue Proximity | -.002 (298) | -.008 (196) |

Conclusion

Deliberative Polling was originally conceived as a method of public consultation that could help remedy some of the deficiencies of the current presidential nomination process (Fishkin, 1988, 1991) -- chiefly, shortfalls in both representativeness and deliberation. Early contests in two small, atypical states generate the "momentum" that may carry candidates to the nomination precisely when -- and partly because -- public familiarity with the candidates and their positions on policy issues is at a very low point. If Deliberative Polling could supplement conventional polling at the early stages of the campaign, and was taken seriously by the media, the judgments of a representative national sample of informed voters might affect the early evaluation of candidacies by the rest of the public, political notables and the media.

The first American Deliberative Poll on a national basis, the 1996 National Issues Convention, included appearances by several Republican presidential candidates (and Vice President Gore, representing President Clinton), but it focused on the issues rather than on candidate preference (Fishkin and Luskin 1999). While some Deliberative Polls in other countries have focused on electoral choice by the mass public in either general elections or

national referenda, this is the first application of Deliberative Polling to the arena for which it was originally proposed-- presidential primary elections.

Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of deliberation in the context of the primary season. We succeeded in engaging a national random sample in five successive weeks of online deliberation. After only five hours of discussion, the treatment group became significantly more informed, acquired fuller views of the candidates, and evaluated them to a significantly greater extent on the basis of policy issues. Overwhelmed by candidate traits in the low information environment of the real world, policy considerations became far more of a factor in the decision-making of the voters in the treatment group. The deliberations also created a context where "momentum" worked differently. They gave the leading candidates an extra boost, perhaps because our participants thought them likeliest to prevail in November. Yet they also provided the lagging candidates something of a cushion, presumably because the participants acquired a broader portfolio of criteria than just their primary-losing ways with which to assess them. In short, our results confirmed that deliberative and real-world primary vote preferences can diverge, even on the basis of only five one-hour sessions.

It is also worth noting that there are some key differences between this process and the original proposal. First, our posttest survey occurred just before Super Tuesday, after most of the candidates had dropped out or were mounting only token campaigns. The "serious" field had already been winnowed down to just Kerry and Edwards. Hence there was no opportunity to get an informed evaluation of the other candidates during the earlier period when many of them were taken more seriously. This winnowing had the effect of weakening the significant effects of the treatment on learning as well as on vote intention. Deliberators became more informed about Kerry's and Edwards' positions on the issues, but their positions were quite similar, providing

little basis for choice. As we have shown, if one of the serious alternatives had distinctive positions, like Senator Lieberman, deliberation would have produced a greater impact on voting outcomes.

A second crucial difference between our original proposal and this online Deliberative Poll concerned the level of media coverage. As originally envisioned, the Deliberative Poll was to be a large-scale media event with the ambition of reaching a far wider audience than the deliberators themselves. The 1996 National Issues Convention did elicit significant television coverage on PBS (with nine and a half hours of national broadcast programming) and substantial print coverage but did not gauge or report the participants' evaluations of the candidates. This online Deliberative Poll, by contrast, examined the effects of deliberation on candidate evaluations but was not designed to be a media event.

Thus the original thought experiment has yet to occur. Suppose Deliberative Polling about candidate preferences (as well as issues) became a common practice at the very beginning of the primary season, when a number of candidates were viable. And suppose the process became newsworthy to the media as a more valuable method of evaluating the candidates. At that point, primary-season Deliberative Polling could provide informal but invaluable input for an informed and representative public voice at a time when it could make an important difference. Of course, this scenario clearly depends on the spread of Deliberative Polling, a likelihood which we believe is greatly enhanced over the long term by the continued development of the online version employed in this study.

Conventional polls are influential because they are both frequent and widely reported, but until now Deliberative Polling, based on expensive face-to-face events could only be rare. But the online process employed here has the potential for making Deliberative Polling much more

common. The most costly part of the experiment was providing computer access to those who lacked it. But the percentage of the population that is online grows steadily. Someday, computers will be as ubiquitous as telephones, and, just as telephone access transformed the economics of conventional polling by obviating the need for face to face interviews, internet access may transform the economics of Deliberative Polling by facilitating the cost effective, continuing deliberations of a national random sample. If this first venture into the presidential primary process is the first of many, and the ensuing events are timed earlier in the process, the informed and representative views of the public about the candidates can become a factor in early-stage candidate evaluation, giving the rest of the public better cues -- consisting of more representative and better informed preference -- for evaluating candidates about whom they know little.

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Appendix

The following table compares our study participants with control group respondents and a large-scale national sample in terms of basic demographic background. With relatively minor exceptions, our participants do not deviate substantially from the rest of the KN panel, or from the population at large.

| | 2004 Online DP | | 2000 CPS |
|-------------------------|----------------|---------------|------------------|
| | Participants | Control Group | March Supplement |
| <u>Education</u> | | | |
| Some high school | 13.45% | 11.89% | 16.9% |
| High school grad | 28.57% | 32.28% | 32.8% |
| Some college | 28.57% | 27.43% | 19.8% |
| College grad | 18.07% | 16.50% | 23.0% |
| Postgrad work | 11.34% | 11.89% | 7.5% |
| TOTAL | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| N | 238 | 412 | |
| <u>Income</u> | | | |
| <\$25,000 | 23.11% | 25.00% | 30.5% |
| \$25-50,000 | 28.15% | 33.98% | 28.3% |
| \$50-75,000 | 23.95% | 21.12% | 18.2% |
| \$75-100,000 | 15.13% | 12.86% | 10.1% |
| \$100,000 | 9.66% | 7.04% | 12.5% |
| TOTAL | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| N | 238 | 412 | |
| <u>Age</u> | | | |
| 18-24 | 6.72% | 7.28% | 13.2% |
| 25-34 | 21.01% | 15.78% | 18.7% |
| 35-44 | 19.33% | 21.12% | 22.1% |
| 45-54 | 19.75% | 21.60% | 18.3% |
| 55-64 | 22.27% | 16.75% | 11.6% |
| 65-74 | 6.72% | 10.68% | 8.7% |
| 75+ | 4.20% | 6.80% | 7.4% |
| TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100.0% |
| N | 238 | 412 | |
| <u>Race</u> | | | |
| White | 82.35% | 82.77% | 83.3% |
| African American | 9.66% | 6.07% | 11.9% |
| Other | 7.98% | 11.17% | 4.8% |

| | | | | |
|----------------------|---------------|--------|--------|--------|
| | TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100.0% |
| | N | 238 | 412 | |
| <u>Gender</u> | | | | |
| | Male | 55.88% | 49.51% | 48.0% |
| | Female | 44.12% | 50.49% | 52.0% |
| | TOTAL | 100% | 100% | 100.0% |
| | N | 238 | 412 | |